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Faryab Survey wave 9 – two years after the redeployment of Norwegian forces from Faryab



Elin Marthinussen and Bård Eggereide



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English summary

Wave 9 of the Faryab Survey was conducted in October 2014. The questionnaire used in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in co-operation with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). It consists of 53 questions covering three main areas: Security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies. In addition, six questions have been added regarding the presidential election in 2014. In total, 1424 people in Faryab between 18 and 81 years of age were interviewed.

The result in October 2014 shows that only 39% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 33% say the opposite. This is about the same situation as seen one year ago. Since the transition of security responsibility in 2012 the trend has been that more and more believe it is a mixed situation, with some things going in the right direction while others go in the wrong direction. Unemployment is still stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, like it has been throughout all the waves. But in October 2014, almost as many believe the security situation is the biggest problem.

The perception of the security situation is at the most negative throughout the survey series. In October 2014, 35% reply that they are satisfied with the situation. One reason for this might be the security threats and incidents during the election period. The Afghan National Police is considered an important security provider, and the impression of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is still good.

The overall perception of the government has been good, but with a declining support amongst the population. 57% express that the provincial government does a good job. Nevertheless, the fairly good impression is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem.

Looking at the Pashtuns, this ethnic group is more negative to the situation compared to the average in Faryab. Primarily, the negative differences are with regards to development and partly security. One reason for this might be that the Pashtun villages have much poorer living standards compared to Faryab overall, with 99% of the Pashtun respondents living with poor roads and poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less).

Despite the significant number of respondents in the survey, every poll suffers from limitations and biases. This is especially relevant in conflict areas, due to limitations in the areas available for the interviewers, or respondents may be afraid of expressing their real opinions, amongst others.

The results of October 2014 are likely to be the final in the Faryab Survey series. Whether or not the needs on ground have been met requires more in-depth analysis of the data combined with other data sources.

Sammendrag

Faryab Survey wave 9 ble gjennomført i oktober 2014. Spørreskjemaet brukt i undersøkelsen er utviklet av Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI) i samarbeid med det norsk-ledede *Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah* (PRT Maimanah). Meningsmålingen består av 53 spørsmål som dekker de tre hovedområdene: sikkerhet, utvikling og styresett. Dette er i tråd med både den norske og den NATO-ledede *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) sin strategi. I tillegg har det blitt lagt til seks spørsmål som omhandler president-valget i 2014. I alt ble 1424 personer i Faryab intervjuet. Disse var mellom 18 og 81 år.

Resultatet fra oktober 2014 viser at kun 39 % av respondentene mener ting går i riktig retning i Faryab i dag, mens 33 % sier det motsatte. Dette er omtrent den samme situasjonen som i oktober 2013. Siden overføringen av sikkerhetsansvaret fra ISAF til afghanerne selv i 2012 har trenden vært at flere og flere mener det er en delt situasjon hvor noe går i rett retning, mens annet går i feil retning. Arbeidsledighet anses fortsatt som det største problemet i Faryab, og det har det vært gjennom alle ni målingene. Men i oktober 2014, mener nesten like mange at sikkerheten er det største problemet.

Synet på sikkerhetssituasjonen er det mest negative siden 2010. I oktober 2014 svarer kun 35 % at de er fornøyde med sikkerhetssituasjonen. En grunn til denne misnøyen kan være sikkerhetstruslene og -hendelsene under presidentvalget. Det afghanske politiet er ansett som en viktig sikkerhets-aktør, og inntrykket av de afghanske sikkerhetsstyrkene er fortsatt godt.

Det generelle inntrykket av styresmaktene har vært bra, men med en nedadgående støtte blant befolkningen. 57 % mener provinsmyndighetene gjør en god jobb. Selv om befolkningen har et godt inntrykk av styresmaktene, blir korrupsjon blant offisielle styresmakter sett på som et problem.

Pashtunere er mer negative til situasjonen sammenlignet med gjennomsnittet i Faryab. Først og fremst gjelder dette innen utviklingsrelaterte spørsmål samt sikkerhet. En årsak til dette kan være at de pashtunske landsbyene har dårligere levestandard i forhold til snittet i Faryab. 99 % av de pashtunske respondentene som ble intervjuet i denne meningsmålingen, lever med dårlige veier og dårlig eller ingen tilgang til vann og elektrisitet (én dag i uken eller mindre).

Til tross for et betydelig antall respondenter som har blitt intervjuet, har alle meningsmålinger avgrensninger og usikkerhet knyttet til seg. Dette gjelder spesielt for målinger i konfliktområder, blant annet fordi enkelte områder kan være utilgjengelige og noen respondenter kan være redde for å uttrykke sine virkelige meninger.

Faryab Survey wave 9 fra oktober 2014 er sannsynligvis den siste i rekken av spørreundersøkelser fra Faryab. Spørsmålet om behovene på bakken har blitt tilfredsstillt krever flere analyser av det eksisterende datamaterialet kombinert med andre datakilder.

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Preface

As part of the project “Analysis support to military operations” (ANTILOPE), the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has deployed operational analysts with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan since December 2008. The PRT was terminated in September 2012 as part of the transition process where the security responsibility was gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership.

PRT Maimanah has been one of 28 PRTs across Afghanistan and part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). One of the main tasks for the analysts was to carry out comprehensive progress assessments regularly. This included both civilian and military issues. In order to embrace the Afghan society in the assessment, FFI in cooperation with PRT Maimanah developed a survey to be held in the Faryab province.

The current report documents the main findings of the ninth wave of the survey, completed in October 2014. We have focused on the trends over time rather than the single results from wave 9. However, it is important to keep in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones. This report follows the same pattern as previous reports of wave 1–8 [1–8].

Wave 9 is the third of the Faryab Survey series to be conducted after the withdrawal of PRT Maimanah and the ISAF mission from Faryab. We hope that the results of this survey will contribute to the assessment of effects of the Norwegian and international engagement in Faryab.

1 Introduction

Norway was the lead nation of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Maimanah¹ in the Faryab province from 2005 and until its termination late September 2012.² The PRT was part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and was a joint military-civilian unit. The mission statement was in line with the general ISAF mission statement:

*In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [GIROA], ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, [...], and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.*³

As part of this contribution, a strategy for the Norwegian civilian and military effort in Faryab was developed by the Norwegian Government [9]. The main goal in the strategy was to support the Afghan Government in its effort to ensure stability, security and development. The strategy also emphasized *afghanisation*, meaning that the Norwegian effort, both in terms of security, development and good governance, should be based on Afghan values.

The current survey reflects how observable the international efforts have been to the population of Faryab, in line with the ISAF mission statement above, two years after the withdrawal of international forces in the region.

1.1 Transition phase

Afghanistan has now been through the last phases of the transition – the process where security responsibility is gradually transferred from ISAF to Afghan leadership [10]. The process was agreed upon between the Afghan Government and NATO at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and formally began in July 2011. The transition was completed by the end of 2014.

