Protection of civilians
– military planning scenarios and implications

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English summary

Protection of civilians has emerged as a principal objective in many contemporary operations. However, protection of civilians is no longer simply about avoiding 'collateral damage' or assisting with the delivery of humanitarian aid. In today's wars amongst the people, military forces are increasingly expected to protect civilians from threats of physical violence that arise from perpetrators who deliberately target them and are responsible for the majority of casualties.

There is, however, a wide range of perpetrators who attack civilians for entirely different reasons and in different ways. This report identifies and describes seven generic scenarios, which seek to capture the range of situations in which military forces may be deployed and expected to protect civilians. The scenarios are meant to help military staffs identify the particular nature of threat facing civilians and the military responses that are most likely to work.

Each generic scenario is described on basis of five parameters that examine different aspects of possible perpetrators: (1) their strategic *rationale* for attacking civilians in the first place; (2) the *types of actor* the perpetrators are likely to be, (3) the *strategies and tactics* they employ, (4) the *capabilities* they are likely to require in doing so, and (5) the *expected outcome* when perpetrators succeed. The first parameter (rationale) is used to categories the scenarios, because it is the perpetrator's motivation that first and foremost will determine the nature of threat to civilians.

The seven military planning scenarios described in this report are:

- GENOCIDE, where perpetrators seek to *exterminate* a certain communal group.
- ETHNIC CLEANSING, where perpetrators seek to *expel* a certain communal group.
- REGIME CRACKDOWN, where regimes use violence to *repress* any resistance.
- POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, where individuals or mobs take *revenge* for past crimes.
- COMMUNAL CONFLICT, where whole communities seek both to *avenge a previous round of violence* and to *deter further retaliation*, as a means of protecting themselves.
- PREDATORY VIOLENCE, where perpetrators *exploit* civilians to survive or for profit.
- INSURGENCY, where insurgents target civilians *as a means* to undermine other actors.

It is argued that the role of military force in protecting civilians is likely to be decisive or important in the majority of situations where civilians are deliberately targeted, albeit the ways in which force can be used with utility will vary greatly. A main finding is that denying freedom of movement for the military units executing violence against civilians on the ground will be the most effective response, because it is the only requirement that perpetrators in all scenarios will be critically dependent on. Another finding is that airpower alone can play a significant role in protecting civilians during REGIME CRACKDOWNS, but largely will be unable to deny perpetrators the ability to attack in other scenarios. Finally, despite the emphasis on civilian security in recent population-centric counterinsurgency doctrines, the potential utility of military force in protecting civilians during classic INSURGENCIES is limited and not necessarily compatible with defeating insurgents. Traditional counterinsurgency approaches will have more utility in terms of protecting civilians against rebel groups who do not have clear political objectives.

Sammendrag

Beskyttelse av sivile har blitt et stadig viktigere mål for militære styrker i dagens operasjoner. Det handler ikke lenger bare om å unngå å skade sivile gjennom egne handlinger eller å hjelpe til med leveringen av nødhjelp til kriserammede områder, slik det tradisjonelt har blitt forstått. I dagens konflikter, der kampene som regel utkjempes blant sivile, forventes det i økende grad at de militære styrkene også skal beskytte sivile fra væpnede aktører som bevisst angriper dem.

Det finnes likevel en rekke aktører som angriper sivile av ulike årsaker og på ulike vis. Med utgangspunkt i den voksende litteraturen på vold mot sivile i krig er det imidlertid mulig å bryte dette spekteret ned i scenarioklasser, som beskriver en rekke situasjoner med grunnleggende fellestrekk der det også kan tenkes at militære styrker kan bli forventet å måtte beskytte sivile.

I denne rapporten identifiseres det syv scenarioklasser, der trusselen mot de sivile vil være fundmanetalt forskjellig og som vil kreve ulike svar og virkemidler. Hvert scenario beskrives med utgangspunkt i fem parametere: (1) angriperens strategiske *rasjonale* for å angripe sivile; (2) hva slags *type aktør* angriperen sannsynligvis vil være; (3) hvilke *strategier og taktikker* angriperen vil ta i bruk; (4) hvilke *kapabiliteter* angriperen vil være avhengige av for å angripe sivile; og (5) hva det *forventede resultatet* vil være om angriperen lykkes. Den første parameteren (rasjonale) brukes til å kategorisere de ulike scenarioklassene, fordi det er angriperens motivasjon som i første omgang vil avgjøre hvilken type trussel de vil utgjøre mot de sivile.

De syv scenarioklassene som blir beskrevet i denne rapporten er:

- GENOCIDE, der angriperne ønsker å *utrydde* en bestemt befolkningsgruppe.
- ETHNIC CLEANSING, der angriperne ønsker å *fordrive* en bestemt befolkningsgruppe.
- REGIME CRACKDOWN, der regimer bruker vold til å *bekjempe* alle trusler mot seg selv.
- POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, der personer og grupper tar *hevn* for tidligere ugjerninger.
- COMMUNAL CONFLICT, der hele befolkningsgrupper angriper hverandre for å *hevne* tidligere angrep og for å *avskrekke* angrep i fremtiden som en måte å beskytte seg selv på.
- PREDATORY VIOLENCE, der angriperne *plyndrer* sivile for å overleve eller tjene på det.
- INSURGENCY, der grupper angriper sivile *som en taktikk* i kampen mot andre aktører.

I denne rapporten vises det at militære styrker vil ha en avgjørende rolle i de fleste situasjoner hvor sivile bevisst blir angrepet, men at måten militærmakt kan brukes på vil variere avhengig av angriperens intensjoner og strategier. Et hovedfunn er at den mest effektive responsen er å svekke bevegelsesfriheten til de militære enhetene som angriper sivile på bakken, fordi dette er noe angripere i alle scenarioene er avhengige av. Et annet funn er at luftmakt alene kan redusere en aktørs evne til å angripe sivile i REGIME CRACKDOWN, men ikke i andre scenarioer der angriperne ikke er like avhengig av konvensjonelle styrker og mye ildkraft. Det vises også at tross vekt-leggingen av de sivile i dagens opprørsbekjempelsesdoktriner, vil nytteverdien av militærmakt være svært begrenset fra et beskyttelsesperspektiv i situasjoner hvor man står overfor et klassisk INSURGENCY. Klassiske opprørsbekjempelsesstrategier vil derimot ha langt større nytte i å beskytte sivile mot opprørsgrupper som ikke har klare politiske målsetninger.

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Preface

This report constitutes one of two parallel publications on the protection of civilians by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in 2014. This particular report outlines seven military planning scenarios, which describe generic situations where military forces may be expected to protect civilians from different types of perpetrators. The other report is a collection of six case-studies of actual perpetrators of violence against civilians (the Lord's Resistance Army, the Taliban, al-Shabaab, tribal war in South-Sudan, and the regimes in Libya and Syria).[1] The purpose of that report is to show how the ideal-typical scenarios described here play out in real conflicts, with their own unique characteristics, actors and contexts.

Both reports are intended as individual academic works on the protection of civilians, but have been written as part of an ongoing Concept, Development and Experimentation (CD&E)-process at FFI. This project has sought to develop a 'Military Planning and Assessment Guide for the Protection of Civilians' for operations across the entire conflict spectrum, which is forthcoming later this year. This work has been undertaken in collaboration with the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) and the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC), with feedback provided by a range of actors – from experts on the topic, to professional military planners, to concept developers at NATO ACT.

The Military and Assessment Guide for the Protection of Civilians will provide guidance and advice for military staffs during the planning and assessment of military operations where protection of civilians is an objective. It is based on NATO's planning phases, but focuses on key steps that will be familiar to most military staff regardless of the organisational framework in which an operation takes place. The guide will be the first of its kind – as a scenario-based guide, which instead of focusing on how military force can be used to protect civilians in general, provides advice on what may and may not work in certain situations on basis of the particular threat facing civilians.

The two reports published now are primarily aimed at an academic audience. They draw on earlier research conducted at FFI.[2] They also represent the cumulative result of extensive research on violence against civilians during the last two years, as well as fieldwork in South Sudan in November 2012, investigating conflict dynamics at a local level. Additionally, another report dealing with operations assessment for the protection of civilians is forthcoming later in 2014.

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[1] Våge, Anders Skeibrok (2014), 'Violence against Civilians: Case-Studies of Perpetrators', FFI-rapport 2014/00520 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment).

[2] Kjeksrud, Stian and Ravndal, Jacob Aasland (2010), 'Protection of Civilians in Practice: Lessons from the UN Mission in the DR Congo', *FFI-rapport 2010/02378*, (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment);
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1   Introduction

Protection of civilians has emerged as a central objective in most of today's military operations. However, protection is no longer simply about avoiding 'collateral damage', respecting the law of armed conflict, and assisting with the delivery of humanitarian aid, as it has traditionally been understood. Today, military forces are increasingly expected to protect civilians from perpetrators who deliberately target them and are responsible for the majority of civilian casualties. Yet, military forces have often failed to protect civilians under imminent threat, which has led to a loss of legitimacy for the operation as a whole. Today, there is general agreement that this failure to protect civilians 'is not simply a function of political will or legal authority; the failure also reflects a lack of thinking about *how* military forces might respond' (Sewall et al., 2010: 7).

Protection of civilians, as an objective for military forces, is not confined to a single type of operation, but may be required in operations across the entire conflict spectrum. Crucially, physical protection of civilians only becomes an objective once a perpetrator has threatened or used violence against civilians in the first place. However, there is a wide range of perpetrators who attack civilians for entirely different reasons and in different ways. This report therefore identifies and describes seven generic scenarios, where the particular nature of threat facing civilians will require different military responses. It takes the perpetrators themselves as the starting point from which to answer the basic question of what military forces can and cannot do to protect civilians in different situations.

The report is divided into three main sections. The next chapter explains the idea of finding the utility of military force to protect civilians, which focuses attention on the perpetrator's use of violence in the first place. This theory has been developed at FFI, combining the work of Rupert Smith on the utility of force in today's wars amongst the people with the particular objective of protecting civilians. The second main section explains the methodology behind the seven scenarios presented in this report, based on five parameters: (1) the possible *rationale* for attacking civilians, (2) the *types of actors* involved, (3) the *strategies and tactics* used, (4) the *capabilities* perpetrators are likely to require in doing so, and (5) the *expected outcome* in terms of civilian suffering if perpetrators succeed. This chapter will be relevant for those with a particular interest in the literature on violence against civilians or scenario-based approaches to military planning.

In the third and final section of this report, the scenarios are described in full detail, with reference to each of the parameters. Additionally, all scenarios end with a discussion of the role that military force can play in protecting civilians. Insights such as these are intended to help military staffs during key planning processes, e.g. when identifying a perpetrator's centre of gravity, critical requirements, particularly valuable targets, or when deciding on the most effective course of action from a protection-perspective.

2   The utility of military force to protect civilians

This chapter explains the idea behind finding the utility of military force to protect civilians – a theory developed at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) to answer the basic question of what military force can and cannot do to protect civilians in different situations. The approach was originally outlined in Beadle (2011), but is refined and summarised in this chapter. It shows how protection of civilians is a relatively new military objective, that it is something military forces can be expected to do in operations across the entire conflict spectrum, and that it is an objective whose criteria for success must be assessed differently from traditional objectives, such as defeating an enemy.

The recent concern for protecting civilians is first and foremost a consequence of changes in the ways in which contemporary wars are fought. The literature on how warfare has changed since the end of the Cold War is vast (e.g. van Creveld, 1991; Metz, 2000; Münkler, 2005; Kaldor, 2007a, 2007b; Kiszely, 2007), but no other work combines the two issues discussed here – the use of force and the role of civilians in war – as thoroughly as General Sir Rupert Smith (2006) in his book *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. His main argument is that the paradigm of industrial warfare, where military force alone could determine the outcome of wars by winning the battle of strengths, has been replaced a new paradigm – 'war amongst the people' – in which military force can only be used to establish 'conditions' where other levers of power can decide the outcome by winning the battle of wills instead.

War amongst the people is both a graphic and conceptual description of the new reality in which both civilians and military commanders find themselves:

> It is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force (Smith 2006: 3-4).

The purpose of Smith's book is to show how Western military forces have repeatedly failed to find utility in today's wars amongst the people. The 'utility of force' concerns 'how to use armed force to achieve a desired and stable political outcome' (Gow, 2006). Above all, Smith has advocated for a return to the essential question of strategy and the balancing of ends, ways and means in determining what role military forces can have in modern war.

Based on his own experiences, Smith has identified 'only four things' that military force can do in today's wars amongst the people:

1. **Ameliorate.** Amelioration does not involve the use of military force, except in self-defence. Instead, military forces 'deliver aid, put up camps, provide communications, build bridges and all other such constructive activities in aid of civilian life' (Smith 2006: 320). Military observers can also perform an ameliorating function by virtue of their presence and by reporting what is going on to the outside world.

2. **Contain.** Containment involves limited use of military force to 'prevent something from spreading or passing through a barrier' (Smith, 2006: 320). This typically includes enforcing arms embargoes or no-fly zones to prevent certain weapons from being used. Force is only used in self-defence and to enforce the exclusion zone or barrier.

3. **Deter** or **coerce.** This involves wider use of force 'to pose a threat to some party or carry out a threat against a party, to change or form that party's intentions' (Smith, 2006: 321). To deter, military forces deploy in a threatening posture and prepare to take active measures, which becomes coercion when force is actually employed to change the opposing party's will.

4. **Destroy.** Destruction involves direct attacks on the enemy's force 'in order to destroy its ability to prevent the achievement of the political purpose' (Smith, 2006: 321). Imposing one's own will on the enemy by destroying his capabilities is what traditionally has been regarded as the primary purpose of military forces.

Smith explains the recurring failures to find utility of force in the 1990s, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, with a 'deep and abiding confusion between deploying a force and employing force' in the past (Smith, 2006: 4). For instance, in Bosnia, the international community tried to 'ameliorate' (through observers and the delivery of humanitarian relief) and 'contain' (through arms embargos and no-fly zones) a situation where the threat to civilians could only be lowered by 'coercing' the Bosnian Serbs into lifting the siege of Sarajevo and negotiating an end to the conflict. In order to find utility of force in today's wars amongst the people, one must therefore identify which of the functions of force that are most likely to establish the conditions required to achieve the desired end state.

Protection of civilians is likely to be one such condition in *any* of today's wars amongst the people, because it is regarded as a pre-requisite for achieving other objective, as well as an end in itself for moral reasons. Military forces are nearly always expected, and often mandated, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. When military force is deployed or employed in such a way that it successfully lowers this threat of physical violence, what can be referred to as the 'utility of military force to protect civilians' has been found (Beadle, 2011).

The criteria for assessing the utility of military force to protect civilians are different from assessing the utility of military force in defeating armed actors, establishing democracy or conquering new territory. On the one hand, the use of force must be able to reduce the threat of physical violence posed by a perpetrator to a lower level than it currently is. At the same time, the use of force must not endanger more people than it protects in the process. This principle of 'do no harm' is derived from medical ethics, and holds that it may be better *not to do something*, or even to do *nothing at all*, than to risk causing more harm than good.

Neither of these criteria, however, can be assessed without prior knowledge of how a perpetrator targets civilians in the first place – because only then will one know the level of threat that must be reduced and what would happen if no action is taken. Yet, there are enormous variations in

terms of how much and in what ways violence is used against civilians. The only thing *all* perpetrators have in common is that they believe they will gain something by attacking civilians.

Based on the Smith's functions of force, Beadle (2011) outlines four possible ways in which perpetrators can use violence against civilians to serve their objectives:

1. **Impair.** Impairment is the opposite of Smith's 'amelioration', as it is about cultivating rather than reducing a sense of insecurity within the population that threatens normal civilian life. The presence of armed actors may impair civilian security, even though they are not physically targeted. E.g. civilians will risk being caught in the crossfire or being used as human shields during fighting between armed actors.

2. **Incite.** Incitement is the opposite of Smith's 'containment', as perpetrators use violence to spread insecurity into areas where it does not already exist. Insurgents and terrorists rely on indiscriminate attacks (e.g. suicide attacks) to challenge a government in this way.

3. **Deter** or **coerce.** Intimidation and threats are commonly used by armed actors to 'deter' civilians from collaborating with the enemy in areas under their control. Actual violence and particular brutality may also be used to 'coerce' groups of civilians into altering their behaviour, e.g. to flee an area or comply with the perpetrator's wishes.

4. **Destroy.** Violence is only used to destroy civilians when physical extermination is the objective, such as during mass killings. It may also be used against civilian property, e.g. by burning homes, destroying crops, or razing religious buildings.

These functions of violence against civilians must be distinguished from an armed actor's use of military force against other armed actors. For instance, whilst insurgents may use guerrilla warfare as a strategy to 'coerce' governments into making political concessions, their use of force against civilians may only be meant to 'incite' insecurity in areas under government control and 'deter' cooperation elsewhere. By contrast, genocidaires will try to 'destroy' a certain group of people, whilst they may only seek to 'impair' the safety of local peacekeepers to prompt their withdrawal.

Separating the perpetrator's use of force against civilians from that which he uses against armed actors is different from how military operations are normally assessed today. Traditional military theory tends to emphasise two *warring* parties. According to military theory on coercion, the will and capability of an adversary is assessed against *one's own* will and capability in order to determine how they may most effectively be compelled to do our will (Johnson et al., 2002). However, such an approach fails to consider the same actor's will or capabilities to *attack civilians* and whose primary objective may be to expel a group rather than fight an intervening force. Furthermore, the operational requirements that the actor requires to attack civilians may be entirely different from those needed to resist another armed force. Clausewitz's famous dictum that the enemy's power is the sum of all his available means and the strength of his will still rings true, but it will have to be assessed differently if protection is the objective for the use of force.

In order for military force to be used in ways that reduce the threat to civilians, without causing more harm than otherwise would occur, the functions of one's own use of force must in theory match the perpetrator's use of violence *against civilians* (Beadle, 2011). Only then will the use of force be able to challenge the perpetrator's willingness to attack civilians, and identify 'against what' military force can be used to degrade his ability.

For example, there is little point in trying to 'ameliorate' or 'contain' a situation when the perpetrator has decided to 'destroy' or 'coerce' a certain group of civilians. Doing so will not match the perpetrator's ability or willingness to attack civilians. By contrast, one is likely to cause more harm than otherwise would occur if one seeks to 'destroy' or 'coerce' perpetrators who only seek to 'incite' the general security situation for civilians. It is conceptually flawed, from a protection-perspective, to try to force a perpetrator into stopping his attacks on civilians when this is not his primary intention in the first place. The threat to civilians posed by these actors is unlikely to diminish until they are completely defeated or politically accommodated, because they attack civilians merely as a tactic and can largely attack anywhere, at any time, and still achieve the intended effect. Instead, the potential utility of military force in these situations may be limited to 'containing' the situation to curtail the most deadly attacks, whilst other instruments of power are needed to permanently reduce the threat posed by such actors. How military force can and cannot be used to match the perpetrator's intention and ability to attack civilians is described for each scenario in chapter 4.

In reality, there is a wide range of armed actors who target civilians for different purposes and in different ways in operations where military forces can be expected to protect civilians. How the utility of military force to protect can be found in each case will depend on the particular type of perpetrator one is faced with. Hence, there is a need to systematically break down the range of perpetrators into a set of categories that can be used to tailor appropriate military responses. Only then will it be possible to identify military implications for each situation.

3   Methodology

This chapter explains the methodology behind the identification of the seven generic scenarios described later in this report. Five parameters have been used to describe each scenario: (1) the *rationale* perpetrators may have for targeting civilians, (2) the *types of actors* usually responsible, (3) the *strategies and tactics* used, (4) the *capabilities* they are likely to require, and (5) the *expected outcome* if they succeed. These parameters have been selected because they represent the most commonly discussed aspects of perpetrators of violence against civilians today.

