

## **Faryab Survey – wave 4**

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## English summary

The Faryab Survey wave 4 was conducted in October 2011. The questionnaire used in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in co-operation with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). It consists of approximately 50 questions covering the three main areas: Security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategies. In total, 1388 people in Faryab were interviewed. These ranged between 18 and 80 years of age. 47% of the respondents were female and 53% male.

53% of the respondents answer that Faryab is developing in the right direction. There is however a slightly negative trend. Unemployment is clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, and it has been through all the four waves.

The perception of the security situation seems to have a seasonal variation: The respondents are more positive to the security situation in the spring compared to in the fall. The Afghan National Police is considered as an important security provider, and the impression of the Afghan National Security Force is good. Still, there is a negative trend from previous waves.

The overall perception of the government is good. Nevertheless the good impression of the government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem. It is worth noticing that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities.

The opinion of the women and men in the survey is fairly similar. The results show a few areas where women are more positive. For instance women are, in general, more positive to ANSF, and to the situation today compared to a year ago.

When comparing the answers for Pashtunes with the answers for Faryab we find that the Pashtunes are much more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab.

The population in Faryab assess the situation in Faryab somewhat more positively compared to the population in Afghanistan. However, the population in Faryab is more dissatisfied on some subjects.

Despite the significant number of respondents in the survey, every poll suffers from limitations and biases, especially in conflict areas. To get a better understanding of the biases and gain a better picture of development trends over time, FFI has an ambition to continue to conduct surveys regularly.

## Samandrag

Faryab Survey wave 4 vart gjennomført i oktober 2011. Spørjeskjemaet som vart nytta er utviklet av Forsvarets forskingsinstitutt (FFI) i samarbeid med det norsk-leia Provincial Reconstruction Team Maimanah (PRT Maimanah). Meiningsmålinga består av omlag 50 spørsmål som dekker dei tre hovudområda: tryggleik, utvikling og styresett, i tråd med strategiane som er lagt av norske myndigheitar og den NATO-leia International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Total vart 1388 persona intervjuet i Faryab. Desse var mellom 18 og 80 år. 47 % av respondentane var kvinner og 53 % menn.

53 % av respondentane svarer at Faryab utviklar seg i riktig retning. Det er like fullt ei lita negativ trend. Arbeidsløyse er det største problemet i Faryab og har vore det i alle fire undersøkingane.

Inntrykket av tryggleikssituasjonen ser ut til å variere med årstida: Respondentane er meir positive til tryggleikssituasjonen om våren samanlikna med hausten. Det afghanske politiet vert sett på som ein viktig leverandør av tryggleik, og inntrykket av dei afghanske tryggleiksstyrkane er godt. Det er likevel ei negativ trend samanlikna med tidlegare undersøkingar.

Det generelle inntrykket av styresmaktene er godt. Dette står noko i motstrid til det faktum at korrupsjon blant offisielle styresmakter vert sett på som eit problem. Det er verdt å merka seg at afghanarar kan vera ukomfortable med å kritisera myndigheitar.

Meiningane til kvinner og menn i undersøkinga er forholdsvis like. Resultata viser eit par områder der kvinner er meir positive. Til dømes er kvinner, generelt meir positive til ANSF og med situasjonen i dag i høve til for eit år sidan.

Når ein samanliknar svara frå pashtunarar med svara frå Faryab finn me at pashtunarane i Faryab er mykje meir misnøgd med deira eigen situasjon og utviklinga i deira område enn befolkninga generelt i Faryab.

Befolkninga i Faryab vurderar den generell situasjonen i Faryab noko meir positivt samanlikna med korleis befolkninga i Afghanistan vurderer sin situasjon. Men befolkninga i Faryab er noko meir negativ på enkelte andre spørsmål.

Trass det store talet av respondentar som vart intervjuet, alle spørjeundersøkingar har avgrensingar og uvisse. For å få ei betre forståing av uvisse og for å få eit betre bilete av trendane over tid legg difor FFI opp til å gjennomføra slike undersøkingar med jamne mellomrom i Faryab.