In order to start the transition phase in an area, four main criteria needed to be satisfied. The criteria were [10]:

- Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF.
- Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities.
- Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced.
- ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

¹ Maimanah is the provincial capital of Faryab.

² In June 2012, the PRT was replaced by the Transition Support Group Faryab (TSG-F), and 28 September 2012 the TSG-F withdrew from Faryab.

³ See <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html> for reference and further details.

The Faryab province started the transition phase in 2012, and PRT Maimanah was terminated late September 2012.

1.2 Assessments

Assessment of the situation and the development in the Afghan society has been necessary in order to analyse the value of the international effort in Afghanistan. It is equally important to assess the situation after the transition in order to see if the situation is sustainable and to draw lessons from the effort.

In November 2014, the Norwegian Government appointed a commission to assess and draw lessons from Norway's involvement in Afghanistan [11]. This includes both the civilian and military effort during the period 2001–2014. The committee will, among other things, consider the design and implementation of Norway's civilian and military engagement and to which degree the engagement in Faryab met the needs on the ground.

In assessing the current situation and the development, and in line with the afghanisation approach, it is important to include the population and their view of their own situation. What does the population of Faryab think of the situation? Has the international engagement met the population's needs?

1.3 Faryab Survey

The Faryab Survey is an extensive survey conducted in the province in order to better understand the population and their perception of the situation. It has been carried out twice a year since the first wave in April 2010 [1–8].

Since the termination of PRT Maimanah and withdrawal of the military forces from Faryab, the need for new and updated data from Faryab was reduced. And so the latest wave, wave 9, was conducted in October 2014, one year after wave 8 and two years after the termination of PRT Maimanah. It was carried out in order to capture people's perception of the situation in the province after the withdrawal of ISAF and to see if the situation has changed, for better or worse, after the withdrawal.

The current report covers the main findings and trends from the Faryab Survey.

1.4 Outline of the report

This report consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the Faryab Survey in general and the ninth wave in particular. This includes the sampling method. Chapter 3 gives the demographics for wave 9. This covers the age, gender and ethnicity distribution, the living standard and literacy level. Chapter 4 presents the margin of error of wave 9 and the uncertainties of the survey. The main findings of wave 9, and comparisons of the results with previous waves, are presented in Chapter 5. Province level results are also compared to perceptions on the same

matters in the districts of Ghormach and Kohistan, to the women’s perceptions and Pashtuns’ perceptions. The last chapter gives the conclusions.

2 Faryab Survey – wave 9

The Faryab Survey has been conducted the past 4.5 years (Table 1.1) by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR), on behalf of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The agency has utilised Afghan civilians to conduct interviews based on a questionnaire. The interviewers have been approximately evenly divided male and female, with a mix of ethnicities to match the respondents. Quality controls have been carried out by ACSOR’s central office in Kabul in order to assure that the standards have been maintained.

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	Wave 8	Wave 9
Field Dates	Apr 2010	Oct 2010	Apr 2011	Oct 2011	Apr 2012	Oct 2012	Apr 2013	Oct 2013	Oct 2014
Sample Size	1069	1182	1208	1388	1449	1433	1389	1441	1424

Table 1.1 Field dates and sample sizes of the nine waves of Faryab Survey.

The survey questionnaire has been developed by FFI in cooperation with the now terminated PRT Maimanah. It is an extensive survey that consists of 53 questions, in addition to batteries of supplementary questions, covering three main areas: Security, development and governance. This is in accordance with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy. In wave 9, six additional questions were included in order to capture people’s opinion regarding the presidential election earlier in 2014.

On average, an interview took 34 minutes to complete. Only very minor modifications have been made to the questionnaire employed across the nine waves of surveying in order to be able to follow the trends over time.

2.1 Wave 9 – October 2014

Country: **Afghanistan**

Field dates: **14–24 October 2014**

Research provider: **ACSOR-Surveys**

Study: **Faryab, wave 9**

Sample size: **1424 (1044 excl. boosters)**

Number of interviewers: **59**

Faryab Survey wave 9 was conducted in October 2014, two years after the withdrawal of international forces from Faryab. It has a sample size of 1424 respondents.⁴ It is divided into a main bulk of 1044 respondents, which is representative of the province, and four extra samples from areas of interest, which are called boosters (Section 2.2).

Since the last wave in October 2013 (wave 8), a number of incidents have occurred that may have affected the results of the current wave. A selection of these is:

- **The Presidential and Provincial Council Election.**

The election was held 5 April and the run-off election was held 14 June. Governor Batash stated that 47 out of 234 polling centers in Faryab were closed due to bad weather and security issues [12]. The turnout in Faryab was about 265 000 and 330 000 voters in the first and second round respectively [13].

- **Security concerns.**

Prior to and during the elections there were several security incidents in Faryab. For instance, 18 March a suicide bomber with explosives on a rickshaw killed at least 16 people and injured 42 at a bazar in Maimanah City [14]. A Parliament member believes it was part of an effort to scare people prior to the election [15].

- **Anti-government groups.**

Anti-government armed militant groups have actively operated in some districts. For instance, in late July, Taliban rebels attacked a check point in Qaisar. After three days of fighting they had occupied Shakh area [16].

- **Afghan security responsibility.**

On 28 September 2014, two years had passed since international forces withdrew from Faryab, and the security responsibility was handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

- **Floods.**

Faryab has been struck with several flash floods triggered by heavy rain and melting snow this spring. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), initial reports indicated that 6000 houses have been destroyed. In addition, people and livestock have died, and roads and bridges have been washed away [17].

The factor that probably has the largest influence on the results of wave 9 is the election period. As mentioned, the election was held 5 April and 14 June, but due to widespread accusations of fraud the results were delayed. Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the winner of the presidential election in September 2014, while the provincial council results were presented as late as October. Security was a challenge during the election period, and in Faryab it was ANSF solely that had responsibility for the security. Several severe security incidents occurred during this period, but the ANSF (together with the National Directorate of Security (NDS)) also foiled several attacks [18].

⁴ As part of the quality control, ACSOR removed a total of 76 cases from the data due to 95+% similarities in answers of pairs of interviews.

2.2 Interview sample

The respondents have been selected using a multi-stage random stratification process that has four layers:

- Province – the interview sample is distributed based on the urban/rural characteristics in the province.
- District – the sample is distributed between the province districts based on the population estimates for each district.
- Settlement – a simple random selection of the known settlements in each district (neighbourhoods in the cities). In each settlement, a predefined number of interviews will take place – normally 10.⁵
- Household – a random walk method is used to select the households in which the in-depth interviews will take place.

There were two constraints in the final selection of respondents:

- The respondents had to be 18 years or older, and
- the sample should have approximately 50% male and 50% female respondent participation.