Scenarios provide a useful way of reducing some of the uncertainty and complexity that inevitably surrounds a relatively new military task, such as protecting civilians. A potential weakness is that scenarios are often based on various contingencies that never materialise, and planners may never know how well their planned response would have worked. However, violence against civilians has always been widespread and defines contemporary warfare. Hence, it is possible to identify realistic military planning scenarios for the protection of civilians based on the growing literature on the motivations and methods of violence against civilians.

A morphological analysis to discern scenarios on basis of all parameter values was attempted, but this proved unworkable due to the number of possible combinations. Instead, the scenarios described in this report have been categorised on basis of the first parameter (the rationale for targeting civilians). This is because a better understanding of the perpetrators of violence, especially their motivations, has been a principal recommendation in order to improve the planning and execution of operations where protection of civilians is an objective (Sewall et al., 2010; Beadle, 2011; Kelly, 2011; Mahony, 2013).

The chapter will therefore begin with a description of the whole possible spectrum of violence against civilians. The second part of the chapter investigates each parameter in turn. A breakdown of possible perpetrator rationales leads to the initial identification of seven generic scenarios, where the threat to civilians will differ fundamentally. Next, the four remaining parameters (actor types, strategies and tactics, capabilities, and expected outcomes) are discussed with reference to how they may be defined and combined with different rationales. How these different parameters may be combined for each scenario is described in the next chapter, together with the military implications. This section only describes the possible values each parameter may have, based on a review of key aspects treated in the literature on violence against civilians.

3.1   The spectrum of violence against civilians

Much of the literature on violence against civilians has come in response to the assumption that such violence 'is irrational, driven by sadism or the frenzy of battle' (Valentino et al., 2004: 376). To the contrary, many scholars have shown that there can be rational motives behind even the most heinous atrocities against unarmed civilians (some of the most notable works are Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Valentino, 2004; Kalyvas, 2004, 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Downes, 2008; Hultman, 2009; Boyle, 2010; Wood, 2010).

Violence against civilians is often systematic and part of a deliberate policy, which assumes a certain level of rationality on the part of perpetrators. Part of the reason why it *must* be rational is that there are significant costs associated with targeting civilians in the first place. The perpetrator loses legitimacy, it fosters resistance, it draws outside attention, such as criminal indictment or military intervention, and is often simply ineffective (e.g. Pape, 1996; Horowitz and Reiter, 2001; Carr, 2002; Arreguin-Toft, 2003). Yet, perpetrators continue to target civilians deliberately in many conflicts, which suggests that the benefits may outweigh these costs. On the whole, the literature suggests that there can be many different logics to the systematic use of violence against civilians and it may take on different forms, but it is hardly ever irrational or random.

One of the more general works on violence against civilians is Hugo Slim's *Killing Civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War* (2007). He argues that those who target civilians can be located along a spectrum from anti-civilian to pro-civilian thinking. Those who are pro-civilian do their best to avoid killing civilians, or do so only by accident. Amongst those perpetrators who *do* target civilians deliberately, there are two main categories – those who completely reject the idea of sparing anyone associated with the enemy, and those who temporarily suspend their non-combatant status because the end justifies the violent means. These two categories are based on entirely opposing logics and thereby provide two extremes at each end of a possible spectrum of violence against civilians.

At one end of the spectrum, there are perpetrators who view violence towards civilians primarily as *an end in itself* ('ends-based'). These perpetrators are absolutely dependent on the use of violence against civilians to achieve their objectives. A classic example might be genocidaires who *must* kill the members of a certain group to achieve their goal of extermination, or ethnic cleansers who *must* use violence to forcible displace civilians. These objectives are highly unlikely to be achieved *without* the use of violence. Thus, these actors will have a strategic incentive to maximise violence, since every person killed or displaced takes them one a step closer to their desired end state.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are perpetrators who view violence against civilians merely *as a means to an end* ('means-based'). Ideally, these perpetrators would have liked to achieve their goals without harming innocent civilians at all, but resort to such violence to achieve entirely different political or economic goals. A typical example of such actors are insurgents who target civilians to undermine popular trust in the government's ability to protect its people, whilst providing social services aimed at garnering popular support for themselves. Harming civilians is only useful insofar it helps increase one's chances of achieving the overarching objective. Anything beyond that will be counter-productive. Thus, perpetrators in this category have strategic incentives to limit, rather than maximise, their violence against civilians.

In this report, this spectrum between completely 'ends'- or 'means'-based perpetrators is used to capture the range of situations civilians may be targeted for different reasons. The remainder of this chapter will seek to break down this spectrum into more specific rationales and features.

3.2 Parameters

In the following, seven scenarios will be identified on basis of five parameters, which are used to distinguish between generic types of physical threats civilians may be under.

The five parameters are:

(1) **Rationale**, i.e. why the perpetrators target civilians;
(2) **Actor types**, i.e. what types of organised armed actor the perpetrators are likely to be;
(3) **Strategies and tactics**, i.e. how the perpetrators operationalise the violence;
(4) **Capabilities**, i.e. what perpetrators may require to implement the violence;
(5) **Expected outcome**, i.e. the result if perpetrators largely succeed, measured in terms of people killed, displaced or harmed in other ways.

3.2.1 Rationale

The first parameter looks at why some actors decide to target civilians in the first place. We are less concerned with the underlying causes and different explanations for the outbreak of violence, which is what much of literature on civil wars focuses on (see e.g. Chenoweth and Lawrence, 2010). Here, we are more interested in what kind of violence it actually involves on the ground, as this is what matters for individual military staff deployed to a particular conflict. In all military planning, the analysis of an enemy always begins with an assessment of his objectives.

Below, the most common rationales identified in the literature on violence against civilians are arranged in five categories, which provide the initial range of possible scenarios. These are:

- **Extermination.** The most basic rationale a perpetrator may have for targeting civilians is to exterminate them. This is the primary objective during 'genocide', which include acts committed 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group' (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: Article 2). Since the Holocaust, much scholarly attention has been given to debating what exactly constitutes genocide and explaining why or how it occurs (e.g. Krain, 1997; Stanton, 1998; Valentino, 2004). Whilst the intention to kill is what matters from a legal perspective, the focus here is on what extermination means on the ground. What matters for a military commander is that an actor has decided to kill the members of a particular group within the area of operations, which is qualitatively different from all other situations. Situations like these are treated in the first scenario – 'GENOCIDE'.

- **Expulsion.** A far more common, but less deadly, situation occurs when a perpetrator seeks to expel civilians from a specific territory. Large-scale, systematic expulsion of a population is referred to as 'ethnic cleansing', where force or intimidation is used to render an area homogenous. Ethnic cleansing typically results from grand nationalist projects, ethnonationalism, or 'military necessity' (e.g. Jackson-Preece, 1998; Mann, 2005; Mulaj, 2008). This form of violence characterised the violent breakups of Yugoslavia and many Soviet states with the end of the Cold War. Ethnic cleansing is also

used to describe the forced expulsion of groups on a sectarian, religious or other basis. What matters is that that perpetrators seek to expel (rather than exterminate) a certain group. Situations like these are described in a second scenario – 'ETHNIC CLEANSING'.

- **Control.** Another common rationale is the need to control a population. This is common during civil wars where two or more parties are fighting each other over political power, which characterised many of the wars for independence and ideological conflicts during the Cold War. Kalyvas (1999, 2006) in particular has pointed out that violence against civilians in these circumstances follows its own logic. Aside from using force to defeat each other, parties use violence to enforce the compliance of a civilian population and to prevent them from supporting the other side. Civilians are therefore likely to be targeted by both sides, but usually more by one side than the other. Studies have shown that if a government deliberately targets its own population, insurgents will be less inclined to do so, since the government will already have jeopardised its role as a credible guarantor of security (Hultman, 2008). By contrast, insurgents are usually the main perpetrators when fighting democratic states, because these governments are less likely to target their own citizens and more susceptible to criticism if they are not able to protect them (Hultman, 2008). Situations where governments and insurgents are the main perpetrators are therefore treated in separate scenarios – 'REGIME CRACKDOWN' and 'INSURGENCY'.

- **Exploitation.** Not all actors, however, attack civilians in order to obtain political power or territorial control. Especially since the end of the Cold War, scholars have observed a notable absence of political programmes, disintegrating lines of command, and ferocious attacks against civilians perpetrated by rebel groups (Keen, 1998, 2000). At minimum, actors may simply act in a predatory manner against civilians to ensure their own survival, which is the pre-requisite for following other objectives (Vinci, 2006). Times of war also enable activities that otherwise would have not have been possible, such as exporting natural resources, which provides economic opportunities for those motivated by the prospects of short-term benefits (Keen, 2000). The so-called 'greed'-thesis holds that the eruption of civil war is driven by economic opportunities (most notably Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier 2000). Perpetrators primarily driven to attack civilians by their own survival or desire for profits are treated in the scenario 'PREDATORY VIOLENCE'.

- **Revenge.** Most post-conflict environments are likely to experience a spate of violent retribution, as former victims feel entitled to avenge earlier atrocities through equally atrocious, but seemingly just, acts of violence against those associated with the previous perpetrators. The primary motivation is to settle scores on a personal tit-for-tat basis, whereby targets are selected on basis of past culpability rather than ethnic or religious identity per se. Once revenge is taken, this rationale ceases to exist. This particular kind of violence has received only limited scholarly attention in conflict studies (see Boyle, 2009), yet the fact that it tends to occur simultaneously in immediate post-conflict environments makes it a likely objective for military forces in the area. This situation is described in the scenario called 'POST-CONFLICT REVENGE'.

Sometimes, however, revenge is neither settled nor replaced by any of the above purposes, but continues to be a motivation for both sides as the roles of perpetrator and victim constantly change during cycles of violence. This tends to happen during conflicts between whole communities who are driven to continue attacking the other, because *not* taking revenge may signal weakness and invite further attacks. This characterises many conflicts in rural areas of Africa, as well ethnic or sectarian conflicts in more urban environments. Situations where revenge continues to be the primary motivations for both sides are treated in 'COMMUNAL CONFLICT'.

There are of course other rationales that motivate perpetrators. Until the abolishment of slave trade, civilians were often captured for purposes of trading them. Some particularly powerful men, like Genghis Khan, have had an 'extraordinary sense of their own right to power and domination' (Slim, 2007: 137), which they subsequently exercised through absolute and violent subjugation of others for little purpose beyond its own immediate value. For individual fighters, it may be to gain respect amongst their comrades, or fear of being killed themselves if they refuse. Neither will any perpetrators be averse to accepting the spoils of war (e.g. goods, land, or cattle), even tribes do (Keeley, 1996: 112). That said, in order for violence to become systematic and widespread enough to prompt a military response, it is likely to fall into one of the categories of perpetrator motivations listed above.

In most conflicts, there are likely to be multiple 'layers' of scenarios unfolding simultaneously, in layers, in different areas or at different times, especially as conflicts drag on. The main point is that the threat to civilians must always be understood on basis of the particular rationale perpetrators have for targeting civilians in a specific area or phase of conflict.

3.2.2 Actor types

The second parameter looks at how a perpetrator may be organised. Certain types of actors are more likely to be associated with certain rationales, and thereby also particular scenarios. Whilst many academic studies are limited to violence perpetrated by a particular type of actor (e.g. states or rebel groups), a military operation tasked with protecting civilians will have to consider the full range of actors, since civilians may be killed by any one of these.

Based on the literature, it is possible to identify four main types of perpetrators:

- **States** will usually be the responsible actors in the three most violent scenarios (GENOCIDE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, and REGIME CRACKDOWN). This is because only states are likely to possess the resources required to conduct large-scale operations needed to exterminate, expel or control a whole population. Statistically, governments have been responsible for the majority of mass killings since 1945, usually when fighting non-state actors using guerrilla warfare (Valentino et al., 2004). Since the Cold War, rebel groups have killed more civilians than governments have in total, but governments have killed most during those years (1994, 1997, 1998, 2004) they have resorted to mass killings (Eck and Hultman, 2007).

Certain forms of government, however, are more associated with particular scenarios. For instance, regimes newly embarked upon democratisation are more likely to commit ethnic cleansing than stable authoritarian regimes, because they are more vulnerable to ethnic nationalism (Mann, 2005). By contrast, authoritarian regimes tend to divide and rule minorities in order to stay in power themselves, but are simultaneously more likely to respond with violence to any threats against its own survival (Mason and Krane, 1989), and somewhat more likely to resort to mass killings than democratic states (Valentino et al., 2004: 394). A totalitarian or authoritarian government is also associated with an increased probability of genocide (Fein, 1993; Harff, 2003).

- **Rebel groups** are the most organised form of non-state armed groups. Their use of violence against civilians, however, will vary considerably. Rebels are generally more violent to civilians when they are fighting democratic governments or losing on the battlefield (Hultman, 2008). The structural organisation of rebel groups is also said to determine the degree of violence (see Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006). Weinstein (2007) distinguishes between 'opportunistic rebels', who are motivated by greed rather than any overarching ideology, attract less committed recruits, and perpetrate more atrocities against civilians – and 'activist rebels', who have a common cause, are mobilised through social bonds, and tend to limit their violence against civilians upon which they are likely to depend. The latter rebels are more in line with how insurgents have traditionally been defined (as movements aiming to overthrow a constituted government through subversion and armed conflict). Comparatively weaker insurgents with less capacity to mobilise support, entice loyalty from the population or mix violence with other incentives, are more likely to target civilians than comparatively stronger groups. Even if they are met with escalating violence from the state, stronger groups employ comparatively less violence against civilians (Wood, 2010). These two main types of rebel perpetrators are treated in two separate scenarios – PREDATORY VIOLENCE and INSURGENCY respectively.

- **Communities** are defined as non-state groups organised along a shared communal identity (Brosché and Elfversson, 2012). Communities have generally limited military and organisational means at their disposal, and can therefore rarely decisively determine the outcome of a conflict. This is precisely why wars between communities often end up as continuing cycles of violence (COMMUNAL CONFLICT).

- **Individuals or loosely organised groups** make up the final and least organised category of possible perpetrators. They are the only type of actors that conduct revenge purely on a personal basis (POST-CONFLICT REVENGE). Other, more organised actors may also be driven by revenge as well, but it will then serve a greater strategic purpose and will be aimed at groups rather individuals.

There will of course be several 'layers' of each actor involved, such as a radical, charismatic or powerful leader or elites running the show from above; executing units, e.g. militants forming violent paramilitaries or regular armed forces on the ground; and core constituencies providing

popular support (Mann, 2005 : 8). What matters for an intervening military force, however, is which of these layers are primarily responsible for ordering or executing violence on the ground.

3.2.3   Strategies and tactics

The third parameter looks at which strategies and tactics perpetrators will employ against civilians. This matters because it says something about how civilians will be attacked and how this violence is meant to serve the perpetrator's overall objectives. What makes some armed actors 'perpetrators' according to international humanitarian law is that they commit 'war crimes'. War crimes are defined as serious violations of the customs and laws applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts. When committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian population, these acts are considered 'crimes against humanity'.

Violent acts against civilians considered to be war crimes include, but are not limited to:[3]

- Murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, or torture
- Sexual violence, like rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution or enforced pregnancy
- Displacement of civilians for reasons other than their security or military necessity
- Indiscriminate attacks resulting in death or injury to civilians, or launching attacks in the knowledge that it will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or damage
- Pillage, slavery, taking hostages, using prohibited weapons or civilians as human shields
- Conscripting or enlisting children into armed forces or groups, or using them in hostilities
- Attacks on religious or cultural objects, provided they are not military objectives
- Attacks on personnel or objects involved in a humanitarian assistance
- Attacks on civilian homes, undefended localities and demilitarised zones

The four different ways in which perpetrators can utilise violence against civilians to serve their goals described in chapter 2 (impairment, incitement, deterrence or coercion, and destruction) determine which of the above war crimes may serve a strategic purpose in different scenarios. For instance, violence will have to be used in ways that physically 'destroys' people in the GENOCIDE-scenario (e.g. mass murder, enforced pregnancy). Destruction may also feature as part of the perpetrator's strategy during occasional mass killings or demolition of villages, or on a much more limited scale during POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, where killing a person is often an end in itself. In most of the scenarios, however, perpetrators will rely on violence to 'coerce' civilians in various ways. In ETHNIC CLEANSING, strategies be designed to force a certain group of civilians to flee (massacre, rape, razing villages). In COMMUNAL CONFLICT, the limited means available to both communities means that neither side is likely to have the ability to decisively 'destroy' or 'deter' the other. Instead, communities try to inflict as much damage as possible when they can (e.g. isolated massacres, burning homes or crops), hoping that their retaliation will 'coerce' the other into stopping. In PREDATORY VIOLENCE, rebels rely on brutality to 'coerce' people at large into compliance (e.g. mutilation, forcible recruitment).

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[3] This list of war crimes is based the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s Customary IHL database. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156

In REGIME CRACKDOWN and INSURGENCY, where control over civilians is the purpose for which they are targeted, perpetrators will have to rely on more mixed uses of force. Kalyvas (2006) argues that there are two ways to enforce compliance from populations through violence. Violence can be used selectively, whereby civilians are targeted on a personal basis to 'deter' them from collaborating with the enemy (e.g. arrested or assassinated). However, this usually requires access to information about who is guilty (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2007; Steele, 2009; Bhavnani, 2011), which in turn relies on having a degree of control already. Civilians are unlikely to collaborate if they cannot be provided with a guarantee against retaliation from the other side. Without information, violence will be used more indiscriminately, whereby civilians are targeted on a more collective basis to 'coerce' them into compliance by force alone (e.g. collective punishment), or to 'incite' their insecurity in areas under complete enemy control to deny the other party information and support (e.g. suicide bombings, aerial bombardment, mortar fire). In areas under their own complete control, only the threat of violence is required (e.g. omnipresent security apparatus) to 'impair' the security of civilians. More details of the perpetrators' strategies and tactics are found in the scenario-descriptions.

3.2.4 Capabilities

All actors who use violence against civilians will also need to fulfil certain requirements to successfully implement their strategies on the ground. The fourth parameter looks at what 'capabilities' perpetrators may require to conduct the intended violence. Studying the operational requirements of perpetrators is relatively uncharted territory as far as the literature goes. There are several books that detail the preparations and operationalisation of perpetrators in specific conflicts (e.g. Gow, 2003 on the Serbian strategy in former Yugoslavia; or Melvern, 2006 on the Rwandan genocide), but no studies appear to look systematically at potential capabilities required by perpetrators in general.

This matters to an intervening force, as it taps directly into the process of identifying targets that – if degraded, denied or destroyed – can have a positive effect on the achievement of the mission's objective (to protect civilians). If a capability is critical for attacking civilians, denying the perpetrator that capability will reduce the threat. There are five main categories of 'capabilities' perpetrators may require:

- **Advance planning** is a likely requirement for actors who need to initiate systematic and widespread violence against civilians, often within a short period of time. History has shown that 'very few conflicts in which very large numbers of civilian losses were *not* attributable to intentional policies of mass killing' (Valentino et al., 2004: fn. 5, 377. My emphasis). To what extent does a 'master-plan' outlining the violence against civilians exist? How dependent are perpetrators on planning for each attack? There is little military force can do to deny perpetrators the ability to plan for their violence – other than to plan for an appropriate response. What will be 'appropriate', however, ultimately hinges on understanding what the perpetrator plans to do.