## Contents

|          |  |           |
|----------|--|-----------|
|          | <b>Preface</b>   | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>1</b> | <b>Introduction</b>  | <b>9</b>  |
| 1.1      | Transition phase   | 9         |
| 1.2      | Assessments  | 9         |
| 1.3      | Outline of the report  | 10        |
| <b>2</b> | <b>Faryab Survey</b>   | <b>10</b> |
| 2.1      | Wave 4   | 11        |
| 2.2      | Interview sample   | 11        |
| 2.3      | Analysis   | 12        |
| <b>3</b> | <b>Demographics</b>  | <b>12</b> |
| 3.1      | Age distribution   | 12        |
| 3.2      | Gender   | 13        |
| 3.3      | Ethnicity  | 13        |
| 3.4      | Survey coverage  | 13        |
| 3.5      | Living standard  | 14        |
| 3.6      | Literacy and education   | 14        |
| <b>4</b> | <b>Biases and margin of error</b>  | <b>15</b> |
| <b>5</b> | <b>Main findings</b>   | <b>16</b> |
| 5.1      | General situation  | 16        |
| 5.2      | Security   | 17        |
| 5.2.1    | Key security actors  | 19        |
| 5.3      | Development  | 24        |
| 5.3.1    | Basic infrastructure and public services   | 25        |
| 5.3.2    | Reconstruction   | 26        |
| 5.4      | Governance   | 27        |
| 5.5      | Women  | 28        |
| 5.6      | Pashtunes  | 28        |
| <b>6</b> | <b>A comparison of the Faryab Survey with a nationwide survey of Afghanistan</b> | <b>30</b> |
| <b>7</b> | <b>Conclusions</b>   | <b>33</b> |
| 7.1      | Security   | 34        |
| 7.2      | Development  | 34        |
| 7.3      | Government   | 34        |

|     |  |           |
|-----|--|-----------|
| 7.4 | Women  | 35        |
| 7.5 | Pashtunes  | 35        |
| 7.6 | Faryab survey compared to nationwide survey of Afghanistan | 35        |
|     | <b>References</b>  | <b>36</b> |
|     | <b>Abbreviations</b>                                       | <b>37</b> |

## Preface

As part of the project “Analysis support to military operations” (ANTILOPE) the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) has deployed operational analysts with the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Afghanistan since December 2008. PRT Maimanah is one of 28 PRTs across Afghanistan and a part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). One of the main tasks for the analyst is to carry out comprehensive progress assessments regularly. This includes both civilian and military issues. In order to embrace the Afghan society in the assessment, FFI in cooperation with PRT Maimanah, has developed a survey to be held in the Faryab province.

This report documents the main findings of the fourth wave of the survey completed in October 2011. We have focused on the trends over time rather than the single results from wave 4. However, it is important to keep in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones.





# 1 Introduction

Norway has been the lead nation of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Maimanah<sup>1</sup> in the Faryab province since 2005.<sup>2</sup> As part of this contribution, a strategy for the Norwegian civilian and military effort in Faryab has been developed by the Norwegian Government [1]. The main goal in the strategy is to support the Afghan government in its effort to ensure stability, security and development. The strategy also emphasizes *afghanisation*, meaning that the Norwegian effort, both in terms of security, development and good governance, should be based on Afghan values.

## 1.1 Transition phase

Afghanistan is now in its first year of transition – the process where security responsibility is gradually transitioned from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan leadership [2]. The process was agreed upon between the Afghan Government and NATO at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, and formally began in July 2011 when seven areas in Afghanistan were handed over. The second stage (tranche) was announced in November 2011 with another list of provinces, districts and cities to be handed over. No parts of Faryab province are in transition, but are expected to be, either partly in villages and/or districts or the province as a whole.

The PRT now operates as a partner to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It is ANSF that primarily plans and leads operations, with the PRT in a supporting role. This concept sees to training and guidance of the Afghan security forces and, at the same time, provides security in the Faryab province.