In total, 1424 people from Faryab were interviewed in wave 9. This sample includes four boosters:

- Booster 1 (60 respondents) is a geographic area of interest. This area has been one of the focus areas of the former PRT Maimanah.
- Booster 2 (180 respondents) is based on an ethnic area of interest. It consists of Pashtun villages in five different districts in order to better cover the Pashtun perception.
- Booster 3 and 4 are intercept interviews of people from Kohistan district (70 respondents) and Ghormach district (70 respondents). These interviews had to be done in neighbouring districts due to security restrictions and transportation restrictions.⁶

2.3 Survey coverage

The interviews took place in 13 of Faryab's 14 districts. The Kohistan district was nonetheless covered through intercept interviews in a neighbouring district (Section 2.2). Figure 2.1 shows the survey coverage.

⁵ There is no population data on settlement sizes, and therefore the sample cannot be distributed based on settlement sizes.

⁶ Unlike standard intercept interviews done on the street where you contact, for instance, each fifth passer-by, the single selection criterion has been respondents from Kohistan/Ghormach willing to be interviewed. The actual interviews were usually done in nearby Samawars (tea-houses, restaurants) or at some secluded place in the open.

It has also been of interest to conduct interviews within the Ghormach district of Badghis province. This district was transferred to PRT Maimanah’s area of responsibility in 2009. Unfortunately, due to security issues, this has not yet been possible. As described in Section 2.2, Ghormach was covered through intercept interviews in a neighbouring district.




Figure 2.1 Survey coverage of wave 9, October 2014. In addition, intercept interviews of Ghormach (Badghis province) and Kohistan respondents were conducted in neighbouring districts due to security and transportation issues. Map: ACSOR.

2.4 Analysis

The main analysis in Chapter 5 of this report uses data from the main bulk of interviews (i.e. it excludes the boosters). The data is weighted according to the population in the different districts, in order to get a representative result. The boosters are not included as this will change the distribution and the ethnical profile, and will not give comparable results for the nine waves.⁷ Still, the results from the Kohistan and Ghormach district are analysed separately in Section 5.5, and the results from the Pashtun booster are compared to the overall results for Faryab in Section 5.7.

⁷ In earlier analyses of the results from waves 1 through 4 [3, 4, 5, 6], the data for Kohistan and booster 1 were included. The current report calculates all results from waves 1 through 9 in the same way in order to provide consistency. This implies that some minor deviations may be found in some numbers when comparing the results with past reports.

The interviewer conducting the survey, assesses each respondent's comprehension of the survey. This assessment has four categories, where the lowest category covers those who have difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from the interviewer. The respondents having difficulty understanding the questions even with help, have been removed from the analysis in order to minimise the margin of error caused by misunderstandings and the like. In wave 9, 28 respondents were removed due to poor comprehension of the questions.

3 Demographics

This chapter summarises the demographics of Faryab Survey wave 9.

3.1 Age distribution

The respondents in the main bulk of the survey ranged between 18 and 81 years of age (Figure 3.1). The average age is 35. The average age throughout the survey has been ranging from 34 to 37.




Figure 3.1 Age distribution of the Faryab Survey wave 9.

3.2 Gender

The main bulk of the survey had 54% male and 46% female participation.⁸ This is about the same as in wave 6, 7 and 8. ACSOR utilises female interviewers exclusively to interview female respondents.

⁸ Only men were interviewed in the Almar district. In the last four waves only men have been interviewed in Almar due to safety concerns for the female interviewers.

3.3 Ethnicity

The ethnicity distribution of the main bulk of wave 9 is:

- 62% Uzbek
- 14% Tajik
- 12% Pashtun⁹
- 9% Turkmen
- 3% Other ethnicities

Figure 3.2 shows the ethnicity distributions of the nine waves.




Figure 3.2 Ethnicity distributions of the nine waves.

A population census has not been conducted in Afghanistan since 1979. Since then, millions of people have been displaced. The ethnicity profile in Afghanistan therefore relies on estimates. The ethnicity distribution of wave 9 is about the same as the estimated ethnicity profile of Faryab [19]. For instance, it is stated in the Faryab provincial profile that 13% of the population speak Pashto.¹⁰ In the survey 12% consider themselves to be Pashtun.

3.4 Literacy and education

When it comes to literacy, 32% replied that they can read and write. This is the highest proportion of literacy comparing with the previous waves. It is also somewhat higher than the average literacy rate in Afghanistan which is 28% [20].

⁹ The booster with Pashtun villages is not included.

¹⁰ The Faryab provincial profile does not specify how many who consider themselves to be Pashtun, only how many that speak Pashto.

The illiteracy among the respondents in Faryab corresponds to the education level (Figure 3.3): 68% say they are illiterate, and the same amount reply that they have no schooling.




Figure 3.3 Level of education of the respondents.

3.5 Living standard

The interviewers made an assessment of the standard of living for each respondent. This is divided into five categories:

1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day per week
5. Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 3.4 shows that 78% of the respondents fell into the two poorest categories. These respondents live in areas with no or poor roads, and with access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week. Only 3.5% of the respondents fell into the top two categories with good roads, and access to water and electricity 4 to 7 days per week. With this, wave 9 has one of the highest proportion of the two poorest categories and lowest proportion of the top two categories throughout the Faryab Survey.^{11, 12} One reason for this might be the flash floods which struck Faryab in 2014 and destroyed much of the infrastructure in the affected areas. Or it might be that more interviews in this wave have been conducted in less developed areas of the province than on average.

¹¹ The average, throughout the Farayb Survey, is 72% and 11%, respectively.

¹² Wave 5, 6 and 8 do also stand out with more interviews in less developed areas.




Figure 3.4 Assessed living standards. The standard of roads, water and electricity accessibility is categorised into 5 categories (1 being the best; 5, the worst).

The higher proportion of less developed areas in wave 9 in October 2014 (together with wave 5, 6 and 8) should be considered in the analysis of the survey, especially when comparing the waves. With a higher proportion of respondents living in areas with no or poor roads, and little access to water and electricity, one can expect a higher proportion to be less satisfied when it comes to these issues.

3.6 Geographical differences

This report will mainly give the overall result of Faryab. Still, there will be geographical differences in the results of the survey. In order to capture some of the differences, we have divided the province into six parts (Figure 3.5).




Figure 3.5 Faryab divided into six parts.

Ethnicity

In the northern parts of Faryab (North) the respondents are mainly Turkmen and Uzbeks, while center parts (Center-North, Maimanah + and Center) are dominated by Uzbeks. In the eastern parts the respondents are divided between Uzbeks and Tajiks, and in the western parts the respondents are Uzbeks and Pashtuns.

Literacy

Only 6% of the respondents in the eastern parts can read and write, while almost half of the respondents in Maimanah + and Center-North can (Figure 3.6).