- **Top-down coordination** of the violence is another potentially critical requirement. The legal definition of 'crimes against humanity' requires violence to be widespread,

systematic and part of a government policy, or tolerated or condoned by the government or a *de facto* authority. Thus, human rights organisations seek to determine whether there is a coordinated policy of abuses directed from above in their reporting of events. Coordination of violence is a direct result of the workings of the political and military leadership, which is why command and control (C2)-nodes are common targets in military campaigns. In most of the scenarios outlined here, there will be an identifiable leadership responsible for organising the violence. The role played by political and military leaders in instigating violence has been emphasised (e.g. Oberschall, 2000), particularly in explaining the occurrence of mass killings (Valentino, 2004). But to what extent does violence depend on top-down coordination in different situations? In which cases will eliminating the leadership, as has been identified as an effective strategy to defeat enemies (e.g. Johnston, 2012) also lead to a decline in violence against civilians?

- **Ambiguity** concerns the ability of perpetrators to maintain the support required from those units needed to execute the violence (e.g. members of the armed forces, ethnic groups), whilst concealing their criminal actions from those who may stop them (e.g. moderate politicians, the international community). This is perhaps a unique requirement for perpetrators of violence against civilians, as it constitutes such an obvious breach of legal conventions that all armed actors are bound by. Operational secrecy may also be required to avoid detection, being caught red-handed, or allowing prospective victims escape. At the same time, leaders cannot implement violence alone. They must tap into prejudices and beliefs of the units expected to carry out the violence and those whose popular support is needed. This is why large-scale atrocities generally require the construction of a moral, legal and institutional framework in which they can take place, often by portraying oneself as the victim (Cigar, 1995). Failure to maintain a sufficient degree of ambiguity may lead the perpetrators to crumble from within, or the armed forces may simply refuse to fire. The question is in what situations perpetrators will be most dependent on this capability. Insurgents often go to great lengths to explain *why* they target civilians, whilst those coordinating mass atrocities tend use euphemisms and destroy any evidence afterwards (e.g. by incinerating bodies, moving mass-graves).

- **Freedom of movement** for the units executing the violence on the ground is critical for perpetrators in all of the scenarios. Freedom of movement is understood as both having the means to move forces from one place to another (mobility) and the ability to do so unimpeded (at low risks from enemy attacks). Both of these can be countered, either by destroying the infrastructure needed to travel (like the bridges that were bombed in Kosovo), or attacking units on the move (as in Libya). The type of freedom of movement required by the perpetrators to reach their intended targets, however, will vary. In general, perpetrators will either need it to concentrate firepower against strategically important population centres, or be able to strike at a specific time or place of their choosing.

- **Relevant military units and weaponry** is the final requirement that perpetrators may be critically dependent on. Depending on the perpetrators' strategies and tactics, they will need different types of units and weapons. Typical executioners of violence include

'regular armed forces', involving heavy weaponry and organised elements; 'interior security forces', involving smaller, special military or police units under state control; 'irregular forces', such as rebel groups, paramilitaries, militias or death squads, which may or may not be sanctioned by the state; and 'individuals or loosely organised groups', which are not part of any formal structure. Certain types of weapons will also be more relevant than others, depending on destructive or psychological effect required in each scenario. Studies have found a link between the number of civilian deaths in today's conflicts and the availability of light weapons, e.g. automatic rifles, grenades, rocket launchers, and small mortars (Laurence, 1998). In fact, the timing of mass killing campaigns may coincide with the availability of additional or more deadly weapons.

All of these potential requirements must be viewed in conjunction with each other. For example, an actor may possess all necessary military units and weapons needed to conduct genocide, but if coordination of these forces is unattainable, or they refuse to fire, genocide will not occur. There are of course other operational requirements that armed actors are likely to rely on – like logistics, communication, training, and funding – but these are these are not directly linked to a perpetrator's ability to attack civilians, which is what this parameter seeks to highlight. The different combinations of requirements are listed for perpetrators in each scenario.

3.2.5   Expected outcome

A final parameter is the 'expected outcome' in each scenario, which describes what happens if a perpetrators largely succeeds. The outcome can be measured in terms of people killed, displaced or harmed in other ways, based on previous conflicts where similar situations have taken place. Although exact figures always are disputed, the *relative distribution* of killed, displaced, arrested or abducted can be identified with much greater certainty. Each of these outcomes may also vary in nature. E.g. a basic distinction can be made between those who flee from a particular perpetrator, and those who flee the presence of violence. These qualitative assessments will illustrate what military staffs can expect in different scenarios.

Where possible, figures are provided to show how many percentage of the victim population is harmed in a particular way. E.g., only in one of the scenarios (GENOCIDE) can the majority of victims be expected to die (est. +50%). By contrast, only a few percentages may be killed during ETHNIC CLEANSING, whilst the vast majority of victims (~90%) have often been displaced. Such estimates can be used to assess the degree to which one's own operations are having a protective effect. Both the qualitative and quantitative expected outcomes draw on reports from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED), the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Worldwide Atrocities-dataset, and several in-depth case-studies of past conflicts that fall into distinct scenarios (Våge, 2014; and a forthcoming report on operations assessment and the protection of civilians in 2014).

4 Scenarios

In this main chapter of the report, the seven scenarios identified in the previous chapter are described in more detail. Each scenario describes a situation where civilians are faced with a particular type of physical threat, based on how the parameters are defined in each instance. The scenarios are intended to capture the range of situations where military staffs may have to plan for the protection of civilians from different types of perpetrators. The key characteristics of each scenario are summarised in Table 4.1 (p. 24), and **emphasised in bold** in the descriptions below.

The scenarios are described in descending order, based on where along the spectrum between ends- and means-based they can be placed and the relative level of violence likely to be seen:

- GENOCIDE, where perpetrators seek to *exterminate* a certain communal group
- ETHNIC CLEANSING, where perpetrators seek to *expel* a certain communal group
- REGIME CRACKDOWN, where regimes use violence to *repress* any resistance
- POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, where individuals or mobs take *revenge* for past crimes
- COMMUNAL CONFLICT, where whole communities seek both to *avenge a previous round of violence* and to *deter further retaliation*, as a means of protecting themselves
- PREDATORY VIOLENCE, where perpetrators *exploit* civilians to survive or for profit
- INSURGENCY, where insurgents target civilians *as a means* to undermine other actors

Before describing each of these in more detail, three observations about the use of these scenarios are warranted. First, all of the scenarios are 'generic' in that they are not limited to specific moments in time, locations, or to particular actors. Instead, the scenarios describe common characteristics of situations where civilians are targeted on a similar basis, by certain types of actors and in certain ways. These characteristics are shared across cases that fall into the same scenario. For example, REGIME CRACKDOWN is a generic scenario describing situations where regimes violently repress any opposition, using conventional forces primarily against opposition strongholds, whilst a particular case of this scenario would be the present situation in Syria (2013). In the unique context of a conflict, the perpetrator's particular *modus operandi* will emerge, which in Syria's case would be the regime's exploitation of sectarian divisions, a scorched earth policy, and heavy reliance on both foreign and local militias. Examples of different perpetrators are provided in boxes to illustrate the variety within each scenario, whilst the descriptions of the scenarios themselves are kept as generic as possible.

Second, all of the scenarios describe situations that fall within the definition of 'civil wars', where civilians are normally targeted by several parties at the same time. Studies show, however, that if one side is very violent against civilians, the other may be less. Hence, not all perpetrators are likely to pose an equally large threat to civilians. For example, the Assad-regime is generally reported to have been responsible for the majority of abuses against civilians in Syria (see e.g. Amnesty, 2012; Reuters, 2012; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012, 2013; Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2013). The scenarios can be seen as a way of distinguishing between different levels of threat civilians may be under during civil wars. Similarly, it is important to note that a conflict may experience *several* scenarios during different

phases, in different areas or even simultaneously. In Syria, there are clear indications of COMMUNAL CONFLICT occurring between ethnic and sectarian groups in certain enclaves, whilst the threat from INSURGENCY is the main threat against civilians in Assad-controlled areas. Identifying which of the scenarios represent the greatest and most imminent threat to civilians will help military planners when deciding when, where and for whom resources should be prioritised.

Third and finally, the scenarios apply regardless of whether the operation tasked with protecting civilians is conducted by the UN, NATO, AU, EU, or a coalition, or if no intervention is made at all. As shown elsewhere (Beadle, 2010; Kjeksrud et al., 2011; Lilly, 2012), each of these actors take fundamentally different approaches to the issue of protection, which is reflected in how they operationalise it on the ground. However, the nature of threat facing civilians, which is what the scenarios are based on, will ultimately be decided by the perpetrators who attack them – not the identity of the intervener. The potential utility of military force to protect civilians from a particular type of perpetrator will in theory be the same – although different intervening actors will not have the same ability to fulfil that potential.

Thus, each scenario ends with a discussion of the implications for military forces. What is the role of military force vis-à-vis other instruments of power, and how may military forces be used most effectively to reduce the imminent threat of physical violence against civilians? The implications identified here are drawn from the insights provided by the perpetrator's motivations, strategies and capabilities, as well as lessons from previous operations where protection has previously been attempted in these scenarios. There are relatively few lessons to draw upon, however, because few real attempts have been made. This only underscores the need for theoretical assessments based on the perpetrator's most likely behaviour. Insights such as these can help military staffs during key planning processes, e.g. when identifying a perpetrator's centre of gravity, critical requirements, particularly valuable targets, or when deciding on the most effective course of action from a protection-perspective.

Generic scenario	1. Type of actor	2. Rationale	3. Strategies and tactics	4. Relevant mil. capabilities	5. Expected outcome
GENOCIDE Halabja ('88) Rwanda ('94) Srebrenica ('95)	States, or the militarily superior actor	To exterminate a certain group	Destroy existence of a group through several, simultaneous mass-killings, deportation, camps, systematic rape to prevent reproduction	Command and control, freedom of movement for special/irregular units, sufficient small arms	Majority of targeted civilians killed (50+%), in relatively short time
ETHNIC CLEANSING Bosnia ('92–95) Kosovo ('99) Kyrgyzstan ('10)	States, or the militarily superior actor	To expel a certain group from a specific territory	Force targeted group to leave through threats, demonstrative killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property	Command and control, freedom of movement for irregular units, regular units for military control	Only a few per cent killed, but vast majority of victims expelled (~90%) Destruction of victim homes and cultural buildings
REGIME CRACKDOWN Iraq ('86-89) Darfur ('03–) Libya ('11) Syria ('11–) ISIS ('13–)	Authoritarian regimes, or de facto authorities in an area	To control restless populations, on basis of real or perceived affiliation with opposition	Violently repress the population at large, through selective and indiscriminate violence, threats, mass-detention, rape as terror, massive destruction, occasional massacres	Command and control from regime, freedom of movement for regular forces, heavy weapons, special/irregular units in support	Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting, large-scale displacement, widespread destruction of population centres
POST-CONFLICT REVENGE Kosovo (post-99) Iraq (post-03)	Individuals or mobs	To avenge past crimes on a tit-for-tat basis	Settle personal scores through criminal acts of violence, such as murder, arson, kidnapping, looting	Freedom of movement for individuals and small groups to access victims	Only a few killed (dozens, hundreds), but groups associated with perpetrator may flee after relatively little violence
COMMUNAL CONFLICT Ituri ('99–03) Iraq ('06–07) Jonglei ('09–)	Whole tribal, ethnic or sectarian communities (possibly with outside support)	To avenge the last round of violence and to deter further retribution out of self-defence	Attempts to coerce other community into submission through massacres, abductions, raids, destruction of homes and means of survival, often seeking to maximise violence	Freedom of movement to reach other communities, access to deadlier weapons and means of communication is associated with higher lethality	Relatively high number of people killed and abducted, especially women and children Livelihoods stolen or killed Temporary displacement in homogenous areas, more gradual withdrawal to 'their own' in mixed areas
PREDATORY VIOLENCE Renamo ('75–92) RUF ('91–'02) LRA ('94–)	Rebel groups (predatory behaviour)	To survive or make a profit by exploiting civilians	Coerce civilians into compliance through plunder, taxation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality, especially against 'easy targets'	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, operational secrecy, outside support, possibly central command	Temporary, but large-scale displacement in affected areas and disproportionately many relative to the number of people actually attacked Many abductions, especially of young adolescents
INSURGENCY FARC ('64–) Taliban ('06–) al-Shabaab ('06–)	Rebel groups (classic insurgents with political or ideological objectives)	To control populations upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals	Selective and indiscriminate violence, through threats, targeted killings, bombings, retribution, depending on their level of control	Freedom of movement to pick time and place of attack, access to indiscriminate and explosive weapons	Fewer killed and injured than in other scenarios, most due to indiscriminate weapons Gradual displacement from areas of heavy fighting

Table 4.1   Generic military planning scenarios

4.1 Genocide

Summary

The first and most violent scenario is GENOCIDE, where a whole group of people is singled out for *extermination*. The perpetrators will typically be governments, using both regular and irregular forces, to entrap and kill as many people as possible in a short period of time. The targeted group will be under imminent threat of violence wherever they can be found throughout the entire area of operations. This threat will persist until the genocide is completed or the perpetrators defeated.

4.1.1 Rationale

This scenario describes key characteristics of situations where an actor seeks to **exterminate a certain group of civilians**. This may occur inside or outside the context of an armed conflict, but will typically emerge as a radical solution to what is perceived as an intolerable situation. A segment of the population is blamed in such a way that their death and suffering becomes 'an outright political end' (Slim, 2007: 122). This conclusion may be a product of racist ideology, nationalism, or perceived military necessity, but the intent will be to physically destroy the existence of a certain national, ethnical, racial or religious group – in whole or in part. This is defined as 'genocide', which is considered to be the gravest of all crimes against humanity. What falls outside the legal definition of genocide is extermination of political groups, which is referred to as 'politicide' (Harff and Gurr, 1988). However, for planners and commanders on the ground, the threat to these civilians is qualitatively the same and it is therefore included in this scenario.

4.1.2 Actor types

The perpetrators in this scenario will be **states** or **state-like entities**, typically orchestrated by ruling political parties or elites at the highest level of government, even though non-state actors will normally be used to implement the violence (Stanton, 1998; Midlarsky, 2005). Whilst non-state actors may *want* to exterminate another group, they are unlikely to possess the means or level of coordination required to conduct what is in reality a 'total war' against a population. The exception is of course if such groups acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

4.1.3 Strategies and tactics

The recourse to genocidal violence will be a product of several preconditions and preparatory stages (see Hilberg, 2003 on the Holocaust; Stanton, 1998 on stages of genocide; Bellamy, 2011 on structural preconditions). Once it reaches the stage where extermination is the objective, as described in this scenario, violence against civilians will constitute the principal part of the perpetrator's strategy. The very ends-based nature of this motivation is obvious in that every person killed brings the perpetrators one step closer to their desired end-state. Hence, perpetrators will have no strategic incentives to limit their use of violence against civilians. To the contrary, the more violence is used, the faster will their goal of extermination be achieved. This will be reflected in strategies and tactics that aim to **maximise the destruction of the targeted group**.

The first people to be killed are often **moderates** amongst the perpetrator's own group, and **leaders of the victim group**, because this will minimise resistance to the violence that follows. There may also be smaller 'trial massacres' to test for negative repercussions (Bellamy, 2011), which is likely to pave the way for larger massacres, if it goes unpunished (Midlarsky, 2005).

Operations will be **designed to kill as many as possible**, involving several 'acts of genocide' taking place simultaneously across the entire area of operations. Acts of genocide include: '(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group' (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: Article 2).

Simultaneous and numerous mass killings will be the defining pattern of violence in this scenario. Civilians may be killed by firearms, axes, knives, machetes or by other means of violent death, but also burning, drowning and gassing crowds to death have been used for purposes of effectiveness. Killing civilians in large numbers, however, require concentrations of victims. These may already exist if population groups reside in separate enclaves, or they must be created, for example by spreading rumours, arresting, or forcing people at gun point to locations where they can be killed more easily. These **killing sites** will typically be stadiums, public houses, concentration camps, ghettos, and so forth, which is where the threat to civilians will also be most imminent. However, the threat of physical violence against civilians will be imminent wherever members of the targeted group can be found. Unlike other scenarios, perpetrators in this scenario may also prevent their victims from fleeing in order to kill them all, e.g. at road blocks.

Deportation operations or labour camps may be arranged to cause many to fall away through natural decline, e.g. by forcing them through inhospitable terrain or working at construction sites where chances of survival are minimal. **Rape** can also be used as a weapon of destruction. When the objective is to destroy a population, females in reproductive years will be particularly targeted, often subjected to group rape (Isikozlu and Millard, 2010: 50). Severe brutality is not going to be the centrepiece of the perpetrator's strategy in this scenario, given the scale of killings, yet there has been widespread brutality during past genocides, which is particularly shocking since it does not really serve any purpose when the objective is extermination. This illustrates how there will be other layers of perpetrators in parallel with the primary objective.

4.1.4   Capabilities

In order to implement a strategy of extermination, perpetrators will need to meet most, if not all, of the requirements a perpetrated may need to carry out systematic and widespread violence.

First, killing large numbers of people, simultaneously and across a large area, **requires substantial advance planning**. The extent to which there is actual documentation outlining such plans is always disputed and documents are usually missing or destroyed. This is not surprising, since *planning* for genocide is also a punishable crime. Still, its successful execution requires, at

minimum, a common understanding amongst perpetrators about how and when the killing is to be conducted (such as specific orders, blueprints, or lists of names of those who are to be killed).

Extermination will also **require a high degree of coordination from above**, with command and control usually concentrated in a small group of political and military leaders within a party or government structure. The entire state administration may not be involved, but control of the military and interior security ministries, departments and offices will be essential. Established lines of communication (e.g. supply routes, radios or local leaders) have been used to issue orders, supply, and coordinate the attacks and movements of both military units and victims.

Ambiguity concerning their intent to kill civilians will be critically important to avoid an external intervention or allowing the victims to flee, which will jeopardise their objectives. Euphemisms are normally used to describe the killings, such as 'special treatment' or 'final solution', and perpetrators will create confusion about what is actually happening. Yet, such ambiguity is not merely an intervention-evading exercise. Killing civilians, especially women and children, is always a moral issue, the views on which will never be uniform even within the perpetrating leadership itself. The top leadership cannot always assume the approval of those below (e.g. commanders, local chiefs, media), so a balance will have to be found between fostering the support necessary and hiding the real implications from those who may oppose it. Operational secrecy is also an issue of high importance, since victims are much easier to kill if they do not know they are going to die.

Finally, the military units conducting the actual killing in this scenario will normally not be regular soldiers, but **special units and irregular forces**. Such forces are easier to deny responsibility for, supply and move around. They may also be more inclined or able to commit war crimes, especially if they have done it before. If the genocide takes place during a war, conventional forces are more likely to play a supporting role in enabling the kind of freedom of movement required, which is for mobile killing units to move rapidly and relatively unchallenged between killing sites to achieve high rates of killing. The biggest challenge for perpetrators in this scenario may be to acquire *enough* manpower and weaponry to conduct killings on the scale required, which is why local tribes or civilian militias have often been recruited, trained and armed (by regular forces) in the past. Mobile killing units, however, will not be the most effective if victims are dispersed. By contrast, only a few killers will be required to kill thousands if victims are congregated at stationary killing sites (e.g. gas chambers, camps).

Examples
The most recent example of a full-scale GENOCIDE-scenario took place in **Rwanda** (1994), where Hutu extremists (known as the 'Akazu') orchestrated the mass killing of most Tutsis in the country and many moderate Hutus. It was a meticulously planned and rapidly executed genocide. Machetes had been purchased and distributed in advance. Trial massacres of several hundred Tutsis began from 1990. After killing Tutsi leaders and Hutu moderates, including the prime minister, the mass killings began in April 1994.

At least 800,000 were killed during the next hundred days. Most of the killing was committed by the *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* – both militias associated with extremist parties that had been organised, armed and rehearsed in advance (Melvern, 2006). Most people were killed with machetes (37.9%), clubs (16.8%), or firearms (14.8%), at four types of locations: (1) central congregation points like churches, schools or public buildings; (2) at roadblocks; (3) in homes during house-to-house searches, and (4) during searches through fields and marshes (Straus, 2004: 88). A commonly used tactic – reflecting the intent to exterminate rather than expel – was to surround public houses where Tutsis had taken shelter, set it on fire or throw grenades inside, and finish off whoever survived with machetes.