## 1.2 Assessments

Assessments of the situation and progress in the society are needed in order to analyse the value of the effort in Afghanistan. This is even more important prior to and during the transition phase, due to the four main transition-criteria that need to be fulfilled. The criteria are [2]:

- Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are capable of shouldering additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
- Security is at a level that allows the population to pursue routine daily activities;
- Local governance is sufficiently developed so that security will not be undermined as ISAF assistance is reduced;
- ISAF is postured properly to thin out as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels diminish.

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<sup>1</sup> Maimanah is the provincial capital of Faryab.

<sup>2</sup> The PRT is part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and is a joint military-civilian unit. The mission statement is to “assist Government of Afghanistan in Faryab province in building security, governance and promote development in order to establish a safe and well governed Afghanistan.” <http://www.norway.org.af>.

In this case, and in line with the afghanisation approach, it is important to include the population in the assessments. The Faryab Survey wave 4 is the fourth in line in an extensive survey conducted in the province in order to better understand the population and their perception of their own situation. Wave 4 was carried out in October 2011 – about 6, 12 and 18 months after the previous waves [3, 4, 5]. The current level of ambition is to carry out waves twice a year.

### 1.3 Outline of the report

This report consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the Faryab survey in general and the fourth wave in particular. This includes the sampling method. Chapter 3 gives the demographics for wave 4. This covers the age, gender and ethnicity distribution, the living standard and literacy level. Chapter 4 presents the margin of error of wave 4 and the uncertainties of the survey. The main findings of wave 4, and comparisons of the results with previous waves, are presented in Chapter 5. The main findings for Faryab are also compared to the women’s opinion and Pashtun’s perception on the same matters. Chapter 6 compares the main findings given in Chapter 5 with a nationwide survey which covers Afghanistan as a whole. The last chapter gives the conclusions.

## 2 Faryab Survey

|             | Wave 1              | Wave 2               | Wave 3             | Wave 4            |
|-------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Field Dates | 19–23 April<br>2010 | 29 Oct–7 Nov<br>2010 | 7–15 April<br>2011 | 20–29 Oct<br>2011 |
| Sample Size | 1069                | 1182                 | 1208               | 1388              |

The Faryab Survey has been conducted in the Faryab province by the agency Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR). The agency utilizes civil Afghans to do in-depth interviews. The interviewers are about 50% male/female and a mix of ethnicities to match the respondents. Quality controls are provided from the central office in Kabul in order to assure that the standards are maintained.

The questionnaire employed in the survey has been developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in cooperation with PRT Maimanah. It is an extensive survey that consists of approximately 50 questions, with batteries of supplementary questions, covering the three main areas: security, development and governance, in line with both the Norwegian and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy. Each interview takes on average about 35 minutes to conduct. Only minor modifications have been made to the questionnaire employed in the different waves. This report covers the main findings from the survey, and do not go into detail on the extensive data.

## 2.1 Wave 4

Country: **Afghanistan**

Field Dates: **October 20<sup>th</sup>–October 29<sup>th</sup> 2011**

Research Provider: **ACSOR-Surveys**

Study: **Faryab, wave 4**

Sample Size: **1388 (1164 excl. boosters)**

Number of Interviewers: **60**

The Faryab Survey wave 4 was conducted in October 2011. It has a sample size of 1388 respondents. This consists of the representative sampling of the province (the main bulk) and two extra samplings (boosters) of areas of interest.

Since the last wave (wave 3) in April 2011, some conditions have occurred that may affect the results of wave 4.<sup>3</sup> Some examples are:

- The Faryab province has suffered from severe drought. This has led to a strong increase in food and water prices, and the living conditions have worsened.
- The suicide attack on the Chief of the National Security Directorate (NSD) in Faryab, General Sadat, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of October, which he died from a week later. This is one example of an unstable security situation [6].

## 2.2 Interview sample

The respondents are selected using a multi-stage random stratification process which has four layers:

- Province – the interview sample is distributed based on the urban/rural characteristics in the province.
- District – the sample is distributed between the province districts based on the population estimates for each district.
- Settlement – a simple random selection of the known settlements in each district (neighbourhoods in the cities).<sup>4</sup> In each settlement a predefined number of interviews will take place, normally 10.
- Household – a random walk method is used to select the households in which the in-depth interviews will take place.