Figure 3.6 Literacy in the different parts of Faryab.

Living standard

99% of the respondents in the eastern parts of Faryab live in areas with no or poor roads and access to water and electricity maximum 1 day per week (category 4 and 5, Section 3.5), while only 29% in Maimanah and Khwajah Sabz Posh do the same (Figure 3.7).




Figure 3.7 Assessed living standards in the different parts of Faryab.

4 Biases and margin of error

One of the key aspects of the Faryab Survey is the large number of respondents. The size of the sample reduces the margin of error to an acceptable level, also when looking at subsets of the total sample, below province level. On the province level, the stated sampling error is 2.6%¹³ at a 95% confidence level. There are, nevertheless, challenges specific to polls in conflict zones that increase the margin of error [21, 22].

4.1 Random sampling

The randomness of the sampling is a key challenge. This is a challenge for surveys in general, but in particular for surveys in Afghanistan due to the poorly documented demography, bad infrastructure and security risks. A truly random sample is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan because there does not exist an exhaustive list of residents or households. The respondents are therefore selected using the stratification process described in Section 2.2. A number of villages per district are randomly selected proportional to the estimated population size of the districts (with some adjustments in order to have a minimum number of respondents per district). In each

¹³ 2.6% is the stated sampling error by ACSOR. This is the maximum sampling error for a reported percentage of 50%. Still, the sampling error applies if the respondents are sampled randomly. The employed random stratification process (Section 2.2) will therefore increase the sampling error.

village, a number of respondents are selected – usually 10. Since the sample is not exactly proportional to the population size in each district, relative weights have been assigned to the respondents. Data from the Central Statistical Office was used to compute these weights.¹⁴

4.2 Accessibility

Some of the villages may be replaced due to inaccessibility. This might be due to poor security or poor roads. In other words, some of the most unsafe areas and underdeveloped villages (at least relative to infrastructure) will not be included in the survey. This will, to some extent, affect the results on questions about development and security. On the other hand, the fact that a village is assessed to be impossible to reach, or too dangerous to travel through, is in itself an indication of the development or the security situation of the province.

7 of the 158 randomly selected villages in wave 9 had to be replaced due to security or transportation issues. In addition, Kohistan and Ghormach district had to be covered through intercept interviews in neighbouring districts due to the same reasons (Section 2.2), and one district had only male respondents due to safety concerns for the female interviewers (Almar).

4.3 Misunderstandings and alike

Furthermore, there are biases inherent in the survey because people may misunderstand questions or answer what they think is expected of them. They may not remember correctly or have the knowledge to answer, or they may deliberately answer wrong, or refuse to answer. There are also cultural norms that could affect the answers. For instance, Afghans may feel bound to answer according to established dependencies, be it governmental or anti-governmental institutions. We have reduced the biases by using civil Afghans who understand the Afghan culture to do the in-depth interviews, and by removing respondents who do not understand the questions (Section 2.4). Where biases remain, their effects are assumed to be constant throughout all the waves of surveying. We therefore emphasise the trends over time rather than simply the status in Faryab in October 2014.

¹⁴ <http://cso.gov.af>

5 Main findings

The subsequent sections in this chapter summarise the main findings from October 2014.¹⁵ The results from wave 9 are first presented on their own showing the population's perception of the situation two years after the withdrawal of ISAF from the province. They are then compared to the previous eight waves tracing the development from the presence of international military forces through transition and finally the Faryab province on its own without international military presence.¹⁶

The findings are categorised into the general situation (Section 5.1) and the three main areas of the survey – security, development and governance (Sections 5.2 through 5.4). The main findings for Faryab are also compared to people's perceptions on the same matters in Ghormach and Kohistan (Section 5.5), to women's perceptions (Section 5.6) and to the Pashtuns' perceptions (Section 5.7).

5.1 General situation

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population's perception of their own and Faryab's situation in general. In the survey, the respondents are asked if they think things in Faryab, in general, are going in the right or wrong direction. The result in October 2014 shows that only 39% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today. 33% say things are going in the wrong direction, while 28% say that the province is going some in the right and some in the wrong direction.

Figure 5.1 shows the result on this question throughout the nine waves. Previously the results have implied a negative trend where the number of respondents saying things are going in the right direction has decreased and, at the same time, the number of respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction have increased. But even though the proportion believing things are going in the right direction is the lowest throughout the survey, the increase in the proportion believing the opposite is not correspondingly large. The trend over the last two years is that more and more believe it is a mixed situation, with some things going in the right direction while others go in the wrong direction.

Geographically people in the eastern and western parts of Faryab have a more negative view of the situation where 49% and 41%, respectively, say things are going in the wrong direction. On the positive side, 57% in the northern parts believe things are going in the right direction.

¹⁵ The results are calculated as a percentage of those who have an opinion where the proportion of respondents replying *Refused* or *Do not know* is small and does not affect the results.

¹⁶ When comparing the results in a graph, the graph shows a gap indicating a year between the eighth and ninth wave (not 6 months as it is between the other waves).




Figure 5.1 In which direction do you think things in Faryab today are going?

5.2 Security

The perception of security in Faryab is stated directly through a question on how satisfied the respondent is with the security situation. In October 2014, only 35% reply that they are somewhat or very satisfied with the situation. This is the lowest percentage seen throughout the Faryab Survey series. Figure 5.2 shows the result throughout the nine waves on this question. One reason for the low percentage of satisfied respondents might be the security threats and incidents during the election period. In fact, 43% of the respondents say that it was not safe enough to vote in their local area in the run-off election 14 June (Section 5.4.3).




Figure 5.2 How satisfied are you with the security situation?

The result shown in Figure 5.2 indicates a negative trend with a drop in October 2012 at the time the PRT withdrew from Faryab. The result also indicates a seasonal variation; the respondents are relatively more positive to the security situation in April surveys, while they are more negative in October surveys. This seasonal variation might appear due to more insurgent activity during the summer, i.e. prior to the October surveys, compared to during the winter.

The areas of Faryab where most respondents are dissatisfied with the security situation lies in the center: about 72% are dissatisfied with the situation in Center-North and Center. While in the northern parts and in Maimanah + they are more satisfied with the situation: 50% and 41%, respectively, say they are satisfied with the security situation.

When asking about how it is today compared to a year ago, 11% say the security situation has improved the last year, 53% say it is the same, while 36% express that it has become worse. This is about the same as in October 2013.

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (Figure 5.1) were asked to give the main reason for why they think so. 24% of these respondents justify this optimism by saying the security has improved or that the Taliban no longer exists in their area (Figure 5.3).




Figure 5.3 Main reasons for why things are going in the right direction. (Note: This was a single-answer question.)

However, the same is seen when asking the respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction: 28% of these respondents justify this negativism by poor security and the presence of Taliban.