Other cases of GENOCIDE include the **Herero and Namaqua Genocide** (1904–1908), the **Armenian Genocide** (1915–1918), the **Holocaust** (1941–1945), and the chemical attack on **Halabja** (1988). There have also been instances where the intent has been to destroy a part of the population during war, as happened with men and boys of military age during the **Anfal Campaign** against Kurds in northern Iraq (1988) and against Muslims in **Srebrenica** (1995).

4.1.5   Expected outcome

This is the only scenario where **the number of people killed is likely to be greater than those displaced or harmed in other ways**. The proportion of victims killed during previous genocides has been estimated to be **around 66–70%** (Midlarsky, 2005: 8). More than half of the Herero in Namibia, Armenians in Turkey, Jews in Europe, and Tutsis in Rwanda were killed, whilst the vast majority of survivors fled. According to the UN Whitaker Report on Genocide (1985: fn. 12), about 65,000 of the 80,000 Herero Africans in Namibia (80%) were killed by the Germans. According to Schwirck (2002: 81, 89), about half of the Nama were also killed. In Rwanda, about 75% of Tutsis were killed (Verwimp, 2004).

Another aspect is **the speed with which it happens**. The escalation from the first killings to outright genocide may be very short (within three months against the Armenians according to Mann, 2005). The number of Jews killed in Europe averaged about 100,000 a month using Hilberg (2003)'s figure of five million dead 1941–1945, but it culminated in 1942 when a total of 2,600,000 – 216,000 a month – were killed (Hilberg, 2003: 1321). In Rwanda, the rate was 240,000 a month (800,000 in a hundred days). In Srebrenica, 8,000 men and boys were killed in the matter of a few days. By comparison, about 11,000 people were killed during the 44-month siege of Sarajevo. Actual figures are always contested, but what matters for military planners is that many, if not most, potential victims will die very quickly if perpetrators are not stopped in this scenario.

4.1.6   Implications for military forces

The theory holds that military force will have a decisive role to play in matching the perpetrator's destruction of civilians. This is generally acknowledged in studies on responding to mass killings (see Sewall et al., 2010, which is now included as an annex to the US Peace Operations doctrine).

In operational terms, **time will be of the essence**. For intervention to have saved the majority of Jews during the Holocaust, it must have occurred in 1941 and 1942 when three quarters were killed. Similarly, most of the killings in Rwanda occurred during the first weeks. Precisely because of its high speed, by the time it is clear that genocide is taking place it is often too late to stop the killing (Hinote, 2008). Thus, convincing threats of military response are important to prevent escalation from happening in the first place. To prevent escalation, one option is to **protect moderates**, who may be able to stop the violence (Stanton, 1998), as well as the political leadership of the victim group whose elimination usually precedes the initiation of mass killings.

Once genocide is underway, however, reducing the threat of physical violence **will require confronting the perpetrators**. At minimum, forces can be used to provide **static protection at potential killing sites**, where civilians are most heavily concentrated. This is likely to save many lives, but will fail to protect civilians in other areas where they will also be under imminent threat. Given that the perpetrators view extermination as a 'final solution', it is unlikely that they can be coerced into stopping. Whilst they may be deterred from attacking an intervening force, their willingness to kill civilians will be much harder to change. Thus, the only viable option for lowering the threat of extermination throughout the area of operations may be to **militarily defeat the perpetrators on the ground**, by destroying their abilities to attack civilians.

Based on a genocidaire's likely capability requirements, it is possible to identify 'against what' force may be used with effect. The scale and speed of the killings may be reduced by targeting the military and interior security ministries, departments or party offices to **degrade the political and military leadership's ability to exercise command and control**. Eliminating the genocidal leadership itself may bring a halt to the killings (as in Nazi Germany). However, if units on the ground are operating on 'autopilot' – readily armed, organised and driven by hate, profit or pleasure (as in Rwanda) – removing the leadership may do little to stop the violence. Targeting media outlets used to create an environment in which killing civilians becomes rational (e.g. hate speech) may work. Whilst the UN mission in Rwanda was not allowed to **seize broadcasting facilities**, it is likely that this will be permissible in today's operations.

In all cases, most utility of force is likely to be found by **confronting the units executing the violence on the ground**, which are likely to constitute the perpetrator's operational centre of gravity in this scenario. These units may either be numerous irregular forces, operating in small sizes and harder to control, or units operating at stationary killing sites, which can more easily be seized. In either case, these forces must be confronted as quickly as possible. Targeting regular forces and infrastructure upon which they depend is less likely to have an effect; since these are likely to play only a supporting role (e.g. bombing the Ottoman military, German army or Rwandan regular forces would not prevent the actual killers from conducting their business).

4.2 Ethnic cleansing

Summary

The second scenario is ETHNIC CLEANSING, which is not as deadly as genocide, but far more common. Here, extermination is not the objective, but the *expulsion* of a certain ethnic or religious group. The perpetrators will usually be states or state-like entities, primarily relying on irregular units to carry out cleansing operations designed to make people flee through excessive and demonstrative violence. The targeted group will be at particular risk in areas where the perpetrators are militarily strong, but do not have a clear majority, and immediately following the seizure of new territory, whilst in other areas the threat will be less physical and less imminent.

4.2.1 Rationale

This scenario describes situations where perpetrators seek to **expel a group of civilians** on basis of their national, ethnical, racial or religious identity. Like GENOCIDE, the underlying reasons may be grand nationalist projects, racist ideologies, ethno-territorial conflicts, or 'military necessity' – but all perpetrators in this scenario share the view that expulsion is the most viable solution.

4.2.2 Actor types

The perpetrators will usually be **states** or **state-like entities** with a vested interest in establishing an ethnically pure territory. Notably, many of the states in which ethnic cleansing has occurred have been newly democratic governments rather than stable authoritarian regimes (Mann, 2005). Non-state actors without outside backing are unlikely to become ethnic cleansers by themselves, since the party initiating ethnic cleansing in new areas has to be the militarily superior one, as this is a precondition for striking out from its heartlands and to conquer and cleanse new territory (Melander, 2007). It is conceivable that non-state actors aspiring to create an ethnically pure state may resort to ethnic cleansing, but the degree to which they are able to meet the capabilities required is questionable. Such actors may instead operate as insurgents, seeking to coerce the sitting government into concessions rather than seek to expel an undesired population themselves.

4.2.3 Strategies and tactics

Any strategy to expel a population is likely to require substantial use of violence, because it ultimately relies on physically clearing geographic areas of a certain population, which is unlikely to happen *without* the use of force. The clearly ends-based character of this rationale comes from the fact that every expulsion takes the perpetrator one step closer to his desired end state. Unlike GENOCIDE, however, the strategies will primarily be designed to **'coerce' a certain ethnic group to leave** rather than 'destroy' their existence, which will be reflected in where, when and how civilians are targeted.

Civilians will be **targeted on basis of ethnicity**. Areas already under perpetrator control are unlikely to experience much overt violence. Instead, persecution and discrimination is likely to dominate. In areas **where the victim group is in majority**, however, they will have to be cleansed by force (Melander, 2007; *Dulić and Hall, 2012*). In particular, areas sandwiched

between or surrounded by the perpetrator's ethnic group are likely to be taken violently and ethnically cleansed early on. Ethnic cleansers will also seek to bridge ethnically pure areas to create a contiguous area, as well as border crossings adjacent to areas dominated by ethnic brethren in different countries, regardless of which ethnic group is in majority or not. The responsible authorities may even issue warnings in advance, asking residents to flee within a given time period or face the consequences. Time will therefore be of the essence in these areas rather than in the country as a whole.

Occasional massacres provide a particularly powerful message to induce flight, but they are also likely to require more resources and attract more attention than driving people away through smaller **demonstrative acts of violence**, where brutality serves as a force multiplier for coercive effect. These typically include **execution-style killings, rape, abductions, and beatings**. Rape can also be used to induce flight by having family members or other residents as witnesses. Alternatively rape camps may be set up to give birth to children of the perpetrator's ethnicity, especially if nationality is determined by the father (Isikozlu and Millard, 2010: 56).

Where military superiority is not clear and straightforward cleansing is not possible, perpetrators may seek to **besiege population centres** (i.e. withholding food deliveries and utilities so as to starve and freeze residents) and deteriorate their living conditions (e.g. by dumping chemicals or dead animals into water supplies). Ethnic cleansers also need to permanently prevent the victims' return, typically by **destroying villages and buildings of cultural or religious importance**. Arrangements may also be made to relocate members of the perpetrator's own ethnic group into these houses and areas to establish a permanent presence.

4.2.4   Capabilities

In this scenario, the systematic design and scale of violence necessary to permanently expel a population demands that most operational requirements must be met. In fact, it **may require** *more* **planning to expel** a population than to kill it, because it require decisions about where the population is to be expelled, perhaps assist in their transportation, and possibly plan for the resettlement of one's own ethnic brethren.

As in GENOCIDE, command and control is likely to be concentrated within an identifiable **small group of political and military leaders**. Extreme nationalist leaders are more likely to resort to violence in ethno-territorial conflicts than moderate nationalist or merely power-seeking leaders, who will only harass and suppress civilians until they are confident that they are stronger than their counterparts (Horowitz and Ye, 2013). Maintaining **ambiguity** regarding their cleansing operations will be another critical requirement for these perpetrators, especially if conventional forces are involved. The resulting refugee flows will also be more visible than mass graves, and outside intervention will undoubtedly jeopardise their objectives.

A recurring pattern in ethnic cleansing is that it has nearly always been **conducted by lightly armed, interior security or paramilitary units** moving from village to village or neighbourhood to neighbourhood. They are typically invited into an area, deployed to 'clean-up' newly seized

territory, or sent into areas where they can wreak havoc against poorly armed civilians. Irregular units are particularly useful because they are able to move quickly from population centre to population centre, can operate autonomously ('plausible deniability'), and may have a nasty reputation which makes people even more likely to flee. Moreover, it may be better to keep regular forces uninvolved, as their cohesion is often based around discipline and the laws of war that prohibit killing civilians, and the risk of defection is likely to increase dramatically.

However, paramilitary units **depend on relative military control to operate freely**. Ethnic cleansing usually requires military superiority, which is why it is unlikely that armed groups will be able to cleanse areas on their own. Instead, paramilitaries or militias will often operate behind the front lines or in the presence of regular forces, which may be used to disarm local civilians in advance. If military superiority is lacking, more conventional forces will be needed to establish control, which in turn increases the reliance on key infrastructure and lines of communication.

Larger operations will typically be **designed to surround three sides**, leaving a route open in the direction that the perpetrators want the population to flee. Heavy weaponry (e.g. tanks, artillery, missiles) is only critical insofar as the operation requires besieging, conquering or defeating a population centre. Their use may appear like traditional military manoeuvres aimed at defeating an enemy, yet the selection of targets, the use of firepower to terrorise the population, and the kind of cleansing operations that follow will be qualitatively different when expulsion is the objective. Indicative of this is **random shelling**, often against civilian areas or buildings, rather than overwhelming use of force to defeat the enemy in the traditional sense.

Examples

A classic example of ETHNIC CLEANSING was the Serbian plan to carve out an ethnically pure and territorially contiguous 'Greater Serbia' during the violent breakup of **Yugoslavia** (1991–1995). It required the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim and Catholic populations in parts of Bosnia and Croatia. Since the late 1980s, a small group of officers who called themselves the 'military line' had begun meeting with members of Serbia's secret police. In Bosnia, plans for the deportation of Muslims began already a year before the war. Coordinated actions between the Bosnian Serb political leadership and the Yugoslav army characterised the early days of the conflict. For example, Serb provocations were used as an excuse for the Yugoslav army to move in to round up 'troublemakers' in Muslim-dominated areas (Gow, 2003). In Serbian-controlled municipalities, paramilitaries were invited by local politicians to 'cleanse' the area. Another characteristic pattern was the destruction of villages that had been exclusively non-Serb, whilst houses in towns or near Serb villages were left standing in anticipation of displaced Serbs (Dahlman & Tuathail 2005: 648). The fact that the Bosnian Serbs were able to acquire control of the majority of Bosnian territory and cleanse most non-Serbs living there was directly linked to their military superiority.

Other relevant cases used to inform this scenario include the ethnic cleansing of **Georgians in Abkhazia** (1992–1993), **Ingush in East Prigorodny** (1996), **Tutsis in North Kivu** (1996), **Albanians in Kosovo** (1999), **Serbs in Kosovo** (2004), **Georgians in South Ossetia** (2008), and **Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan** (2010). A larger, but less recognizable case of ETHNIC CLEANSING, involves the most violent phase of the REGIME CRACKDOWN in **Darfur** (see Olsson and Valsecchi, 2010).

4.2.5   Expected outcome

Whilst genocide leaves behind a landscape of dead bodies, ethnic cleansing produces a trail of displaced, abandoned homes and destroyed religious and cultural buildings. The actual number of people killed in this scenario may not necessarily be very high (a few per cent of the potential victim population), but **the relative number of displaced will be huge** (~ 90%).

A declassified Central Intelligence Agency (1994) report estimated in late 1994, before the last eastern enclaves like Srebrenica fell, that 90% of non-Serbs who lived in the 70% of Bosnia under Serb control had been forced to flee or killed. The overall number of both civilians *and* military deaths on all sides were limited relatively speaking (2.3%), based on the most common estimate of 100,000 dead out of total pre-war population in Bosnia of 4.38 million in 1991. However, the relative number of deaths amongst the Muslim population was higher (3.6%), based on the figure of 68,000 victims identified by the Demographic Unit at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) out of a pre-war population of 1.9 million Bosnian Muslims.

In Kosovo too, virtually all Albanians (90%) were displaced from their homes (Human Rights Watch, 2001:4), whilst only a few were actually killed – about 3,000–6,000 (Mann, 2005: 357) out of a total Albanian population of 1.4 million in 1995. Later, the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was reversed, as the Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities were targeted during two days of rioting in 2004. According to Amnesty (2005), 19 people were killed (11 Albanians and eight Serbs), while 730 houses, mostly belonging to Kosovo Serb, as well as dozens of Orthodox churches and cultural buildings were destroyed, and 4,100 minority members displaced in total – all in less than 48 hours. In a few villages and towns, every single Serb house was destroyed and the entire Serb population was displaced (Human Rights Watch 2004).

In what used to be Eastern Zaire (1996), it is estimated that 'the entire Tutsi population' were displaced from the North Kivu province, where they had been in majority (Reed, 1998: 144). In a less clear-cut outcome, one study has found that 57% of the targeted population in one area of Darfur had been ethnically cleansed, and 48% of their villages destroyed between 2003 and 2008 (Olsson and Valsecchi, 2010). What matters for planners is that a **large number of civilians will be fleeing** – and that they **flee from the perpetrators of violence** rather than the presence of fighting per se (as in REGIME CRACKDOWN and INSURGENCY).

4.2.6   Implications for military forces

Any military response that does not confront the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing is unlikely to reduce threat of expulsion. Limited use of force to 'contain' (e.g. no-fly zones or arms embargo) or 'ameliorate' the situation (e.g. humanitarian aid) without confronting the perpetrators directly is likely to save some lives, but may only make matters worse if it also prevents the targeted population from defending themselves, or prolongs the crisis with more people being killed and displaced. **Defending certain cities, villages, enclaves or sites** is possible when backed by adequate force, but will only have a temporary effect if the location lies within territory that 'must' be cleansed in the eyes of the perpetrators. Simply 'deterring' against attacks will do little to alter the perpetrator's motivation, possibly only making them more determined to clear other areas.

The theory indicates, and past experiences have shown, that the role of military force is likely to be decisive in reducing the threat of expulsion to civilians – albeit it will have to be used in different ways than during a GENOCIDE. The key lesson from operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) is that perpetrators can be **'coerced' to abandon ethnic cleansing** when faced with the prospect of defeat or loss of territory. Coercing ethnic cleansers is possible because, unlike genocidaires, they are less likely to view the conflict in zero-sum terms, and more in terms of bargaining over demography and borders. Their decision to pursue violent ethnic cleansing can therefore be influenced by raising the costs involved. For example, coercing perpetrators in this scenario has historically required a **show of force**, **punitive strikes**, or **larger joint operations**.

To have a protective effect, however, **operations must also be designed to reduce the perpetrator's ability to cleanse civilians** in the process (which was the case in Bosnia, but not in Kosovo). The principal requirement of any such operation is that they will have to **deny freedom of movement for the smaller units** actually conducting the cleansing operations. Seizing or destroying conventional forces and heavy weaponry, such as artillery, tanks, and supporting functions, will only be useful if they are used to besiege towns or cities, or are critical to establishing military control in which paramilitaries can operate. Without military superiority, it is unlikely that these perpetrators will be able to attack civilians in new areas. If civilians are largely undefended, however, paramilitaries can conduct cleansing operations on their own at only slightly more risk to themselves (Vick et al., 2001: 18). These paramilitary forces are therefore likely to be an ethnic cleanser's operational centre of gravity in most situations.

4.3   Regime crackdown

Summary
The third scenario is REGIME CRACKDOWN, where a regime responds to threats against its own survival with *violent repression of its own population*. The threat to civilians comes primarily from the indiscriminate tactics used by the regime to supress all forms of resistance. Civilians are targeted on basis of real or perceived affiliation with the opposition. This threat is likely to persist until the regime is overthrown, prevails, or it escalates into ETHNIC CLEANSING or GENOCIDE.

4.3.1   Rationale

This scenario describes a situation where a regime faced with protests or armed insurrections, which it perceives as a genuine threat to its own survival, decides to respond with violence. Unlike other scenarios, this scenario is usually triggered by events on the ground rather than instigated by the regime itself. The common rationale for using violence against civilians is **to control a population** rather than expel or exterminate them.

Repressive violence *can* reduce the level of popular support for the opposition, if it is targeted against those who pose a real threat (see Mason and Krane, 1989). However, repressive violence 'does not redress the grievances that gave rise to opposition in the first place; it simply terrorises nonelites into not acting overtly to redress those grievances' (Mason and Krane, 1989: 193). During an armed uprising, regimes face the basic problem of how to distinguish *actual* insurgents from the large and growing population of *potential* insurgents. The regime may genuinely try to make a distinction between civilians and combatants, but the indiscriminate tactics and strategies they rely on in doing so are likely to affect the population at large, regardless of their affiliation with the insurgents. This is in turn likely to produce increased active support for the opposition.

4.3.2   Actor types

The perpetrators in this scenario will always be **authoritarian regimes** – usually state governments, but sometimes also non-state de facto authorities in an area. They will be authoritarian in nature, because this form of government is by definition more likely have the means and be willing to violently repress its own population. This is because political authority in authoritarian states is concentrated within a small group of individuals, and political channels for voicing grievances are closed – meaning that any signs of opposition will be perceived as a threat to the regime itself.

Studies have shown that autocracies are statistically more violent against its own population than democracies and semi-democracies (Lynn-Jones, 1998; Hultman and Eck, 2007). In fact, 99% of all deliberate killings of civilians by governments have occurred during conflicts over the political system rather than territorial conflicts (Eck and Hultman, 2007). The common denominator is that their hold on power rests on the threat of violence, and violence is seen as 'the ultimate arbiter of conflicts in authoritarian politics' (Svolik, 2012: 2). When their power is threatened, the natural response for authoritarian regimes is to follow this threat through with actual violence.

4.3.3   Strategies and tactics

Rather than peek early on, violence is likely to **escalate gradually** in accordance with the perceived threat against the regime's own survival (see e.g. Lichbach and Gurr, 1981). At worst, mass atrocities may be resorted to out of frustration with conventional tactics in an effort to stave off defeat, and because less violent strategies for counterinsurgency have proven at least equally costly and prone to failure (Valentino et al., 2004).