There were two constrictions in the final selection of the respondents:

- The respondents had to be 18 years or older.
- The sample should have approximately 50% male and 50% female respondents.

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<sup>3</sup> ACSOR has not reported any new events that occurred during the conduction of wave 4 that could have had an impact on the results.

<sup>4</sup> There is no population data on settlement sizes, thus the sample can not be distributed based on settlement sizes.

In total, 1388 people in Faryab were interviewed in wave 4. This includes two boosters. Booster 1 with 42 respondents, is a geographic area of interest. This is one of the focus areas for the PRT Maimanah. Booster 2 with 182 respondents, is an ethnic area of interest. The representative sample has a lower proportion of Pashtuns compared to the Faryab provincial profile [7]. And so, booster 2 consists of Pashtun villages in 5 different districts in order to better cover the Pashtun perception.

**2.3 Analysis**

The analysis in this report includes data from the main bulk of interviews and booster 1 (geographical area of interest), which is weighted in order to get a representative result. The Pashtun booster is not included as this will change the ethnical profile too much. This booster is used to compare the results for the Pashtunes with the overall results for Faryab (Section 5.6).

The interviewer conducting the survey assess’ each respondent’s comprehension of the survey questionnaire. This assessment uses four categories, where the worst is covering those that have difficulty understanding most of the questions, even with help from the interviewer. These respondents have been removed from the analysis of the survey in order to minimize the margin of error caused by misunderstandings and alike.<sup>5</sup>

**3 Demographics**

This chapter summarises the demographics for wave 4.

**3.1 Age distribution**

The respondents ranged between 18 to 80 years of age (Figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1 Age distribution of the Faryab Survey wave 4

<sup>5</sup> In wave 4, 2 respondents were removed due to poor comprehension of the survey questionnaire.

The age distribution shows peaks at the age of 30, 35, 40, 45, and so on. One contributing factor to this is the estimation of the age by the interviewer: the interviewer estimates the age if the interviewee does not know it. The age is then to a large extent estimated to a round number. However, this only covers a small fraction of the respondents. The pronounced peaks may therefore indicate that many do not know their real age and estimate it to a round number themselves.

### **3.2 Gender**

The main bulk of the survey has 52.7% male and 47.3% female respondents. ACSOR utilises female interviewers exclusively to interview female respondents.

### **3.3 Ethnicity**

The ethnicity distribution of wave 4 is:

- 67% Uzbek
- 13% Turkmen
- 12% Tajik
- 8% Pashtun<sup>6</sup>

A population census has not been conducted in Afghanistan since 1979. In the meantime, millions of people have been displaced. The ethnicity profile in Afghanistan therefore relies on estimates. The ethnicity distribution of wave 4 is slightly different than the estimated ethnicity profile of Faryab [7]. For instance, it is stated in the Faryab provincial profile that 13% of the population speak Pashtu, while only 8% consider themselves to be Pashtun in the survey. Presuming the provincial profile gives the right distribution this indicates an under-representative Pashtun fraction in wave 4. It is known that there is a majority of Pashtuns in some of the more insecure areas. As such, it is reasonable to assume that replacement of sampling points in these areas (due to security issues) may be one reason for the lower fraction of Pashtuns in the survey.

### **3.4 Survey coverage**

The interviews took place in all of Faryab's 14 districts.<sup>7</sup> We would also like to include the Ghowrmach district of the Badghis province in the survey, but due to security issues it has not been covered.

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<sup>6</sup> This is exclusive the booster in Pashtun villages. When this booster is included there is 20% Pashtunes.

<sup>7</sup> Faryab has originally 14 districts. ISAF and PRT Maimanah included the Ghowrmach district (originally Badghis province) into the PRT's area of responsibility in 2009.