In the survey, respondents are also asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. 17% respond that lack of security is the biggest problem in October 2014 (Section 5.3 and Figure 5.10). This is the highest percentage saying insecurity is the biggest problem throughout the Farayb Survey.

5.2.1 Key security actors

During the transition phase, the military forces of the PRT Maimanah operated as a partner to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). I.e. it was primarily the ANSF that had the responsibility to plan and lead operations, while the PRT had a supporting role. The objective of this concept was to train and guide the Afghan security forces and at the same time help them to provide security in the Faryab province. Since October 2012 the ANSF in Faryab has operated on its own.

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population's perception of the key security actors in its local districts, especially when it comes to ANSF. In October 2014, two years after the withdrawal of ISAF, 43% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be a security provider in their districts (Figure 5.4), whereas 8% express the same about the Afghan National Army (ANA). A possible explanation for why more people consider the ANP to be an important security actor is probably not due to a better impression of the police compared with the army (as stated later in this section), but due to their area of responsibility: the ANP is recruited locally and continuously operates in the province as a whole, while the ANA is focusing on the problem areas. Thus, the ANA has less visibility compared to the ANP, and the security is worse in the areas where the ANA operates. This is evident looking at the differences when it comes to presence of the police and army: 50% say they see the ANP once a week or more, while only 31% say the same about the ANA.

Comparing the waves, less people now say that ANP is a security provider. The previous results has been fluctuating around 60%. Less people also respond that the people themselves provide security in their area (18%), and that the elders or the Shuras provide security in their area (13%) (Figure 5.4). One reason for this might be that the Arbaki (a tribal security system) has become more important the last year – 15% say that the Arbaki is a security provider in their areas. Close to none has mentioned these as security actors in the previous waves.




Figure 5.4 Who provides security in your district? (Note: This is a multi-answer question, i.e. the respondent is free to answer more than one actor as the security provider.)

The appearance of the Arbaki as a security actor may be a result of cultural aspects; this might be the Afghan solution for solving the security concerns in the province. It may also be that the national security actors are not present in these areas or that they are not doing a good enough job in the area.

The Afghan National Police

All in all, the respondents have a positive view of the Afghan police. 68% believe that the police are leaving a good impression on the people (Figure 5.5). This is a decrease since October 2013 (74%), but about the same as in October 2012 (70%). Still, 84% agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the population, which is consistent with the results from the past four waves (Figure 5.7, first graph).




Figure 5.5 The impression of the Afghan National Police.

64% say they will report crimes to the police. This is a marked decrease and a negative trend compared to the previous waves. About 80–90% said they would report crimes to the police until October 2013 when it was down to 71%.

One reason for the decrease might be that the ANP is not present in their area. Figure 5.6 shows how often people see the ANP in their area. There is a marked drop after the transition where about 45% see the ANP once a week or more, while half a year prior to the withdrawal of the international military forces, in April 2012, 63% saw the ANP once a week or more.




Figure 5.6 How often do you see the Afghan National Police in your area?

47% of the respondents believe that the ANP has insufficient forces in their area, and 62% of the respondents believe that they cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces. Still, 71% agree that the ANP helps to improve the security (Figure 5.7).




Figure 5.7 Responses on four statements related to ANP.

Even though the respondents seem to believe that the police help to improve the security and that they are honest and fair, they also believe the ANP are corrupt: 63% respond that corruption is a problem amongst police officers in their area. This discrepancy might be due to several reasons, especially cultural factors: the expectations of the ANP might be low, the population might be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, corruption is part of how the society functions and may not be considered a problem, and so on.

Corruption

The question regarding corruption in the survey is based on a Western definition of corruption referring to payment for services the recipient is not entitled to by law. In a society like Afghanistan without a functioning tax system, collection of money by the representatives of the local authorities falls into the definition of corruption. Therefore, corruption by the Western definition may be accepted and it also may be considered as a good thing, by indicating that the local authorities are eager in doing their job.

The Afghan National Army

All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan army (Figure 5.8). 72% believe that the army is making a good impression in the province. This is about the same result as in October 2013 (74%) and in October 2012 (70%), and does not follow the negative trend as seen in the previous waves in 2010–2012. In addition, 85% agree that the ANA is honest and fair to the citizenry, which is consistent with the results over the last two years (Figure 5.9).¹⁷




Figure 5.8 The impression of the ANA.

68% believe the army helps improve the security, but at the same time, 53% think that they have insufficient forces in their area. 59% believe that the ANA cannot operate on their own and need support from international forces.



Figure 5.9 Responses on four statements related to the ANA.

¹⁷ Corruption amongst the ANA was not included in the questionnaire.

5.3 Development

In the survey, the respondents are asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. This is an open-ended, single-answer question, meaning the respondent is free to reply whatever he or she feels like. As illustrated in Figure 5.10, the two biggest problems in the province is unemployment (18%) and lack of security (17%). Poverty comes up as third with 12%. The subsequent problems do not distinguish themselves as much.




Figure 5.10 The biggest problem in the local area.

Table 5.1 below shows the top five biggest problems in the respondents’ local area throughout all nine waves of surveying. Unemployment has consistently been number one throughout the waves. But in the previous waves, unemployment has also stood out with a much higher proportion. In October 2014, about as many believes that unemployment and the lack of security are the biggest problems (Figure 5.10). Together with unemployment, poverty has also recurred within the top five problems throughout the waves.

	Apr 2010	Oct 2010	Apr 2011	Oct 2011	Apr 2012	Oct 2012	Apr 2013	Oct 2013	Oct 2014
N ^o 1	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment	Unemployment
N ^o 2	Lack of electricity	Lack of water	Illiteracy	Lack of water	Lack of water	Lack of security	Poverty	Poverty	Lack of security
N ^o 3	Lack of water	Poverty	Poverty	Lack of security	Lack of electricity	Poverty	Lack of electricity	Lack of security	Poverty
N ^o 4	Poverty	Illiteracy	Lack of water	Poor roads	Poverty	Lack of water	Poor roads	Illiteracy	Illiteracy
N ^o 5	Corruption	Corruption	Lack of electricity	Poverty	Illiteracy	Illiteracy	Illiteracy	Lack of water ¹⁸	Corruption

Table 5.1 The five biggest problems in the local area throughout all waves of surveying.

Interestingly, lack of security appears in the top five list of problems only in the waves conducted in October. This supports the theory of a seasonal variation when it comes to the security situation (Section 5.2).

5.3.1 Basic infrastructure and public services

The respondents' basic infrastructure and access to public services are assessed by both the interviewers and the respondents themselves. The interviewers specifically assess the area where each respondent live with respect to road conditions and access to water and electricity (Section 3.5). The respondents assess how satisfied they are with the basic infrastructure and public services (Figure 5.11). The respondents are also asked if they believe the situation have improved or not with regard to these issues, and what they think will happen in the year ahead.