Target selection is made **on basis of real or perceived affiliation with the opposition**. Armed insurgents will be the primary targets for the regime because they pose the biggest threat. The first to be targeted will be leaders of opposition organisations, next will be the rank and file supporters of those organisations, and then finally, if nothing else works, randomly selected groups of the mass public who have little or no demonstrable affiliation with the opposition (Mason and Krane, 1989: 179). Hence, the population at large may become targets. Communal identity may be used as a proxy for determining who may be potential insurgents, but it is not their ethnic or religious identities per se that make them targets.

Governments will employ a **combination of indiscriminate and selective violence**; depending on the level of control they have in a particular area (Kalyvas, 2006). In areas where the regime is in complete control, they will use violence selectively to 'deter' collaboration with the opposition (e.g. arrests, disappearances, assassinations, firing at protestors). In areas where it dominates but does not have complete control, they will be less able to acquire information to target opposition supporters on a selective basis. Instead, violence becomes more indiscriminate violence and intended to **'coerce' a population into compliance** (e.g. mass-detention, raids, heavy military presence, general threats). In areas where regimes have little or no control, they are likely to **rely primarily on indiscriminate use of force to 'incite' insecurity more generally**, in the hope that it will wrestle control away from the opposition or make the areas ungovernable (e.g. artillery, air bombardment, missile strikes). This use of force is often what kills most civilians, due to the indiscriminate tactics and destructive weapons used.

Military force may also be used to **'destroy' opposition strongholds** to deny rebels any sanctuary or potential support from the local population. As Napoleon advised his generals in 1800, the idea is that 'you have to burn two or three of the worst towns' to quell the uprising (quoted in Batatu, 1999: 274, drawing parallels to Hafez Assad in Syria). The regime may deliberately seek to displace people from areas that may harbour rebels rather than remove the insurgents from the population centres (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002). This makes civilian buildings, such as schools, hospitals, neighbourhoods and other critical infrastructure, valuable targets. Regimes may also feel a strong incentive to target civilians directly, because rebel groups rely on support from the people. Targeting their potential support base can thereby increase the costs of fighting (Valentino et al., 2004). The strategy may become 'draining the sea by filling the graves', which has proven effective under certain circumstances (Downes, 2007). If expelling a population, or the destruction of civilians rather than their homes, becomes the primary objectives, the scenario will have escalated into ETHNIC CLEANSING or GENOCIDE and must be treated accordingly.

Brutality serves as a force multiplier for coercive effect in this scenario. This may include the use of feared paramilitaries or militias to crack down on collaborators and their personal networks. In the past, **sexual violence** has been tolerated and possibly promoted by regimes against suspected insurgent supporters during detention to terrorise a population (Wood, 2006). More targeted rape can also serve to punish and deter individuals who are engaged in activities believed to threaten the perpetrator, or to punish their enemies by targeting those associated with them, like wives,

sisters, and mothers. This is generally perpetrated by government or state-sponsored militia forces – both against male and female civilians (Isikozlu and Millard, 2010: 61).

4.3.4 Capabilities

Regimes determined to crush all resistance will be under pressure to meet most of the operational requirement needed to operationalise violence against civilians, as this scenario quickly becomes a conventional war against its own population and possibly an intervening force. Perpetrators in this scenario may be in a worse starting position than governments in the two previous scenarios, because they will not have had the time to make elaborate plans in advance as they are forced to respond to events on the ground outside their control. However, this places an even greater dependency on a coordinated response if the regime is to prevail.

Hence, **coordination from above will be absolutely critical** from the very start, because it is the state's own coercive apparatus that are the principal means in this scenario. Their employment is solely due to orders from the regime's top leadership, driven by its own survival. It is hard to imagine the Great Terror without Stalin, the Holocaust without Hitler, or the crackdown in Libya without Gaddafi. This is why the regime itself is likely to be the strategic centre of gravity.

This same leadership must master a **precarious balance between denying that they commit war crimes and maintaining support** from the forces required to implement the violence. Concealing its war crimes and maintaining a convincing narrative will be critical to avoid intervention, especially since massive violations of human rights by governments against their own populations is less accepted today than it was during colonial times or the Cold War. At the same time, the moral, legal and institutional framework that facilitates violence against civilians may not extend much beyond the inner circle and the most dedicated armed units. Regimes will be critically vulnerable to defections from its armed forces, especially if the forces expected to conduct operations are made up of conscripts or otherwise recruited from the very population they are meant to repress (e.g. tribes). Defections are commonly explained by reluctance of soldiers to kill civilians. The dependency on regular forces is best illustrated by the simple fact that, if the forces refuse to fire on orders from the government, there will be no crackdown at all.

As opposed to extermination and expulsion of certain groups, which can be conducted by smaller units, the efforts required to control a whole population through force will require a much larger role to be played by **conventional armed forces**, especially if there is an armed uprising. The interior security apparatus will increase its arrests and use of torture detention centres, whilst regular and state-sponsored armed groups will assume a bigger role in crushing all resistance. In fact, the state's best armed and trained military units are often dedicated solely to the protection of the regime, whilst the rest of the armed forces are tasked with protecting its borders. All of these forces are only useful insofar as they maintain **freedom of movement**, especially as the uprising may spread very quickly across the entire operating theatre. This is also why traditional logistical lines of support, airports, border crossings and key highways will be particularly important in this scenario – also for the perpetrator's ability to attack civilians.

Aside from its reliance on conventional forces, the perpetrators in this scenario will also depend on **heavy weaponry** to deliver the firepower required to crush opposition strongholds, which is where most civilians are likely to be killed. The need for firepower is evident in how regimes in the past have adopted all types of weapons to target civilian areas, even though they are intended for entirely different purposes (e.g. firing anti-air weapons into crowds, dropping bombs from the back of cargo airplanes). Civilians are usually killed by both sides, but the regime's greater military capability is part of the explanation why most die at the hands of government violence. Regimes will resort to more and more destructive tactics if more firepower is required to quell the uprising, e.g. escalating from snipers to raids to aerial bombardment to missile attacks. Given this escalatory dynamic, it is not unthinkable that regimes may also resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), due to their highly destructive and coercive effects. However, this may simultaneously jeopardise their ability to maintain an ambiguity about what it is actually doing.

Examples

Regimes that resort to violence against their own populations are perhaps one of the most common scenarios in modern history. Notable examples include **Stalin's terror** of the 1930s, Franco's repression during and after the **Spanish Civil War** (1936–39), which included the first aerial bombing of a defenceless civilian population, and the reigns of African dictators like **Idi Amin in Uganda** (1971–79) and the **Habre-regime in Chad** (1982–90).

A more successful example was the Syrian regime's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in **Hama** (1982). Saddam Hussein did much of the same against the Kurds during **the al-Anfal campaign in northern Iraq** (1988), which escalated into several acts of GENOCIDE, and later against Shiites in **southern Iraq** (1991). The massacres in **Indonesia** (1965–66) against political opponents and Khmer Rouge's violence in **Cambodia** (1975–79) were both brutal REGIME CRACKDOWNS that escalated into many acts of GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING (of minorities in Cambodia). A less clear-cut example is the **Sri Lankan offensive against the Tamil Tigers** (2008–09), where both sides have committed many atrocities.

The REGIME CRACKDOWNS in **Libya** (2011) and **Syria** (2011–) provide the most recent examples of this scenario, and are both discussed in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 in Våge (2014). As the de facto authority in northern parts of Syria since 2013, the **Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant** (ISIS)'s violent rule over the local population is another, coinciding case of this scenario.

4.3.5   Expected outcome

It follows from the particularly destructive strategies, tactics and weapons that this scenario has the potential of becoming very bloody. Whilst ETHNIC CLEANSING and GENOCIDE split countries along group identities, the destruction is likely to be everywhere in this scenario. It is not uncommon to see whole neighbourhoods, villages, or even cities flattened to the ground. Unlike GENOCIDE and ETHNIC CLEANSING, however, the **number of people killed or fleeing is likely to rise gradually** in accordance with the intensity of fighting rather than peek early on.

The ratio between combatant and non-combatant deaths and between members of various ethnic groups is also likely to be more evenly distributed. This is because civilians are not primarily targeted on basis of communal identity, and because both sides are often organised military forces fighting each other. One can still expect fairly **high numbers of civilians killed in populated areas and localities where resistance is greatest**. In Syria today, a third of the total number of fatalities are civilians, which makes them the largest single category of casualties (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2013).

The inherently indiscriminate nature and wide margins of error with the weapons often used in this scenario means that civilians are most likely to be killed by **heavy and explosive weapons** (e.g. air bombs, artillery shells, mortar bombs, tank shells, rockets, and improvised explosive devices). 67% of the casualties caused by explosive violence in Libya were civilians (Dodd and Perkins, 2012: 2); whilst it is 78% in Syria (Dodd and Perkins, 2013: 3). When explosives were used in populated areas, the figure was 91% compared to 32% outside (Dodd and Perkins, 2013: 3). The deadliest phases are associated with periods of **siege warfare** or **military offensives**, as this means an increase in size and frequency of explosive weapons used, and often obstruction of humanitarian assistance. As a result, the **number of injured and maimed** can also be expected to be higher than in other less destructive scenarios.

Another feature of this scenario is the relatively **high proportion of people arrested, extra-judicially killed, or 'disappeared'**. People will also **flee on a massive scale**, but it will normally be gradual and take time to reach a scale similar to ETHNIC CLEANSING or GENOCIDE. Moreover, people will be **fleeing the presence of violence** rather than the presence of a particular actor. According to the UNHCR (2011: 154), more than 550,000 Libyans were internally displaced and 900,000 people fled the country during eight months of conflict in Libya, whose total population is about 6 million. After 2.5 years of war in Syria, a third of the population has been displaced either internally or externally. Studies show that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) compared to refugees (who leave the country) is likely to be comparatively higher in conflicts that fall into this scenario than in the two previous ones (Moore and Shellman, 2006). Regimes may in extremis commit acts of GENOCIDE, where the motivation becomes to kill all potential supporters in a particular area, such as the chemical attack against the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988, or resort to ETHNIC CLEANSING, where the solution becomes to expel a certain group rather than seek to control them, as happened from 1998 to 1999 in Kosovo.

4.3.6   Implications for military forces

In this scenario, any military operation is likely to be controversial, as it will violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Since these perpetrators rely on the destruction of insurgents and population centres where supporters reside, whilst controlling the general public through threats or use of violence, it will be extremely difficult to change their rationale for targeting civilians when this is such an integral part of their strategy for survival. Non-military efforts (e.g. sanctions, indictments, asset freezes) have rarely wielded much power over such regimes.

There is a **slim chance that regimes can be militarily coerced to negotiate**, because the regime itself may be split about what to do. Yet, negotiations are unlikely to be anything but an option of last resort (and for that to happen, they need to be losing). Amongst different types of authoritarian regimes, personalist authoritarian states are the least likely to negotiate compared to military or single-party regimes (Geddes, 1999). Past examples of authoritarian regimes negotiating themselves out of power are few and far between.

Once a regime has upped the ante to the point where killing civilians has become common, whether intentionally or through indiscriminate fire, significant military force is likely to be required. In order to reduce the threat to civilians, **operations must be designed to weaken the regime's ability** to target its own citizens and population centres. Imposing no-fly zones are likely to have a greater impact than in other scenarios, because some of the most destructive attacks are typically delivered from the air. Yet, the usefulness of a no-fly zone is directly linked to the fact that the regime is using its air force in the first place, which may change over time.

Larger **population centres or buffer zones may be defended** through shows of force or punitive air strikes that may deter the regime from attacking, if they risk defeat. Sustained **air strikes against fielded armed units** responsible for the ground-launched heavy weapons can also play a greater role in protecting civilians, since it will force the perpetrators to rely on smaller units with lighter arms, which are harder to target from the air, but also makes it harder for the regime to crack down because it requires significant power to deliver destruction.

However, these and other forms of containment, deterrence and coercion may only temporarily reduce the threat to civilians. It is highly unlikely to affect the willingness of a regime to fight for its own survival in the long run. In order to reduce the threat to civilians more permanently, the only viable option may be to **defeat the responsible regime**, either directly or indirectly (e.g. supporting rebels). In the majority of past cases that fall into this scenario, the threat to civilians was only lowered after the regimes defeated the opposition (followed by mass reprisals), or were replaced through a coup d'état, revolution, or regime change enforced by external actors. In none of examples listed above did the reduction of violence come as a result of a negotiated settlement.

Some targets are likely to have more protection-value than others. In general, going after **the forces solely dedicated to regime survival** may deal a decisive blow, since these are likely to be the units most willing to attack civilians. **Destroying C2-nodes and disrupting lines of communication** is likely to have a greater impact than in other scenarios, because the regular units executing the violence are much more dependent on orders from above. During the operation in Libya – which is the only case of intervention in this scenario to date – the centre of gravity was **the regime itself** (in Tripoli), because this is where the orders to attack civilians were coming from. Force commander Bouchard explained that 'If you can cut the orders from being given – and we saw this happen – many of [Gaddafi's forces] did not want to engage. Libyans didn't want to kill Libyans.' (Bouchard, 2012: 129). Following Gaddafi removal, there has been a period of POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, during which especially black Africans have been targeted. Militias have continued fighting each other, but these actors rarely target civilians.

There is, however, a **window of opportunity** to protect civilians by removing the perpetrating regime. The longer a conflict persists, the less likely it is that violence against civilians will cease once the threat from the regime is removed. The situation may simply be replaced by another scenario, such as ETHNIC CLEANSING, COMMUNAL CONFLICT, or at least POST-CONFLICT REVENGE. Alternatively, these or other scenarios may also occur simultaneously with the REGIME CRACKDOWN, as has become the case in Syria at the time of writing (late 2013).

4.4 Post-conflict revenge

Summary

The fourth scenario is POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, which occurs in the immediate aftermath of most conflicts. Here, yesterday's victims become the perpetrators of today as they seek to *avenge past crimes*. The perpetrators will be individuals or unorganised groups committing criminal acts of murder, arson, kidnapping and looting on a personal basis against people associated with the former perpetrators, particularly in areas of previous atrocities. The threat will persist until revenge has been taken or public order is restored. Alternatively, this scenario may be replaced by another motivation, where perpetrators become better organised and violence is more strategic.

4.4.1 Rationale

In this scenario, the **desire for personal revenge** is the primary motivation for perpetrators. Such situations arise in the aftermath of conflict, as retribution is endemic to all conflicts and very much a human activity. In other words, it may follow any of the other scenarios.

4.4.2 Actor types

The actors will usually be **individuals, loosely organised or entirely uncoordinated groups** of civilians, who are driven by emotions, such as grief or anger (Boyle, 2010: 192).

4.4.3 Strategies and tactics

Although violence occurs on a smaller scale than in previous scenarios, post-conflict revenge is a very ends-based form of violence, because the goal of revenge can *only* be achieved through an act of violence. Its purpose ceases to exist once revenge has been taken. Although passionate and not part of a grand strategy, revenge killings are usually rational acts and can also be consistent with social or cultural norms, such as established codes for blood revenge (Boyle, 2010: 193).

The purpose of violence is to **rectify a wrongdoing** by 'destroying' the life or property of another person or group associated with the former perpetrators. Victims are therefore **selected on basis of previous culpability** (see Boyle, 2010). Attacks tend to be proportionate to the original act ('an eye for an eye'). The most common acts of violence are criminal rather than strategic in nature, such as murder, arson, kidnapping and looting. Most attacks are likely to be concentrated **in areas where past crimes have been committed before**. Unlike other scenarios, violence is kept under the radar and not carried meant to send message to others. Rape can also serve as

punishment. In this scenario, rape is often committed with particular brutality and physical violence due to the personal sentiments involved (Isikozlu and Millard, 2010: 54).

4.4.4   Capabilities

Given the individual and loosely organised type of actors involved, the perpetrators in this scenario will not depend on many operational requirements to execute the violence. It is precisely the *absence* of coordinated attacks that characterises the violence in this scenario, and what makes the perpetrators so difficult to stop. That acts are kept under the radar frees them from the need to hide their true intentions as well. The previous crimes committed against them may make these acts more 'understandable' from the neutral's point of view. Small arms are also likely to flow in post-conflict environments like these. The only requirement that perpetrators are critically dependent on in this scenario is the **freedom of movement** to reach their intended targets, which are usually selected on an individual, personal basis.

If the violence assumes a higher degree of planning, coordination, military tactics and weaponry, revenge will have been replaced by a more strategic rationale. Such escalation is most likely to occur if groups associated with the former victims have assumed control of the state, which puts them in a better position to organise violence for strategic purposes (Boyle, 2009), such as during a REGIME CRACKDOWN. If this happens, victims will no longer be selected on basis of previous culpability, but targeted collectively. Violence will be used more demonstratively to send a message beyond the mere victim itself, for instance by leaving massacred bodies in the streets. Organised armed actors may exploit post-conflict environments to pursue more strategically motivated objectives, whilst still trying to conceal it as mere 'revenge' (Boyle, 2010). When revenge is replaced by a more strategic motivation, what Boyle (2010) calls 'reprisal' violence, the situation will have transformed into a different scenario and must be treated accordingly.

Examples

The first wave of violence following the Serb withdrawal from **Kosovo** (June 1999 to June 2000) was a classic case of POST-CONFLICT REVENGE. Serbs and other minorities were targeted as former 'perpetrators' and 'collaborators' and were statistically overrepresented as victims of crime. Attacks were especially concentrated in areas that had previously been hardest hit by the Yugoslav Army and Serb interior police, and in villages where returning Albanian refugees were passing through on their way home (Boyle, 2010: 201). The second wave of post-conflict violence (June 2000 to December 2001), however, bestowed a level of organisation that did no longer fit the mere POST-CONFLICT REVENGE. There was greater coordination of attacks, use of snipers, remote-controlled bombs and tactics indicated military training, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was identified as a responsible actor, and coordinated assaults on forces escorting Serbs to the market that could not be explained by revenge alone (Boyle, 2010: 205). Revenge was gradually overtaken by violence intended 'to expel Serbs and weaken Belgrade's case for continuing control over Kosovo' (Boyle, 2010: 207). This later culminated in several acts of ETHNIC CLEANSING of many Serbs in Albanian-dominated areas in 2004.

Other examples include **Iraq** (2003), where retribution against officials and their families of Saddam Hussein's regime was concentrated in areas where the regime had been most repressive in the past (The New York Times, 2003). In **Libya** (2011–12), sporadic revenge has been taken against Gaddafi-loyalists, but far more systematic against Tawergha, whose population has been accused of committing some of the worst violence against Misrata (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012a).

4.4.5 Expected outcome

Although violence is the only way to achieve revenge, it will not be as deadly or destructive as in the previous scenarios, since it is only perpetrated by individuals or loosely organised groups at most. The number of people killed is **unlikely to be very high** (more in the dozens or hundreds). Yet, the genuine threat of retribution in an immediate post-conflict environment may prompt disproportionally many from communities or cities affiliated with the previous perpetrator to flee very easily.

After the 1999 war in Kosovo, 'only' 135–400 of the remaining Serbs were killed (~ 0.15%), whilst about 50% of the Serb population of 200,000 had left the province within months (International Crisis Group, 1999: 1). In Iraq, dozens of Saddam Hussein-affiliated people were reported to have been killed in Basra and other Shiite-dominated cities, where repression had been worst (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2004). In Libya, most of the 40,000 who lived in Tawergha have been displaced, many buildings destroyed, and about 1,300 Tawerghans are either 'detained, missing, or dead' (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

4.4.6 Implications for military forces

Even though maintaining public safety is normally a task for police forces, military forces are often the only forces available in post-conflict environments. Because perpetrators in this scenario aim to 'destroy' their enemies, protectors should in theory aim their guns at the perpetrators to match their willingness to kill, as they are likely to be incoercible in their desire to take revenge. In practise, it will be impossible to eliminate the perpetrators, or their means, when they are only individuals or mobs.

The most that military forces can do really is to **protect civilians by virtue of their presence**, which denies perpetrators the opportunity to settle old scores (e.g. by imposing curfews, checkpoints) and deterring perpetrators from escalating into a more violent scenario. Lessons learned from previous operations where this scenario has taken place have highlighted the **potential pitfall of failing to recognise 'who is killing whom'** as the role of perpetrators and victims changes. Whilst the Kosovo Force (KFOR) had no trouble deterring the Serbian army from re-entering the province, it failed to prevent revenge attacks against non-Albanians. This has partly been attributed to excessive emphasis on force protection (Seybolt, 2007: 217).

The few examples of successful physical protection in this situation involves **static protection** of isolated 'safe sites', such as housing complexes, villages or religious buildings, which deny perpetrators the opportunity to attack. Lessons from East-Timor have also suggested that sporadic score-settling can be minimised by facilitating the **orderly return of refugees**. However, there are few past operations upon which to draw lessons in this regard. To prevent escalation into more strategic violence, the need to boost force density and allow for aggressive rules of engagement in the immediate aftermath when the risk of is highest has been emphasised, whilst **rapid reaction forces** and deployment of **civilian police** will help respond to the kind of violence seen in this scenario (Boyle, 2009).

4.5 Communal conflict

Summary

The fifth scenario describes situations where whole communities are at war with each other and the roles of perpetrators and victims constantly change during continuous cycles of violence. The motivations for both sides are to *avenge the last round of violence* and *deter further retribution*, because *not* fighting back may increase the risks of being attacked again. The actors will, however, often lack the resources required to decisively defeat the other, precisely because they are organised as communities. Instead, means of survival, women and children, and heavily crowded areas are often targeted because of the maximum destruction it can wreak.

4.5.1 Rationale

Unlike in POST-CONFLICT REVENGE, the desire for revenge is neither settled nor replaced by another motivation in this scenario. Instead, **revenge continues to be a driver of conflict for both sides**, even though it is likely to be returned in kind. This use of force can be thought of as 'trading in violence' (Slim, 2007: 141), where each round of violence continues to fuel more revenge. Revenge is not the only motivation, however, as violence **also becomes a matter of survival and self-protection**. Where order has broken down, actors cannot afford *not* to retaliate, as this will be a sign of weakness and will invite further attacks on themselves and the resources upon which their very survival depends (see Chagnon, 1988). The rationale therefore becomes both to avenge the previous cycle of violence perpetrated by the other side, which is more of an end in itself, and to deter further retaliation in the future, as a means of protecting themselves.

4.5.2 Actor types

Unlike previous scenarios, the actors on both sides in this scenario will be **communities** – where tribal, clan, ethnic or confessional identity provides the principal reference point for collective action, including violence. Instead of governments or rebel groups fighting each other, confrontation takes place along the line of group identities (Brosché and Elfversson, 2012), where the distinction between civilians and combatants is virtually non-existent. This means that deliberate attacks on a community is very often also a deliberate attack on civilians.

There are several possible types of COMMUNAL CONFLICT. One of the most common in rural areas is conflict **between tribes** or **between clans within the same tribe**. The root cause of conflict between these communities has historically been economic competition, since tribes do not produce surplus and neighbouring tribes may rely on the same resources for their survival. These actors are foten pastoralist tribes, whose social and economic system is centred on breeding and raising livestock. Conflict arises when there is competition over territory and resources, such as land for grazing and livestock (very often cattle, but also camels and chickens). One of the actors is usually also nomadic, whereby they move their herds in search of fresh pasture and water on which to graze according to different seasons, which makes them prone to conflict when communities come into competition over access to resources. COMMUNAL CONFLICT may also occur between tribes **during local or national elections**, and between **old and new settlers** in an area (Brosché and Elfversson, 2012). A final type is conflict between **communities in mixed, urban societies**, where the breakdown of order has left ethnicity or confession as the only structure of social organisation its members can turn to for protection.

4.5.3   Strategies and tactics

The root causes of conflict between communities are usually long-standing competition and grievances. The escalation into armed conflict, which is what this scenario describes, is perhaps best explained by the **'security dilemma'** which faces communities when central authority is absent or has broken down (Posen, 1993). A security dilemma arises when both parties take measures to enhance their own security, such as arming themselves – but in doing so increases the perceived threat they pose to others. The types of weapons available to communities (e.g. small arms, clubs, machetes) represent just as much an offensive capability as a defensive one. Offensive and defensive actions become indistinguishable, and the perception of threat increases. At the same time, communities are likely to have very few defensive means at their disposal. For instance, the social and economic conditions required to construct fortifications, which will be the greatest form of defence tribes can attain, are seldom met (Keeley, 1996: 58). More often, wooden fences or roadblocks may be all that communities can erect themselves.

If left unchecked, violence may escalate with each round of violence until it reaches a perception of an existential threat. The resulting situation is one in which **both sides engage in retaliatory attacks**, as the roles of perpetrators and victims constantly shift with each round of violence. The existential threat will be reflected in the strategies communities follow and how they use violence against the other community. Wars between tribes 'are in principle wars of extermination' because they seek the annihilation of an enemy tribe in order to prevent them from seeking revenge against the victors in the future (Karsten, 1923: 277). Anything short of 'destruction', such as occupation or subjugation of another tribe, is not really an option for communities that do not tax their own populations and only exercise limited control. Neither is ethnic cleansing an option for communities that already live in ethnically homogeneous areas, but may be a desirable option for communities in mixed societies. Yet, communities, tribes in particular, will very rarely possess the means required to actually exterminate or even expel the other, primarily due to inherent weaker logistical capacities imposed by small populations, slim economic surpluses, and limited transportation capacities (Keeley, 1996: 175).

As neither side is able to 'destroy' or 'deter' the other, **both sides end up following a logic where they attack in order to 'coerce' the other into refraining from further attacks** – even though it is likely to be returned in kind. The underlying logic is that swift retaliation serves as a deterrent over the long run, and because *not* conducting revenge raids makes future attacks *more* likely as they are perceived as vulnerable (see Chagnon, 1988). Attacks may also be launched because tribal leaders are unable to restrain hotheads among their own (Diamond, 2012: 127).

The trigger of conflict between tribes has traditionally been 'retaliation for acts of violence' (Keeley, 1996: 127). Historically, small-scale raiding aimed at stealing each other's herds has been quite normal between pastoralist communities (known as cattle rustling). However, once war breaks out, the objective is no longer simply to steal livestock, but to kill members of the other community (Rands and Le Riche, 2012). War is then as total as it gets, which makes it **more rational to target civilians and civilian objects than combatants**.

The most common acts of violence in tribal wars include **plundering wealth and food (like cattle), destroying houses, fields and other means of production** that are essential for survival (Keeley, 1996: 48). Larger attacks against civilians are typically directed against population centres or areas where large numbers of the other community is expected to be, especially where previous attacks are considered to have originated from. Particularly brutal acts beyond what is required to kill people are not typically associated with this scenario. Captured male enemies are seldom spared. **Abducting women and children as wives or out of revenge** is very common. There is actually a strategic incentive to target the most vulnerable parts of the population, particularly 'easy targets' like women and children, because this can wreak as much destruction to the opposing tribe as possible. **Instances of mass killings** have historically taken place during large raids, for instance by surrounding or infiltrating an enemy village and attempting to kill everyone within reach when a signal is given (Keeley, 1996: 59).

The same strategic incentive to wreak maximum damage and loss of life applies to conflict between communities in mixed, urban areas as well, although the tactics will be different. Attacks may involve **death squads** killing relatively many members of the other community over time, **bombing of religious buildings or markets** associated almost exclusively with the other community, or **large massacres** in villages where they reside. The timing of attacks in all communal conflicts will be **driven by windows of opportunity** provided by collapse of central authority, or when the prospects of outside intervention to stop them will be low, such as before or after the deployment of peacekeepers, or when they are preoccupied elsewhere.

4.5.4   Capabilities

The limited means available for communities to wage war is a defining feature of this scenario, and is essentially what prevents the situation from escalating into a more decisive one.

Planning in this scenario is unlikely to go beyond preparations for individual attacks, such as assembling forces for a raid against the neighbouring tribe or placing an explosive device at a location where many will be killed. Coordination is equally limited, given the limited forms of

communication available to tribes in particular. The role of tribal leaderships is also ambivalent. Their role has typically been limited encouragement, blessings and information during times of conflict (Schilling et al., 2012). The most successful attacks rely more on operational secrecy that exploit the element of surprise in order to maximise the effect of each raid, bombing or massacre. Improved communication infrastructure in rural area has increased the chances of the targeted community to notice and prepare for the planned raid (Schilling et al., 2012: 6–7). Ambiguity regarding their intentions is also less important, because everyone knows why attacks occur and whose turn it is next – the only real question is when. The willingness within the community to fight an existential threat is unlikely to require much convincing either.

Attacking other communities still requires at least two capabilities. **Freedom of movement** to access their victims will be critical for success in all types of communal conflicts. This will be relatively easy to achieve in mixed societies, given the likely proximity to their intended targets. It may be harder for communities in rural areas, if they are located at some distance from each other. Additionally, logistical constraints will prevent them from moving rapidly and in large numbers. Tribes may simply have to walk long distances to launch an attack. Rainy seasons will in some areas inhibit the mobility of tribal militias and freeze conflicts temporarily.

Another critical requirement is **access to military means** with which to carry out attacks. The units involved in COMMUNAL CONFLICT are not permanently organised groups, but typically ad-hoc militias that join forces before individual attacks or short campaigns. Urban communities may also organise self-protection militias, whose objective is to protect their neighbourhoods and retaliate when necessary. These actors lack group training, which prevents military efficiency. Thus, more units, better military organisation, and deadlier weapons are associated with more fatal outcomes and an escalation of violence in this scenario. The influx of firearms into conflicts that were previously fought with only primitive means (spears, arrows, sticks, knives) is said to have led to more deadly conflicts. Studies point to a link between the availability of light weapons and civilian death and suffering (Laurence, 1998; Mirzeler and Young, 2000; Mkutu, 2006).

The resource limitations may be overcome if outside actors supply the communities with means, or organise and train militias. This has been done in the past by actors that seek to incite communal conflict for their own purposes, such as rallying support during elections, states seeking to destabilise their neighbours, or to mobilise for more violent scenarios. The massive potential for violence combined with the limited availability of means, also raises the prospect of WMDs being used by communities who may regard an attack as their only means of defence – a situation which is not entirely unthinkable in Syria, where one or several communities may acquire control over chemical weapons.

Examples

War between tribes predates modern warfare, but is still quite common in some parts of the world. A classic example is that between the **Lou-Nuer and Murle tribes in South Sudan**, which is discussed in the accompanying report (Chapter 5 in Våge, 2014). Other cases that bear many of the same characteristics include tribal conflicts in the **Karamoja region of Uganda**, between **Lendu and Hemu ethnic groups in eastern DRC**, and between pastoralist tribes **in Southern Darfur**, **Warrab and Unity States of South Sudan**, the **Turkana and Pokot in north-western Kenya**, and **Orma and Pokomo tribes in Kenya's Tana River District**. These low-intensity conflicts have a long history of grievances, which occasionally escalates into the kind of violence described in this scenario.

COMMUNAL CONFLICTS are also often intermingled with other conflicts in more urban societies, where internal or external actors may seek to incite or exploit communal tensions for their own benefit. COMMUNAL CONFLICTS occurred amidst the civil wars in **Lebanon** (1975–1990) and **Iraq** (2006–2008), and it appears to have broken out between Sunni Arabs and some minorities in certain parts of **Syria**. In **North Kivu** of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the security dilemma dynamics between communities has been identified alongside the presence of PREDATORY actors (Burbidge, 2009).

A rather exceptional case is **the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the two Intifadas** (1987–1993 and 2000–2005). As in COMMUNAL CONFLICTS elsewhere, the underlying cause of conflict pertains to competition over land, the primary rationale for attacking has been retaliation for the last round of violence, violence has been used against whole communities, and it has been designed to wreak maximum destruction in the unlikely hope that it will deter further retribution. What makes it stand out is that Israel is a state actor, which undoubtedly has the means to settle the conflict decisively. Policy rather than the lack of means has stopped the Israelis from decisively defeating the Palestinians during both Intifadas, albeit the fundamental dynamics of violence remain the same.

4.5.5   Expected outcome

Despite the primitive form of organisation and limited means available to actors in this scenario, there is a massive potential for violence. A cycle of violence may last for days, weeks or months, depending on the weather, likelihood of success, and forces available – but revenge will come eventually. During each cycle, the one-sided casualty figures will make it clear who the perpetrators and victims are.

In general, there will be a **relatively high number of deaths** proportional to the total population of the community under threat. Historically, tribal wars have been more violent than even the most destructive industrial wars (see Keeley, 1996). This is because when whole communities are at war, fighters make up a relatively large proportion of the population as a whole.

The average tribal society loses 0.5% of its population in combat every year – the equivalent of 1.5 million deaths in the US (Boot, 2013). In the Karamoja region of Uganda, one study showed that as many as 25% of households had suffered death or injury to a family member during the last six months (Bevan, 2007). Also, **the number of deaths may be higher than the number of injuries**, due to the intent to wreak maximum destruction and because tribes have no reason to take prisoners. For example, there were reported on average between two and eight times as many killed as injured during the raids in Turkana between 2006 and 2008 (see graphs in Schilling et al., 2012). If the conflict occurs between pastoralist communities, **the number of livestock stolen is likely to be very high** (several tens of thousands of cattle stolen per cycle is not uncommon).

As for fleeing, communities in rural areas tend to **vacate their villages** pending an onslaught they cannot defend against. Civilians may flee to nearby population centres where forces that can protect them are based, or simply disperse into the bush if they regard that as safer (a common practise in parts of Africa). This displacement may only be temporary as attacking tribes are likely to withdraw to their own areas afterwards, even when victorious, leaving the geographic distribution of communities largely unchanged. Those civilians unable to flee or defend themselves, however, are likely to be killed or abducted. A high proportion of victims will be women, children, and elderly (see Leff, 2012). In **mixed societies**, the attacks may prompt communities to relocate to their own ethnic brethren, which creates homogeneous areas similar to the outcome of ETHNIC CLEANSING (e.g. Baghdad 2006–08). This will be accompanied by regularly increasing numbers of people killed in raids, bombings or massacres by both sides, which will be more evenly distributed than typical of GENOCIDE or ETHNIC CLEANSING.

4.5.6   Implications for military forces

In this scenario, whole communities will be under periodic threats of violent death, having their villages destroyed, and their means of survival plundered or stolen. The need for **physical protection may not be limited only to people, but also of livestock** because they are means of survival. A bottom-up study on how 'protection' was perceived in Jonglei state in South Sudan showed that the population took it to mean *physical* protection of themselves *and* their animal herds from banditry and local clashes (Harragin, 2011), which is likely to be common across pastoralist communities. The role of military forces will be important in addressing both of these forms of physical threats, but will not be able to address the root causes in the long term.

The threat to civilians and livestock will only become 'imminent' when attacks are in preparation or already underway, which means that most utility of force may be found in various forms of **protection through presence** that will deny opportunities and deter attacks. It is possible to **deter militia attacks** through presence of military forces, since the perpetrators are attacking others primarily so as not to die themselves. Inflicting only a few casualties on the attackers may be sufficient, since the fighters may constitute a relatively large proportion of the community's total population and the frequency of battles means that they cannot sustain large numbers of casualties in each. This may reduce the perception of threat to all communities, which are the primary motivations for both sides to attack the other in this scenario.

Yet, military forces tasked *only* with deterring attacks, however, may end up doing traditional peacekeeping between tribes. As roles change, protectors may end up protecting last week's perpetrator in the next round and thus merely joining the cycle of violence themselves as parties to the conflict. Denying the opportunity to launch attacks may require **physical separation** through curfews, checkpoints, roadblocks, walls, or positioning of force between the communities. Albeit controversial, the Israeli walls along the West Bank and Gaza have effectively ended the number of Palestinian suicide bombers, which was the principal killer of Israelis. In Iraq, American forces physically separated Shiite and Sunni neighbourhoods with apparent short-term success. In Jonglei, the UN and South Sudanese forces once maintained a perimeter defence around the town of Pibor, which protected the people inside (but not outside).

However, by the time it becomes apparent that an attack is underway it may be too late to react, especially if forces are deployed to rural areas with limited mobility. Military force may have to be used more **pre-emptively to 'coerce' perpetrators** into changing their minds about attacking in the first place, by reducing their ability to do so and threatening them with consequences. Securing vulnerable arms depots, cutting external support, or seizing weapons (small arms especially) is likely to increase the costs involved for the community, or at least reduce the lethality of attacks if they occur. The largest attack in Jonglei (2011–12), during which the Nuer White Army showed hitherto unprecedented ability to coordinate large forces, indicated how better coordinated attacks, more communication equipment, and vehicles for mobility, enabled the deadliest massacres in a long time. This means that any military action to degrade any of these capabilities will reduce their ability to attack, much in the same way as against a conventional enemy that relies on a number of functions for support.

Military forces may also provide a **coercive incentive to disarmament of communities** (Danish Demining Group et al., 2012). The lessons from coercive disarmament campaigns in the past have been mixed (see Small Arms Survey, 2006; Leff, 2007; Wepundi et al., 2011; Saferworld, 2012). In theory, it can prolong the cycles between attacks and thereby create a longer window of opportunity for other instruments of power to address the root causes. For instance, almost 90% of attacks in Karamoja were perpetrated with small arms (Bevan, 2007). However, the weapons that communities use to attack each other are also used to defend themselves. This is why impartiality will be of high importance. Successful disarmament of whole civilian communities (as opposed to armed rebel groups) requires it to occur simultaneously in areas perceived as threatening to the other community, and by forces trusted by the locals, which studies have shown may be international rather than local (Danish Demining Group et al., 2012). It is also said that the security dilemma is only overcome when a third party is willing to enforce demobilisation (Walter, 2002).

4.6 Predatory violence

Summary

The sixth scenario describes situations where civilians are subjected to PREDATORY VIOLENCE, such as plunder, murder and abduction, by armed groups who rely on *exploitation* of civilians to ensure their own survival or make a profit. This scenario is most likely in areas where there are 'lootable' resources or central authority has collapsed, which enables activities that otherwise would not have been possible. Civilians, especially women and children, will be under sporadic threats of violence, which is likely to persist until the perpetrators are disbanded or defeated.

4.6.1 Rationale

In this scenario, the perpetrators target civilians for selfish purposes. At minimum, the motivation may simply be to ensure their own survival, which depends on plundering civilians. Survival is the minimum objective that any actor may have and is a prerequisite for pursuing other objectives (Vinci, 2007). Alternatively, the motivation may be to make profits in a chaotic war environment. War is not viewed as means through which to achieve political objectives, but as an advantageous state of affairs that enables actions that in peacetime would be punishable, such as exportation of illegally obtained minerals or taxation of the local population.

The rationale for targeting civilians is therefore not to exterminate, expel or control them, but rather **to exploit the population** in ways that increase their chances of survival or profits.

4.6.2 Actor types

The actors in this scenario will **typically be rebels groups** who have failed to achieve their original political objectives, but still refuse to demobilise or disarm, or rebel groups who never really had a political ambition from the very start (see Tranekaer, 2012; Metelits, 2007). These actors are often referred to as 'opportunistic' rebel groups (Weinstein, 2007: 10), who are rebels that enjoy access to a substantial flow of economic endowments that serves as the catalyst and the means for initiating violent campaigns. These endowments are often 'lootable' natural resources that 'can be harvested by simple methods by individuals or small groups, do not require investment in expensive equipment, and can easily be smuggled', such as alluvial diamonds and coltan (Lujala et al., 2005: fn. 1). Alternatively, the endowments may be outside funding from actors who seek to use these groups to destabilise the region for their own purposes, whilst simultaneously making them less dependent on the local population for support.