As seen in Section 3.5, 78% of the respondents live in areas with no or poor roads, and have access to water and electricity a maximum of 1 day per week. Thus, it is no surprise that people are dissatisfied when it comes to these issues; 60% say they are dissatisfied with the road conditions and 62% with the supply of electricity (Figure 5.11). On the other hand, the topic the respondents are most satisfied with is the availability of clean water (65%). However, the difference between the more developed areas and less developed is evident: 86% of the respondents living in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2, Section 3.5) are satisfied with the availability of clean water, while 62% of the respondents living in the less developed areas (category 4 and 5) state the same.

In general, people in the north and in Maimanah + are more satisfied with the infrastructure and public services compared to other parts of Faryab. This does not come as a surprise seeing that these are the most developed parts of Faryab when it comes to roads, electricity and water (Section 3.5).

¹⁸ *Lack of water* is the portion of those who lack both clean water and water for irrigation.




Figure 5.11 The respondents assess how satisfied they are with basic infrastructure and public services.

Even though people live under poor conditions and are very much dissatisfied with these, the three issues the respondents are most dissatisfied with are the availability of jobs, job and education opportunities for women and the security situation. This is in line with the previously stated results in this section. In October 2014, 69% are dissatisfied with job opportunities, 66% dissatisfied with job and education opportunities for women especially and 65% are dissatisfied with the security situation.

The overall dissatisfaction is substantial. This is a concern as insurgents can exploit the situation for increased recruitment and support. This is particularly a concern in relation to the great dissatisfaction with the job opportunities.

Despite the dissatisfaction, the respondents are in general more optimistic than pessimistic when they are asked about the year ahead. This has been the case throughout the Faryab Survey series. And in October 2014 they are even more positive compared to the wave conducted in October 2013. For instance, 43% believe the job opportunity will get better a year ahead. One year ago, in October 2013, 34% believed the same. And when it comes to the security situation, 41% believe it will get better a year ahead, while the corresponding number in October 2013 was 32%.

5.3.2 Reconstruction

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (green line in Figure 5.1) were asked to give their reasons as to why they thought so. Earlier reconstruction has been one of the biggest reasons, but this year only 13% believe that things are going in the right direction due to reconstruction (Figure 5.3).¹⁹

On another question concerning reconstruction, only 14% say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is a clear low-point with regards to aid projects. The corresponding value in October 2013 was 23%. There is a considerable way to go to reach the levels of 2010–11 where about half the respondents said aid projects had been implemented in the last year (high-point of 63% in April 2011).

One factor that is likely to contribute to this low-point is the larger proportion of respondents living in the less developed areas of the province (category 4 and 5, Section 3.5). Only 8% living in these areas say that aid projects have been implemented in their area in the last year, while 49% say the same in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2). This indicates that a larger part of the aid projects in Faryab is implemented in the more developed areas of the province.

The respondents who knew of aid projects were asked to mention what kind of projects these were, and they were allowed to mention two projects. In total, 35% say that these projects are construction of wells, while corresponding numbers for construction of bridges, vocational projects (tailoring) and construction of schools are 26%, 21% and 20% respectively. These are about the same kind of aid projects that are replied in the previous waves, although not always in the same order.

Geographically, more people in the north and Maimanah + have seen aid projects in their areas. 36% in Maimanah + and 20% in the northern districts know of aid projects, while only 3% say the same in Center-North.

5.4 Governance

When asked who has the most influence in their local area – the government, opposing government elements (*mukhalafeen-e dawlat*) or neither – 86% reply that it is the government, and 11% that it is opposing government elements. Figure 5.12 compares the results from the nine waves on this question.

¹⁹ In average, during the first eight waves, 26% believed that things are going in the right direction due to reconstruction.




Figure 5.12 Who has the most influence in your mantaqa (local area)?

The survey shows that a higher proportion of the less developed areas are under influence of opposing government elements than the more developed areas. For instance, 12% of people living in category 4 and 5 areas (Section 3.5) state that opposing government elements have most influence, while 6% state the same in the more developed areas (category 1 and 2).

5.4.1 Local government

The overall perception of the government on different levels has been good, but with a declining support amongst the population. In October 2014, when asked to rate the performance of various levels of government, 57% expressed that the provincial government in Maimanah did a somewhat or very good job. One year prior, the corresponding number was 61% and a half year prior to that: 71%. The respondents saying they are doing a bad job, believe it is because they are weak or corrupt. This has not changed throughout the survey series.

However, the fairly good impression of the provincial government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that 73% state that corruption is a moderate to big problem amongst the provincial government officials. Thus, many of the respondents who believe the local government is doing a good job also believe corruption is a problem amongst the local government officials. This is the same situation as seen when looking at the Afghan police (Section 5.2.1). Again, the Afghan perception of corruption may differ from the Western definition.

Over time, there has been a negative trend when it comes to whether or not the respondents express that the provincial and district governors misuse their power. In April 2010, less than half the respondents stated that the provincial government officials misused their power, whilst the corresponding number in October 2014 is 84% (about the same as in October 2013 (87%)). The respondents are slightly more negative when it comes to the district governor.

5.4.2 Rule of law

Regarding justice and rule of law, 34% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 23% would go to the local Shura/Jirga (traditional assembly of elders and leaders), and 33% would use both in the case of a dispute. 10% would use neither. This is about the same as a year ago. There is a trend that fewer people state that they would go to an Afghan state court now compared to the previous years, while more say they would use both the state court and the local Shura/Jirga in case of a dispute.

5.4.3 Presidential and Provincial Council Election 2014

The Presidential and Provincial Council Election was held 5 April 2014 and the run-off election was held 14 June (Section 2.1). The turnout in Faryab was about 265 000 and 330 000 voters in respectively the first and second round [13].

In the survey, 74% say they voted in the presidential election on April 5. At the same time, half a year after the election was held, only 68% of the respondents say they now would participate in an election. This is lower compared to previous years where about 80% has stated the same. One reason for this might be that people have become more reluctant to participate in an election due to the security threats and incidents prior to and during the recent election (Section 2.1). This is confirmed by two other questions: if they thought it was safe enough for people in their local area to vote in the presidential election, and if they would have concerns about their safety if voting in a new election today. 43% believe it was not safe enough to vote in the presidential election and, comparing the waves, more and more of the respondents willing to participate in an election say they would do so with concerns about their safety (Figure 5.13). In October 2014, 78% of the respondents willing to participate in an election, would do so with concerns about their safety.




Figure 5.13 Would you participate in an election with no concerns, some concerns, or a lot of concerns about your safety?

Geographically, most people in the northern parts and Maimanah + voted in the election (86% and 87% respectively), while least people in the western and eastern parts voted (61% and 63% respectively).

5.5 Ghormach and Kohistan

As described in Section 2.2, booster 3 and 4 consist of respondents from Ghormach and Kohistan. However, due to security and transportation restrictions, the interviews were not held in these districts, but rather in neighbouring districts. These respondents are therefore not a representative sample of the two districts. Still, in order to cover these districts the boosters have been analysed and compared to the main bulk of Faryab. This chapter highlights issues with major discrepancies between the main bulk and the respondents from Ghormach and Kohistan.

5.5.1 Ghormach

70 people from Ghormach were interviewed in neighbouring districts. These are all men, nearly all Pashtuns, who were travelling to a neighbouring district. They come from areas with no roads or poor roads and access to water and electricity maximum 1 day per week (category 4 and 5, Section 3.5). The literacy and education level among these respondents are much lower compared to the average in Faryab: only 18% of the respondents from Ghormach replied they can read and write, while 32% state the same overall in Faryab.

Regarding what direction the general situation in Faryab is developing, the Ghormach respondents are more negative than the overall population in Faryab. 51% of respondents say they believe things are moving in the wrong direction, compared to 33% in the overall population. The reasons why are, however, the same as in the main bulk – predominantly poor security and corruption.

Indeed, lack of security is reported as the biggest problem in Ghormach (21%). Furthermore, 86% are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the security situation, compared to 65% in the overall population of Faryab. Perhaps as a result of this situation, 81% and 82% believe the size of ANP and ANA forces, respectively, are insufficient.

The lack of security in the Ghormach district might have led to a lower turnout in the presidential election in April: none of the respondents think it was safe enough to vote in their local area. Despite this, 54% say they voted in the election.

One out of three says that neither the government nor opposing government elements has most influence in their area. The lack of a government, together with the insecurity, may have resulted in less development in Ghormach. 83% of the Ghormach respondents believe the government has not satisfactorily addressed the needs of their community the last year, and only 6% report that aid projects have been implemented that benefited their community during the last year (compared to 14% overall in Faryab).

The lack of reconstruction is evident looking at how dissatisfied the respondents are with the availability of basic infrastructure and public services. For instance: 93% are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the supply of electricity (62% on average in Faryab), 89% are dissatisfied with the conditions of the roads (60% on average in Faryab), 76% are dissatisfied with the availability of clinics and hospitals (51% on average in Faryab), and 72% are dissatisfied with the availability of education for children (48% on average in Faryab).

5.5.2 Kohistan

70 people from Kohistan were interviewed in neighbouring districts. As for the Ghormach booster, these are all men who were travelling to neighbouring district. Nearly all the respondents from Kohistan are Tajik. 85% of the respondents come from areas with no or poor roads and none or very infrequent access to water and electricity (category 5, Section 3.5). The literacy and education level among these respondents are the same as for the Ghormach respondents and thus much lower compared to the average in Faryab.

Kohistan respondents agree with the main bulk that unemployment is the biggest problem. On second place, poor roads are reported as the biggest problem at 16% (compared to 7% in the main bulk). Indeed, 46% believe roads are most important for the needs of the community at present (18% of the overall population of Faryab believe the same). This is also confirmed through another question: only 14% of Kohistan respondents are somewhat or very satisfied with the conditions of the roads (37% of the main bulk of Faryab feel the same).

Lack of electricity, together with lack of security, is rated as the third biggest problem in Kohistan. This is supported by the fact that 86% are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the supply of electricity, compared to 62% in the main bulk.

The respondents from Kohistan are more satisfied than on average in Faryab when it comes to the availability of water: 83% are somewhat or very satisfied with the availability of clean water for drinking and cooking, compared to 65% in Faryab. A reason for this might be reconstruction and aid projects: 42% say that aid projects have been implemented that benefited their community during the last year (compared to 14% overall in Faryab). When asked what kind of projects these are, most people say vocational projects (tailoring) and construction of wells.

54% say they voted in the presidential election in Kohistan. Still, 70% believe it was not safe enough to vote in their area. As seen in Ghormach, fewer of the respondents think the size of the security forces are sufficient compared to the average in Faryab: about 25% agree the size of ANSF are sufficient, compared to about 50% agreeing in the main bulk. Maybe due to a consequence of this, 82% of respondents in Kohistan reply that the people themselves provide security in the district. Still, 70% say ANP provide security in Kohistan, while only 2% say the same about ANA.

5.6 Women

Afghanistan is considered one of the most dangerous countries for women to live in [23]. This is due to violence, lacking healthcare and poverty, among others. The Norwegian Government states that the absence of participation of women in the society is one of the main obstacles to achieve stability and development in Afghanistan. The gender perspective is therefore an integral part of the Norwegian aid to Afghanistan [24].

Comparing the female and male respondents, the survey shows that fewer women can read and write compared to men. Only 23% of the female respondents can read and write, while 38% of the male respondents can (Figure 5.14). This is also seen when it comes to the level of education: 75% of the women have no formal schooling, while the same applies for 62% of the men.




Figure 5.14 Women and men answer: Can you read and write?

Throughout the waves, more boys than girls have attended school.²⁰ In wave 9, 82% of the boys are going to school, while only 60% of the girls are doing the same (Figure 5.15). 45% of the respondents answer that they are not allowed and 16% that insecurity is the reason for why girls are not going to school. Corresponding numbers for boys are 2% and 7%. The main reason for why boys are not going to school is that they are working (50%).




Figure 5.15 How many boys and girls are going to school?

²⁰ This question was first introduced in April 2011 (wave 3).

It is also seen in the survey that women use various media less than men. This might be a consequence of the fact that fewer women can read and write. They also use mobile phones less often than men do.

When it comes to women’s job and education opportunities, 66% are dissatisfied with women’s opportunities in Faryab. Both genders are dissatisfied with the situation. Previously there has been a positive trend on this subject (Figure 5.16), but since April 2013 the results have not followed this trend. The results in October 2014 are more positive than in April 2013, and about the same as in October 2013. Looking one year ahead, about half of the respondents believe it will stay the same, while 33% and 15% think the opportunities will become respectively better and worse. This is slightly more optimistic than last year.




Figure 5.16 How satisfied are you with women’s job and education opportunities?

In general, the opinions of women and men in the survey are fairly similar. This similarity in opinions may be due to no significant difference of opinion between the genders, or it could be due to the fact that none of the women were alone with the interviewer during the interview.²¹ Other persons present could be family members, friends or neighbours.

One area where the opinions differ is the impression of the Afghan security forces and the government. Women’s impression of the government, ANA and ANP is in general more positive. In addition, women are in general more positive to the security situation and the availability of water.