Because these groups are driven more by economic opportunity than ideological commitment or nationalistic goals, they are **likely to operate as 'roving bandits'** (Olson, 1993), crossing borders into new territory where they may be regarded as 'foreigners' by the local population. This means that their chances of gaining popular and material support from the population are minimal. Whilst more classic insurgents 'can obtain resources by striking cooperative bargains with noncombatant populations', opportunistic rebels 'employ coercive tactics because they cannot credibly commit to non-abusive behaviour' (Weinstein, 2007: 10).

Because survival 'is not fundamentally dependent on civilian support, such groups behave in a more predatory fashion, unconcerned about the reactions of the population' (Weinstein, 2007: 171).

Thus, these actors are also more likely than other groups to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Sometimes, these actors may be **militias** or **criminal gangs**, controlled by heads of states or warlords who are less interested in ruling the country than employing the state's apparatus to accumulate personal wealth and sustain its patronage network. This tends to happen if predatory rebels assume the reins of state. In some cases, it may also be **rogue units within the security forces** that are poorly paid or equipped and therefore engage in plunder and abuse to survive and to profit. It is not uncommon to see collusion between these actors, who under normal circumstances would be fighting each other, but instead collaborate when it comes to plunder of civilians and trading with another in raw materials, drugs and even weapons (Keen, 2000: 35).

4.6.3   Strategies and tactics

The tactics employed by predatory perpetrators will reflect how violence is the principal means with which to attain their goals, and that these goals entail significant violence against civilians. In this scenario, civilians are **primary targets**, because attacking civilians 'is more profitable and less risky than confronting other armed forces' (Slim, 2007: 161). Hence, these perpetrators will typically *avoid* pitched battles or encounters with other armed forces – including an intervening force. This is not so much because they lack the means to do so, but rather a lack of interest in winning when their primary occupation is to exploit the situation of war.

Thus, the whole population within the area of operations may be potential targets for perpetrators, although perpetrators prefer **'softer' targets** in the sense of them being poorly defended, because the rewards will be greater and the risks lower. In fact, perpetrators will have no incentives to limit violence against civilians, when they have no ambition of controlling the population in the ways that insurgent groups fighting for political power will. To the contrary, actors in this scenario have a greater incentive to maximise violence against civilians if this will increase their chances of survival or economic rewards. The only times rebels will typically limit their violence is if it threatens to reveal their locations or draws unwanted attention.

In order to survive, rebels will often need to **plunder civilians and aid supplies** to acquire food. Rebel groups in this scenario have been known to suffer from periods of starvation. Civilians may also be **forced to carry plundered goods** back to rebel bases. To maintain their ranks, civilians are **abducted and forced into military service**, as they have no other ways of recruiting them when they do not live amongst the population. Young adolescents are often targeted in particular because they are overrepresented in the population, more easily indoctrinated than young adults, and more effective guerrilla fighters than younger children (Blattman and Annan, 2010). To minimise the children's prospects of returning, they are often **forced to kill members of their own family or community**. Those caught attempting to escape are likely to face a brutal death in front of the other children. The type of rape most typically associated with this scenario is

'opportunistic rape', perpetrated against civilians not identified with any side of the war. Instead, it is driven by sexual desire or desire for power and domination that have little to do with the war objective, with females of various ages constituting the majority of targets in these cases (Isikozlu and Millard, 2010: 59). Girls and women may also be taken as **sex slaves** and wives. The line between war crimes committed out of 'necessity' and what is done for pleasure will be rather blurred.

There are a number of ways that actors can benefit economically from exploitation of civilians without holding the reins of state power, such as **pillage**, **protection money**, **controlling trade**, **labour exploration** and **stealing aid supplies** (see Keen, 1998). Controlling and exporting **minerals** will be a particularly lucrative business in resource-rich areas, which can both enable short-term profits and finance its perpetuation. Thus, control over diamond-rich areas or outside funding will be typical strategic centres of gravity for perpetrators in this scenario.

For some actors, the use of violence **may also contain an element of population control** (Olsen, 2007). Deliberate targeting of civilians may serve to deter collaboration with governments that may be in pursuit, or to minimise resistance from the people they seek to exploit. Whilst rebels who seek to garner popular support will combine violence with other incentives (e.g. security or health services), physical violence is the only means with which to exercise control over the population for perpetrators in this scenario. In doing so, rebel groups **may become famous for their brutality**, such as the amputation of arms or mutilation of lips. The violence will typically exceed what is required to kill the victim as a macabre warning to others who consider resisting. Terror is used to paralyse whole communities. This explains why rebel groups may sometimes resort to massive violence against civilians, which may at first seem irrational since they do not aim to exterminate or expel them.

4.6.4   Capabilities

The actors in this scenario are first and foremost military rather than political organisations. Their main targets are civilians, which means that most of their capabilities are directly linked to their ability to attack civilians. Rebel groups are often conventionally organised, with clear structures of command and control, war councils, and strict internal discipline to maintain internal cohesion. Looting and plundering is often attributed to an undisciplined rank-and-file, but for these perpetrators it serves a strategic purpose. In fact, recent studies have shown that 'organizational *hierarchy* rather than anarchy [as is commonly assumed] is associated with an increased incidence of acts against the civilian population' (Schneider, 2009). This suggests that coordination from above is necessary for attacks against civilians to be effective. Sophisticated coordination beyond tactical movements and simple radio communication is unlikely to be required to attack undefended villages or towns. Hence, planning and coordination are associated with greater efficiency during attacks on civilians, but not critical in and of themselves.

Like any other non-state actor, rebel groups are not critically dependent on concealing or justifying their war crimes (ambiguity), since they cannot formally oppose an intervention. The perpetrators in this scenario do not seek popular support either. Their brutality is still likely to

draw unwanted attention, which may prompt military operations against them. Hence, they will be interested in creating a political narrative that justifies their existence and can be used to grant them legitimacy in possible negotiations, even though their actions on the ground reveal otherwise. These groups may rely on operational secrecy to avoid detection. Thus, attacks may occur more frequently under the cover of darkness at dusk and dawn.

In operationalising their violent campaigns, the rebels may have a centralised command and conventional structure with headquarters, local detachments and clear logistical lines of support. Alternatively, they may be decentralised units operating autonomously in small teams of only a handful fighters. In either case, the distinction between layers of perpetrators will be less clear in this scenario, since the **rebels are both instigators and executioners of violence** on the ground. Both survival and greed-driven groups are likely to have significant numbers of child and female soldiers amongst their ranks – in some cases, making up most of their fighters.

They are likely to have **light or primitive weapons** (e.g. rifles, machine guns, knives, clubs, machetes), but relatively primitively armed groups in small numbers can wreak massive havoc due to their unrestrained brutality. Hence, neither manpower nor weapons to attack civilians is likely to be hard to acquire, even though they are critically dependent on them. They are still likely to require better weapons than the civilians they target, who may have spears and other primitive weapons to defend themselves. Possession of more conventional military capabilities will increase their ability to launch attacks on better defended areas, such as diamond or coltan mines, but these capabilities will not be critically related to their ability to target civilians.

A second critical requirement, however, is **freedom of movement to attack when and where** rewards are likely to be highest and resistance smallest. However, this is unlikely to pose an insurmountable challenge. If one village is defended, they may simply proceed to the next.

Examples

In general, the emergence of more predatory rebels has been associated with the mixture of war, organised crime and massive violations of human rights in the so-called 'new wars' (Kaldor, 2007a), and opportunities for exporting primary commodities (Collier, 2000). A classic case was the **Revolutionary United Front** (RUF), which ravaged Sierra Leone from 1991 until it was largely defeated in 2001 (see Gberie, 2005). When the RUF invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia it failed to garner local support as they were largely perceived as foreigners, and resorted to forceful coercion of civilians from the very start. Diamonds was the 'principal motivation for the RUF and its outside backers' from early on (Gberie, 2005: 9). With little more than a hundred men, it was able to bring the country to its knees within a year 'by dramatically killing, cutting people's arms off and abducting their children' (Slim, 2007: 158). According to Gberie (2005: 204), the use of violence 'for the purpose of terror, control and criminal expropriation was indeed always the linchpin of the RUF's strategy'.

The **Lord's Resistance Army** (LRA) represents the more survival-driven type of predatory rebel groups and is treated in Chapter 2 of the accompanying report (Våge, 2014). Other actors who fall into this scenario include **Renamo** (1975–92) in Mozambique, which emerged as a pseudo-terrorist group sponsored by Rhodesia and emerged as a full-scale predatory actor under the tutelage of South Africa (see Finnegan, 1992), and the **Allied Democratic Forces** (ADF), which harrowed Uganda in the 1990s and has now resurfaced in the DRC (see International Crisis Group, 2012). In that same area, fractions of **the Congolese Armed Forces** have also been involved in extensive looting, rape and extortion of civilians, even though two thirds of the local population still believe that their presence contributes to their protection from other armed groups (Oxfam, 2012). **Boko Haram** in Nigeria has increasingly targeted civilians primarily, and parallels have been made to this development and that of the LRA in the 1990s (Zenn, 2013).

4.6.5   Expected outcome

Since violence is primarily intended to exploit populations, it follows that **not that many civilians will be killed relative to the number of people potentially under threat**. Looting, abductions and various acts of brutality are likely to stand out as frequent war crimes. By 2008, the LRA was estimated to have killed thousands and abducted between 52,000 and 75,000 children and adults to serve as soldiers, porters, and sex slaves (Pham et al., 2009). Abduction continues to be the most frequently documented crime reported by the LRA Crisis Tracker since December 2008 – with 4,551 abductions compared to 2,310 deaths (as of 28 October 2013). In Sierra Leone, it has been estimated that as many as 20,000 were mutilated (Hoffman, 2004). The perpetrators are also likely to leave behind many **plundered population centres** stripped of every lootable item – from plumbing to furniture to medical supplies – and what cannot be transported, may be destroyed. In Mozambique, Renamo destroyed, looted or forced about 50% of all health care clinics to close (Finnegan, 1992: 24).

The number of **displaced people will be disproportionately high**, due to the brutality and unpredictability of the attacks. E.g. about 20% of the population (420,000 people) in LRA-affected areas of the Central Africa Republic, South Sudan and DRC are currently displaced (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013), whilst more than half the population in Sierra Leone displaced during the war (Kaldor and Vincent, 2006). Mere suspected sightings of rebels can prompt whole villages to leave. Hence, the number of IDPs may fluctuate a lot. IDP camps also pose attractive targets for rebels since they are often poorly defended.

There is also a **realistic danger of violence escalating into campaigns of mass killings** (destruction of civilians rather than property) aimed at paralysing a whole community. These campaigns may amount to acts of genocide, but fall outside the definition of genocide because civilians are not targeted because they belong to a certain group. For example, having lost 90% of Sierra Leone by 1999, including the diamond mining districts, the RUF launched 'Operation No Living Thing', whose stated purpose was according to the force commander, to kill everyone in

the country 'to the last chicken' to avenge their ousting (Gberie, 2005: 120). During the three weeks it took for intervening forces to counter the rebel offensive, some 6,000 civilians had been killed, thousands mutilated and abducted, and a large part of the city torched (Gberie, 2005: 161). By comparison, 70,000 had been killed and 2.6 million displaced during ten years of war in total (Gberie, 2005: 6; Kaldor and Vincent, 2006: 4).

4.6.6   Implications for military forces

As in all other scenarios, non-military means will be required to address the root causes of state breakdown and enabling conditions for predatory behaviour, but the role of military forces is likely to be decisive in protecting civilians from the threat of physical violence in this scenario.

In the short term, some protection can be afforded through various forms of **military presence** that can 'deter' attacks against poorly defended targets. The **saturation-approach** typical of counterinsurgency operations will be particularly useful because it inhibits the perpetrator's freedom of movement and have a greater deterrent effect due to the wider military presence. Military presence can also reassure the population, through patrols, live fire exercises, and arresting perpetrators. In this context, **protection of women and children** should be given priority, as they are more likely to be victimised than others. This may include escorting them when going to the market or fetching water or firewood outside their villages. It will be difficult to determine which areas to prioritise, however, as space is normally not an operational limitation for these perpetrators, unless their interests are tied to resources in specific areas.

In the long-term, **the threat of physical violence against civilians is likely to persist as long as the rebel groups are allowed to continue to operate**. If the perpetrating group is coercible, which is most likely if economic rewards are their primary motivation, they may be quite easily coerced. E.g. a relatively limited 'show of force' may be sufficient to coerce opportunistic rebel groups into disarming and demobilising. E.g. Operation Barras (2000) in Sierra Leone was only a small operation to rescue British soldiers captured by a small rebel group, but it was the first attack on a rebel base in the hinterlands and signalled both to the RUF and other militias that they would risk further confrontation if they did not comply (see Roberson, 2007). During the EU Operation Artemis in Bunia in 2003, it took only a few clashes that left some 20 militiamen dead before security in the town was re-established, but it left no doubt as to the willingness to use force (Homan, 2007).

It may be harder to coerce those perpetrators whose lives depend on attacking civilians. If the rebels are incoercible, they will have to be **militarily defeated** to reduce the threat they pose to civilians. Destroying the military capabilities of predatory rebels may be difficult if they operate in inhospitable terrain and only rely on primitive weapons. Here, eliminating the rebel leadership is one option. The leader himself may be a charismatic individual upon which the cohesion of the fighters depends, whose loss may cause the organisation to dissolve or fragment. This is less likely to work if groups operate autonomously and in dispersed units who only occasionally have contact with the leadership. Here, the only option left may be to conduct **'search and destroy'**

missions. If a sufficient number of rebels are killed, it may prompt the rest to desert, which the latest report shows with regards to the LRA (Lancaster and Cakaj, 2013).

The International Crisis Group (2010) has emphasised the need for a strategy beyond killing the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony. Ending the LRA threat will require neutralising isolated groups of fighters and doing more to induce members to surrender. Based on these perpetrators' modus operandi, there is also reason to believe that the approaches and tactics found in current counterinsurgency doctrines can also be used for purposes of protection without much modification – such as interdiction campaigns to cut external supplies, gradual spread of government control, and framework patrols to neutralise insurgents. This is because the objective in counterinsurgency operations – to defeat those who threaten stability – will be required to protect civilians in the long run as well.

A cautionary note, however, is that failed attempts to defeat these rebel groups may backfire against the civilian population rather than own forces. The RUF's operation 'No Living Thing' came in response to it being ousted from Freetown. Similarly, the LRA launched a murderous campaign against civilians in retaliation for a military offensive that tried, but failed, to apprehend its leadership in late 2008. During the two months that followed, the LRA killed close to a thousand civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands in the DRC and southern Sudan.

4.7   Insurgency

Summary
The seventh and final scenario describes situations where insurgent groups attack civilians only *as a tactic or as a means* to achieve other objectives. Civilians are not the perpetrator's primary targets, but are still deliberately attacked for purposes of population control. The physical threat to civilians will be greatest in areas where insurgents are losing control, seek to wrestle control from others, or come back to re-establish control through retaliation. Civilians are less targeted where neither side is in control, but the presence of fighting carries other risks. These threats are likely to persist until insurgents are politically accommodated or completely defeated.

4.7.1   Rationale

This scenario provides the clearest examples of perpetrators who deliberately target civilians merely as a means to achieve an end. Violence against civilians is not intrinsic to the goal for which they are fighting, but is resorted to out of necessity or because of its particular utility. The rationale for targeting civilians is primarily '**to control a population** rather than simply to loot, displace or eliminate it' (Kalyvas, 2006: 147). Such control is often a pre-requisite for collecting resources, obtaining information about collaborators, and building a credible alternative to the governments they may seek to replace – all of which is central to their ability to continue military operations and to eventually achieve their political or ideological objectives.

4.7.2   Actors types

Unlike the REGIME CRACKDOWN-scenario, where governments are fighting over control of the population, the **main perpetrators in this scenario are non-state armed actors**. This is most likely to occur when rebels are fighting democratic states, because the incentive to target civilians is greater against governments that are held accountable if they are unable to protect their own citizens (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Hultman, 2008). Precisely because governments do not attack civilians indiscriminately, rebels will have to do so in order to create insecurity, undermine trust in the government, and seek to obtain control themselves. Unlike authoritarian regimes, however, rebel groups will not possess the same coercive apparatus to control a population by force or launch massively destructive attacks in government areas. This means that the overall level of violence in this scenario is likely to be lower than in a REGIME CRACKDOWN, even though the rationale for targeting civilians is largely the same.

The actors in this scenario will normally be rebel groups with a **clear political or ideological objective**, and that use a combination of guerrilla warfare against government forces and violence against the civilian population at large to achieve this. Their opponents may also be rival armed groups, but most often government forces, including international forces there to assist them. Ideally, the rebels would have liked to achieve their ends with no violence against civilians at all, especially since they often seek to rule over the populations they target in the process, but such violence is seen as a 'necessary evil' where the end justifies exceptional means. Rebels may seek to build popular support before beginning a military campaign (see Tse-tung, 2000 on the Maoist protracted war), or try to jumpstart a revolution by initiating conflict with only a small number of revolutionaries (the *foco*) in the hope that this will provoke an indiscriminate response from the government and inspire broader support for an insurrection (see Debray, 1967; Guevara, 2006). The focoist approach has been a favourite amongst contemporary guerrilla movements, like the Taliban (Kilcullen, 2009: 86). Rebel groups will vary from one operational theatre to another, but common to all perpetrators in this scenario is that they **depend on and fight for control of the population** in order to sustain operations and achieve their objectives, and have little to gain by exterminating, expelling or only exploiting them.

This distinguishes the rebels in this scenario from those relying on PREDATORY VIOLENCE. The rebel groups in this scenario are more likely to be politically motivated 'activist' groups, who are stationary or affiliated with a certain group of people. They are also likely to be larger in numbers, and may have organised states-within-states in areas under their control, where they can impose their own form of governance, and possibly provide alternative social services to those of the state. Hence, these actors are **more in line with the traditional definition of classic insurgents** found in most military doctrines – as a movement pursuing a protracted struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established political authority while increasing their own control (e.g. see Chapter 1 in Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24).

4.7.3   Strategies and tactics

Since the rationale for targeting civilians is to control the population upon which they may depend for information, supplies and active support, attacks on civilians are only useful insofar it helps the achievement of their desired end state. Excessive violence is counterproductive, as it will alienate the population and possibly drive them into the hands of their rivals. This is reflected in how their strategies seek to limit rather than maximise the use of violence against civilians.

The primary targets of violence will be government or enemy forces and their allies, whilst civilians will be subjected to a combination of **'indiscriminate' and 'selective' violence depending on the level of control** the perpetrators have in different areas (Kalyvas, 2006). In areas where the government is in complete control, violence against civilians will primarily serve to 'incite' insecurity. Civilians will not necessarily be the primary targets of violence, but may constitute the majority of casualties due to the indiscriminate nature of the tactics used. The primary killers of civilians in these situations are often indiscriminate weapons, like car bombs, suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These tactics not only seek to create insecurity where it does not already exist, but also to provoke equally indiscriminate responses the government. In the long run, the hope is that this will 'realign people's incentives in order to ensure their passive or active support of the perpetrating group' (Slim, 2007: 143).