5.7 Pashtuns

The major ethnic groups living in Faryab are Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen and Pashtuns [19]. The Uzbek group is the largest ethnic group, which is reflected in the surveys, and holds the most

²¹ Women who speak their opinion may challenge the culture of what is acceptable in Afghanistan and may be afraid of speaking their mind freely.

powerful positions in the province government and authorities. Due to ethnic tensions between the Uzbeks and Pashtuns, this has led to an unfair distribution of goods to the Pashtuns. The Faryab Survey includes a booster of respondents from Pashtun villages in order to better cover the Pashtun perception of the situation. This chapter compares the result from these Pashtun villages to the overall average in Faryab.

As seen in previous waves, the Pashtun minority is significantly worse off in relation to living standards than the average in Faryab. Figure 5.17 shows that for 99% of the Pashtuns in wave 9 live with poor roads and with poor or no access to water and electricity (one day a week or less). The corresponding number for the overall population of Faryab is 78%.



1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day per week
5. Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 5.17 Living standard comparisons between Pashtuns and Faryab (main sample).

The Pashtun minority is also significantly worse off compared to the average in Faryab concerning development projects. Figure 5.18 shows that for Pashtuns in wave 9, 73% have never seen NGO representatives in their area. The corresponding number for the overall population of Faryab is 31%. And when asked if there have been implemented aid projects in the past 12 months, which have benefited their community, 97% answer no. The corresponding number for the overall population of Faryab is 81%.²²

²² 4% in Faryab did not know or refused to answer.





Figure 5.18 How often do you see NGO representatives in your area?

The Pashtuns' satisfaction with the situation is shown in Figure 5.19 (the corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.11). The Pashtuns are generally more negative to the situation compared with the average in Faryab. This might derive from the poorer living conditions and from the fewer aid projects in these villages. The largest differences in a negative direction are in the areas of availability of education for children, security at school, availability of electricity, ability to move safely in their area and security. For the remainder of the surveyed areas, the Pashtuns are approximately as satisfied/dissatisfied as the average in Faryab. One positive finding is that the Pashtuns are significantly more satisfied than the average in Faryab with the availability of clean water for drinking (84% compared to 65%).



- | | | | |
|-----|--|------|---|
| i | availability of clean water | viii | availability of products in the markets |
| ii | availability of medicines | ix | condition of the roads |
| iii | availability of education for children | x | supply of electricity |
| iv | availability of water for irrigation | xi | security situation |
| v | availability of clinics and hospitals | xii | education and job opportunities for women |
| vi | security at schools | xiii | availability of jobs |
| vii | ability to move safely in your area | | |

Figure 5.19 How satisfied are the Pashtuns with the...?

The Pashtuns share the opinion of the rest of Faryab that the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the people themselves are the most important security providers. Positively, the Pashtuns agree that the ANP is the *main* security provider. 42% replied that the ANP is an important security provider, compared with 28% replying that it is the people themselves. Local elders / Shuras are stated as third, with 14%, and local commanders have 12%. Regarding the ANP, this level is the second lowest result.²³

When it comes to the impression of the security forces, the Pashtuns are more negative compared to the population overall in Faryab (and also compared with previous waves). 54% of the Pashtunes have a good impression of the police, compared to 68% overall in Faryab. However, 88% agree that the ANP is honest and fair with the people (84% overall in Faryab). Also, with regards to professionalism, 74% say the ANP is unprofessional, compared to 62% overall in Faryab. This is far worse than last year.

52% Pashtuns have a good impression of the army. This is much lower compared to 72% overall in Faryab. However, 84% believe the ANA is honest and fair with the people, compared to 85% overall in Faryab. Similarly, 46% reply that the ANA is unprofessional, compared to 52% overall in Faryab.

Fewer Pashtunes felt safe during the election compared to overall in Faryab: 36% of the Pashtunes felt it was safe enough for people in their area to vote, compared to 55% overall in Faryab. In addition, fewer Pashtuns feel free to express their political opinion in their area: only 23% feel free to express their political opinion in their area, compared to 52% overall in Faryab.

²³ In April 2013, 38% agreed that the ANP was the main security provider.

6 Conclusions

The Faryab Survey provides an insight into the population's perception of its own situation. Wave 9 was conducted in October 2014, two years after the withdrawal of the international military forces from the province. On many topics the results since the withdrawal have had a negative trend. On others, e.g. in what direction things are going in Faryab, it has been steady for the last two years.

The result in October 2014 shows that only 39% of the respondents believe things are going in the right direction in Faryab today, while 33% state the opposite. The trend the last two years is that more and more believe it is a mixed situation, with some things going in the right direction while others go in the wrong direction.

The survey can be used to assess how the people in Faryab stand regarding the four transition criteria (Section 1.1):

- **Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF**

The overall impression of the Afghan National Security Forces is still good. Around 70% say that the police and army are leaving a good impression on the people. This is about the same as in October 2012.

In October 2014, and two years after the withdrawal of ISAF, 43% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be an important security provider in their districts. This is a marked drop compared to the previous waves. One reason for this might be that the Arbaki has become more important, which might be due to lack of national security forces and/or a result of cultural aspects where the Arbaki is a tribal security system.

Another reason that less people considers the ANP to be the most important security provider might be the visibility of the police. There is a marked drop after the withdrawal and transition of the security responsibility where about 45% see the ANP once a week or more, while half a year prior to the withdrawal, in April 2012, 63% saw the ANP once a week or more.

Still, during the election period in 2014 the ANSF (together with the National Directorate of Security (NDS)) foiled several attacks in Faryab.

- **Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities**

Prior to and during the presidential and provincial council election there were several severe security incidents in Faryab. This is reflected in 43% of the respondents saying it was not safe enough to vote in their area in the election of 2014.

The general perception of the security situation has had a negative trend where less and less people say they are satisfied with the security situation. In October 2014, only 35% reply that they are satisfied with the situation. A negative result in the autumn might be due to a seasonal variation.

- **Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced**

The overall perception of the government has been good, but with a declining support amongst the population. In October 2014, 57% express that the provincial government in Maimanah does a good job. Still, 73% state that corruption is a problem amongst the provincial government officials.

When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 34% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 23% would go to the local Shura/Jirga, and 33% would use both in the case of a dispute. 10% would use neither. The trend throughout the Faryab Survey is that fewer people state that they would go to an Afghan state court, while more say they would use both the state court and the local Shura/Jirga in case of a dispute.

After the election in April 2014 fewer people say they would vote in an election. They might have become more reluctant due to the security threats and incidents prior to and during the recent election.

- **ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish**

ISAF posture is not relevant after the transition.

The transition criteria aside: Unemployment has consistently been considered to be the single largest problem in Faryab. In October 2014, nearly as many believe that lack of security is the biggest problem.

The results of October 2014 are likely to be the final in the Faryab Survey series. Whether or not the needs on ground have been met requires more in-depth analysis of the data combined with other data sources.

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Abbreviations

ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
ANTILOPE	Analysis support to military operations, FFI-project 1342
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IEC	Independent Election Commission
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDS	National Directorate of Security
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
TSG-F	Transition Support Group – Faryab