At the same time, insurgents must avoid being 'too indiscriminate' in the sense of it being randomly targeted, because they often rely on support from the local population and may seek to rule over them in the future. The idea is that the more secure victims feel, the more they produce, which will increase the amount of resources the armed groups can extract (such as food or drugs). Civilians must therefore feel that cooperation with the insurgents guarantees them some sense of security. Thus, **in areas under insurgent control, insurgents have stronger incentives to limit their violence**. Instead, insurgents use more selective tactics to 'deter' collaboration with the enemy through targeted assassinations, threats, spreading rumours or the mere virtue of their presence. Intimidating civilians in areas under their control can also serve a number of other purposes, such as looting property, forced recruitment, and illegal taxation. This is where the threat of physical violence, however, is likely to be smallest and least imminent.

The **biggest threat of physical violence to civilians in this scenario arises at times and in areas where control is shifting hands**. If the insurgent's monopoly is challenged, whether by the government or other rebels, insurgents will have to resort to more indiscriminate and selective violence to maintain or re-establish control. In the past, insurgents have increasingly targeted alleged spies and individuals suspected of collaborating with the enemy in advance or anticipation of attacks against them (e.g. arrests, detention, execution). In areas where insurgents have recently been cleared by government forces, rapid escalation of indiscriminate violence can be expected, as insurgents seek to undermine the new rulers. In areas where they have lost control, but retake it, the incentive to collectively punish the population for perceived collaboration with the government is likely to be very high. Sexual violence and rape is used less as a tool of war in this scenario, and if it happens it is more likely to be a product of poor command and control (Wood, 2006).

These forms of deliberate targeting of civilians for purposes of population control **come on top of the threats that emanate from ground engagements between governments and insurgents**. However, it is in these most contested areas that direct targeting of civilians by insurgents is likely to be least, because they will have nothing to gain from it (neither support nor undermine the government). Hence, governments may become the main perpetrators by accident. Thus, this is where measures to reduce civilian casualties caused by own actions will be most important.

4.7.4   Capabilities

Insurgent groups are typically political as well as military organisations, which means that many of the capabilities they require – weapons to conduct guerrilla warfare, recruitment of committed fighters, fostering popular support, and possibly even establishing a state-within-state organisation – will *not* be directly linked to their ability to attack civilians.

Advance planning and coordination by the military and political leadership will focus on the war against the government and other rivals rather than how to cause harm to civilians. In fact, it is not uncommon for organised armed groups like those described in this scenario to have codes of conduct, where certain war crimes are prohibited and punished. Insurgent groups have little to gain by hiding or being ambiguous about their violence either, as they have no way of formally opposing outside intervention, counterinsurgency operations are probably taking place already, and the violence is intended to send a message to others. In fact, insurgents normally go to great lengths to *explain* why their targeting of civilians is justified and claim responsibility for attacks (except the most deadly).

In terms of relevant military units and weapons used to control the population, such as car bombs, targeted assassinations, or issuing threats, they are fairly simple and do not require much in terms of equipment, logistical supply or military hardware. **Some tactics or weapons are still likely to be more deadly** than others (especially explosive weapons), but will not be critical to the insurgents' ability to attack civilians. Even if they are denied the use of certain tactics, they are only likely to devise new ways. A good example of adaptation is the use of IEDs, which gradually became the number one killer of both pro-government forces and civilians in Afghanistan.

The only requirement that insurgents will always be critically dependent on to launch their attacks on civilians is **freedom of movement** to access to the population amongst which they operate and threaten. This freedom of movement is different from the freedom of movement they require to attack government forces. Whilst attacks on government targets will have to be launched in specific areas to achieve greatest military or symbolic effect, insurgents can attack civilians anywhere, at any time, and still achieve the intended destabilising effect. Insurgents still require the mobility to conduct such attacks and operational secrecy to operate amongst the people, which is precisely why physically separating insurgents from the population is in theory the most effective way of protecting civilians from all types of insurgent violence.

Examples

There are many past cases of insurgents who have targeted civilians as part of their strategy to defeat the government. Classic examples include the **Vietcong**, the **Nationalist Liberation Front (FLN)** in Algeria, the **Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)**, and the **Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)**.

Whilst both insurgents and governments in these types of conflict have been responsible for extensive violence against civilians in the past, the distinction between INSURGENCY and REGIME CRACKDOWN has become clearer in recent years, due to precision-guided munitions, smaller bombs and lower tolerance for civilian casualties, which has clarified which of the parties that target civilians as part of their strategy the most. Two current examples include the **Taliban** in Afghanistan and **al-Shabaab** in Somalia, which are discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 in Våge (2014).

Another important aspect is that there are many armed groups that have targeted civilians in line with this scenario – but whose atrocities have been much smaller than those by the regimes they have been fighting. These include the **Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)**, the **Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)** in former Yugoslavia, the **Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)** in Darfur, and the **Free Syrian Army (FSA)** in Syria. There are also insurgents operating alongside other types of scenarios, such as the rebellion by **David Yau Yau** in Jonglei state in South Sudan, where COMMUNAL CONFLICTS have occurred alongside several INSURGENCIES.

4.7.5   Expected outcome

The greater limitations on violence in this scenario will be reflected in a **smaller number of people killed or injured compared to the other scenarios**. For example, far more civilians have been killed (36,000) during two years of REGIME CRACKDOWN in Syria (early 2011–mid-2013) than have been killed in Afghanistan (about 15,000) after five years of Taliban INSURGENCY (2007–2012) – both in absolute figures and relative to the total populations (figures based on Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2013; UNAMA, 2013a).

One can also expect more battle-related deaths than one-sided violence against civilians, because the conflict is one between two warring parties – not a war against civilians. The number of people affected – killed or displaced – will **grow in accordance with the intensity of fighting between belligerents**. Traditional 'fighting seasons' may be a more accurate predictor of fluctuation in civilian deaths than the particular demographics of an area, as in other scenarios.

The **primary cause of civilian death will typically be indiscriminate insurgent attacks** against government military or political targets. During 2012 in Afghanistan, which is the best documented conflict in this scenario, 41% of insurgent-caused civilian deaths come from IEDs, 22% from suicide attacks, 18% from targeted killings, 14% ground engagement, and 3% during complex attacks (UNAMA, 2013a). Selective violence too can, contrary to widespread

perception, be massive in scale (Kalyvas, 2004). E.g. the Vietcong is estimated to have selectively assassinated 50,000 people in a decade and a half (Wickham-Crowley, 1990: 215). In Somalia, the greatest threats to civilians include combat situations in civilian spaces, being forcibly recruited or accused of spying activities, sexual violence as a result of poor command and control, looting of property, and deliberate targeting of civilians in retaliation for attacks (African Union, 2013).

The number of people fleeing the area of operations is also likely to rise gradually. The majority of the population is likely to stay put, even during prolonged periods of conflict. Those who do flee will be fleeing **the presence of violence rather than the presence of insurgents** (or counterinsurgents). Thus, civilians may only vacate the area for the duration of fighting rather than leave their homes permanently. In some cases, people may also flee a particular form of rule being implemented (e.g. sharia or communal discrimination) or because continued fighting disrupts their livelihoods, but not because civilians are physically targeted. This reflects the notion that physical safety is unlikely to be the primary concern for the majority civilians in this scenario. Civilians may be equally concerned with corruption, development and basic services (e.g. see opinion polls from Afghanistan by the Asia Foundation, as well as FFI's own surveys from Faryab province – the latest of which is Marthinussen et al., 2014).

4.7.6   Implications for military forces

Military forces have been faced with this scenario in many recent conflicts – in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali – where civilians have been more 'objectives to be won' (Smith, 2006) than 'targets'. Despite the 'population-centric' contemporary counterinsurgency-doctrines today, the **role of military force in protecting civilians will be relatively limited in this scenario**, since threats of physical violence are unlikely to dominate the agenda and because defeating insurgents is likely to require use of force beyond what is necessary to protect civilians.

At minimum, military forces must **reduce the number of civilian deaths caused by own actions**. Much progress has been made in this regard over the last ten years. Advancements in precision weaponry have reduced the damage caused to civilians from the air. The number of civilian deaths resulting from NATO's air campaign in Kosovo (1999) was estimated around 500 (Human Rights Watch, 2000) compared to 72 in Libya (2011) (Human Rights Watch, 2012), despite flying more strike sorties. The operation in Libya was the first time in history only precision-guided munitions were used (NATO, 2012). More importantly, tactical directives restricting the escalation of force, hazardous driving, use of close air-support, and monitoring incidents where civilian casualties have occurred has had a notable effect in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Sewall and Lewis, 2010; Beadle, 2010). Pro-government forces have reduced the proportion of civilians killed by own actions in Afghanistan from 41% in 2007 to 11% in 2013 (UNAMA, 2009; 2014). In Somalia, AMISOM has undertaken similar measures to reduce civilian casualties (Lotze, 2011). In this scenario, cautionary measures such as these will be most relevant in areas where fighting between government and insurgent forces is taking place.

However, excessive focus on 'how not to kill' civilians will overlook the fact that **insurgent violence remains the biggest threat to civilians** in this scenario, as they are responsible for the vast majority of civilian casualties. For example, even though pro-government forces kill fewer and fewer civilians in Afghanistan, the total number of deaths *doubled* from 1,523 in 2007 to 3,131 in 2011. The number of deaths and injuries matters at least as much as who caused them, because civilians in Afghanistan have identified the presence of violence, rather than the presence of Taliban or international forces, as the primary reason for their negative views on security situation (see Asia Foundation, 2011). When people feel their physical security is threatened, they tend to support whoever can provide security rather than out of ideological conviction (Kalyvas, 2006). Hence, the total number of civilian deaths is more important than who is actually responsible for them.

Enemy-centric counterinsurgency operations aimed at deterring, coercing and defeating insurgents through military force alone are highly likely to cause more harm to civilians than otherwise would occur, which undermines the perception of the local population, political support at home, and consent from the host-nation government. Today's more **'population-centric' counterinsurgency doctrines** allow for offensive, defensive and stability operations, but primarily aimed at achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the local population (see Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24). The clear-hold-build-approach emphasises offensive, defensive and stability operations during each of these phases respectively. The utility of force to protect civilians will vary depending on the threat civilians are under in each particular area.

The role of military force will be **greatest in those areas where control is being contested**, because this is where the physical threat from insurgents will be greatest. Because insurgents primarily seek to incite insecurity through indiscriminate and selective violence in areas of complete or relative government control, the most that military force can do in these areas is to **contain the situation** (e.g. by arresting insurgents, securing weapon caches, and other 'defensive' measures). This conforms to the hold-phase, whose main effort is on securing the population and re-establishing government presence at the local level (Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24: 5-60).

The role of military force will be **smallest in those areas under complete insurgent control**. From a protection-perspective, there is little point in 'clearing' insurgents from areas where they have little or no incentive to target civilians in the first place – even though it makes perfect sense in line with the primary objective of counterinsurgency operations, which is to defeat the insurgency and establish a legitimate central government. Here, the role of military force is greatest in terms of defeating insurgents, but *smallest* in terms of protecting civilians.

However, protection of civilians will not be the only objective in this scenario, military planners and commanders will have to make **trade-offs made between protection of civilians and other objectives**, such as defeating insurgents or expanding government control. Based on the insurgents' rationale and strategies for attacking civilians, it is possible to find ways to include protection of civilians-concerns during the designing of operations.

In general, **military forces must avoid tactics that will unnecessarily increase the threat of insurgent violence against civilians**. Going into insurgent-held villages to **provoke fire-fights** to flush out and eliminate fighters is likely to be counterproductive. This is because insurgents do not pose a significant physical threat to civilians in areas they are already in control, so picking a fight raises the current level of threat to civilians in the area. Also, civilians are likely to view the presence of violence rather than the presence of insurgents as their primary concern. Fighting increases this threat, regardless of who initiates or is responsible for subsequent casualties.

Similarly, **intelligence-driven operations aimed at killing local insurgent leaders**, which has been a tactic of choice in Afghanistan, may also have a negative impact from a protection-perspective, because new leaders will have to re-impose control through violence. Statistically it has been shown that religious terrorist groups (as opposed to nationalist-separatist groups) increase their level of deadly violence substantially when subject to decapitation strikes (Mannes, 2008). For this same reason, **temporary presence in areas outside full government control** (e.g. patrols) into insurgent-held territory may be critical for obtaining information, but is likely to invite attacks on civilians in retribution for perceived collaboration.

One should also be **careful of conducting larger clearing operations into insurgent strongholds or safe havens**, because it creates an incentive for insurgents to attack civilians. If one does clear a stronghold – but fails to hold it – it will risk provoking indiscriminate attacks against the population as a whole. For instance, many of the civilians killed in retaliation by a rebel group in the DRC, occurred in areas that previously had been under their control, but became contested as Congolese forces seized them and later left them behind (Levine, 2011). According to counterinsurgency legend Thompson (1966: 114), if there is no prospect of holding an area, involving the inhabitants on the side of government forces 'is merely asking them to commit suicide'.

From a protection-perspective, it would be **wiser to reverse the order in which various insurgent-held areas are cleared** (see Beadle, 2012 on protecting civilians whilst fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia). Instead of going after strongholds first, one should focus on securing areas under partial government control, where indiscriminate attacks to incite insecurity are most likely, and areas under partial insurgent control, where selective and indiscriminate violence is more likely to be used to control the populations (Levine, 2011 makes this argument with reference to fighting rebels in the DRC).

In the long term, **insurgent violence against civilians is unlikely to stop** until they are politically accommodated or completely defeated. The strategic role of military forces in situations such as these is to 'reduce fear and insecurity and create a breathing space where political solutions can be discussed' (Kaldor, 2007b: 82), which is an idea shared by most counterinsurgency experts (e.g. Galula, 1964). However, the insurgent threat to civilians will remain until this can happen. With decisive military defeat ruled out for fear over excessive civilian casualties or simply the lack of sufficient resources, the most that military forces can do in the meantime is to avoid

increasing the risk of insurgent violence, whilst trying to reduce the current level of threat by targeting the means that insurgents are most critically dependent on to attack civilians.

Denying perpetrators **access to the weapons or tactics responsible for the majority of civilian casualties** is likely to reduce the threat to civilians in the short term. If IEDs constitute the primary method by which civilians are killed (as in Afghanistan), clearing IEDs or seizing IED factories will serve a protection purpose. One statistical analysis has estimated that about 900 Afghan civilian lives may have been saved between 2004 and 2009 by IED clearing (Bird and Fairweather, 2010). The same would in theory apply to securing MANPANDS which can be used to shoot down civilian aircraft in Mali. Most effect will nonetheless be achieved by **denying insurgents freedom of movement to attack civilians**. One possibility is 'protected villages' used in past counterinsurgency operations, such as in Malaya, but whose operationalisation in recent times, like in Uganda, has been poor at best. In theory, however, this can work to protect civilians because it denies the insurgents access to their intended targets.

In general, however, there are few operational requirements that, if degraded or destroyed, will reduce the insurgent's ability to attack civilians in the long term, because they can attack anywhere, at any time, and still achieve the intended destabilising effect.

5   Conclusion

Once an armed actor deliberately targets civilians as part of his strategy, some form of military response is likely to be required to protect them. In general, 'military force can be used either to protect populations from attack or to coerce or compel compliance by targeting those responsible for attacks on civilians' (Bellamy, 2009: 146–7). The basic question facing military staffs is which of these military responses are most likely to protect civilians in different situations.

The seven military planning scenarios outlined in this report represent the first attempt to identify and describe a set of generic situations in which military forces may find themselves tasked with protecting civilians. Based on these scenarios and the military implications identified, it is possible to make some general observations about the role of military forces in protecting civilians. First, the potential utility of military force in protecting civilians may be greater than what is often assumed. One may get the impression from much of the literature on contemporary conflicts that the role of military force is always limited and its utility declining. However, protecting civilians from imminent threats of physical violence is an exception. Failure to protect is also much more costly than with other objectives. Unlike territory or systems of government, once lives are lost, they cannot be recovered.

Second, the role of military force in protecting civilians will vary according to the role violence against civilians plays for the perpetrators. Based on the possible perpetrator rationales used here, it is clear that there are more situations where violence is an intrinsic part of the perpetrator's strategy than not. In most scenarios, the perpetrators have a strong incentive to maximise violence against civilians for strategic purposes. This means that in the majority of situations where civilians are faced with imminent threats of physical violence, military force has a critical and possibly decisive role to protect them. This is particularly true when non-military means are unavailable, or simply unable or unlikely to reduce the threat before it is too late.

Third, there is always a risk that protecting civilians will require more military force than was perhaps envisioned at first. Common to all scenarios is the risk that perpetrators will escalate their violence against civilians if they feel that their current strategy is not working. They may decide – out of anger, desperation or strategic necessity – that escalating violence against civilians is the most rational thing to do. Examples are numerous – the Hutu government in Rwanda's slide into genocide after failing to defeat Tutsi rebels, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)'s decision to kill everyone 'to the last chicken' after they were driven out of Freetown, and Milosevic's decision to 'drain the sea' of Albanians in which the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) could swim. This underscores the importance of recognising the moment when the threat to civilians changes from one scenario to another, which must be treated accordingly.

What really matters, is how exactly military force is used to respond in each scenario. Although there are lessons identified in previous military operations, the scenarios provide a different way of arranging them from a protection-point-of-view. Instead of comparing operations on basis of what the intervening force did – for instance the aerial campaigns in Kosovo and Libya – the scenarios can enable comparisons across missions based on what the perpetrators did. E.g.,

lessons from the ETHNIC CELASNING in Kosovo will have limited value for the REGIME CRACKDOWN in Libya. By contrast, operations that are wildly dissimilar – such as the American experiences in Baghdad 2006–07 and the UN's efforts to protect tribal communities at war in South Sudan – may highlight some common lessons because they share the fundamental characteristics of being COMMUNAL CONFLICTS.

A key contribution of this report – which adds operational substance to the theoretical discussion about the role of military forces in protecting civilians – is the attention given to the perpetrator's 'operational requirements'. It is not only a perpetrator's willingness to kill that matters, but also his capabilities to do so. If planners fail to acknowledge that an armed actor may require different capabilities for attacking civilians than he does for attacking armed opponents, there is a grave risk of designing operations that are only capable of defeating or resisting that actor, but not protecting civilians from him in the process. Perhaps the most interesting findings about *how* military force can best be used to protect civilians in the scenarios outlined here are:

- **Denying freedom of movement** for the military units executing the violence against civilians on the ground (e.g. regular forces, paramilitaries, or militias) will be the most effective response in all scenarios (and the only viable one in POST-CONFLICT REVENGE).

- **Airpower can alone play a significant role** in protecting civilians during REGIME CRACKDOWNS, because the deadliest attacks on civilians may be delivered by air or heavy weapons that are more easily targeted from the air – but will only have a supporting role in other scenarios, because it will not be able to deny or significantly degrade perpetrators the ability to attack.

- **Perpetrators too can fail**. We may fall to the assumption that perpetrators are perfect strategists, and if they fail, it is due to our own successful operations. There may be an alternative explanation, which is that perpetrators themselves may undermine the critical requirements they need to implement violence. E.g. Gaddafi's failure to hide his true intentions in Libya was what prompted outside intervention (see Våge 2014).

- **Despite the focus on 'population-centric' counterinsurgency doctrine**, the role of military force in protecting civilians in classic INSURGENCY-scenarios is rather limited. Perhaps the greatest lesson that must be taken from Iraq and Afghanistan is how to *avoid increasing the threat from insurgents* (rather than merely focusing on limiting civilian casualties resulting from own operations). The traditional saturation approach is likely to have greater utility against PREDATORY rebel groups, also in terms of protecting civilians.

In the end, inability to understand the particular nature of threat facing civilians one is tasked to protect can lead to massive failures – such as during events like Srebrenica or for whole operations like Rwanda – where one's own forces fail to protect civilians at high human, political, military and moral costs. Understanding both why and how civilians are targeted in different ways holds the key to avoiding such failures in the future. Equally important, however, is to recognise when threats change, because it will also alter what military force can do to protect.

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