### 3.5 Living standard

The interviewers made an assessment of the living standard for each interviewee. The standard is divided into five categories:

- 1. High quality road, access to water and electricity 6 to 7 days per week
- 2. Good road, access to water and electricity 4 to 5 days per week
- 3. Fair road, access to water and electricity 1 to 3 days per week
- 4. Poor road, access to water and electricity 1 day a week
- 5. Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electricity

Figure 3.3 shows that 70% of the respondents fell into the two poorest categories. These live in areas with poor or no road and with little or no access to water and electricity (not more than one day a week). Even though this is about the same as in wave 1–3, there has been a slightly increase in the sum of category 4 and 5 compared to wave 2 and 3. Also more respondents fall into category 5 compared to wave 2 and 3. Only 13% of the respondents fell into the top two categories and live in areas with good road conditions and with access to water and electricity 4–7 days a week.




Figure 3.3 Assessed living standard. The standard of roads, water and electricity accessibility is categorised into 5 categories (1 is the best, 5 is the worst).

### 3.6 Literacy and education

When it comes to literacy, 21% replied they can read and write. This is lower than the Afghanistan average where 28% are said to be literate [8]. It is also significant lower than the illiteracy rate that we have observed during our three first waves of the survey. This could indicate that, on average, the sampling has been done in less developed areas this time. Also, other questions support this observation, e.g. more people have never used a cell phone or

watched TV, fewer people say that aid projects have been implemented in their area, and fewer respondents have access to roads, water and electricity (Section 3.5). The literacy among the respondents in Faryab corresponds to the education level (see Figure 3.4): 79% say they are illiterate and 78% have no schooling.




Figure 3.4 Highest level of education of the respondents.

## 4 Biases and margin of error

One of the key aspects of the Faryab Survey is the large number of respondents. The size of the sample reduces margin of error to an acceptable level, also below province level. On province level the stated sampling error<sup>8</sup> is 2.6%.<sup>9</sup> There are, nevertheless, challenges specific to polls in conflict zones which increase the margin of error [9, 10].

The randomness of the sampling is a key challenge. This is a challenge for surveys in general, but in particular for surveys in Afghanistan due to the poorly documented demography, bad infrastructure and security risks. A truly random sample is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan because there does not exist an exhaustive list of residents or households. The respondents are therefore selected using the stratification process described in Section 2.2. A number of villages per district are randomly selected proportional to the population size of the districts, with some adjustments in order to have a minimum number of respondents per district. In each village a number of respondents are selected (e.g. 5 or 10). Since the sample is not totally proportionally to the population size in each district a relative weight is assigned to the respondents. Data from the Central Statistical Office was used to compute the weight.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The sampling error applies if the respondents are sampled in a simple random sampling procedure. Since a random stratification process has been employed (Section 2.1), it also will affect the sampling error.

<sup>9</sup> 2.6% is the stated sampling error by ACSOR.

<sup>10</sup> <http://cso.gov.af>. Since our survey a new population estimate from December 2011 has become available.

19 of the original 134 randomly selected villages had to be replaced due to:

- poor security (6 villages)
- poor accessibility (transportation) (13 villages)

That is, some of the most underdeveloped villages (when it comes to infrastructure at least) and areas with a high threat level have not been included in the survey (see also Section 3.4). This will, to some extent, affect the questions about development and security. On the other hand, the fact that villages are assessed to be too hard to reach or too dangerous gives by itself an indication of the development or the security situation in these areas of the province.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, there are biases because some people for instance misunderstand questions, answer what they think is expected by them, do not remember correct, do not have the knowledge to answer, deliberately answer wrong, or refuse to answer the question. There are also cultural norms that could affect the answers, for instance public or open criticism of state institutions is difficult. We have reduced the biases by using civil Afghans, which understand the Afghan culture, to do in-depth interviews, and by removing respondent that do not understand the questions (Section 2.3). But where biases remained, the effect is assumed to remain constant from wave to wave. It is important to have in mind the potential biases when dealing with results from surveys in conflict zones. We have therefore tried to focus on the trends over time rather than single results.

## 5 Main findings

The subsequent sections in this chapter summarise main findings from the Faryab Survey wave 4, in its own and compared to the previous three waves. The findings are categorised into the general situation (Section 5.1) and the three main areas of the survey: Security, development and governance (Section 5.2–5.4). The main findings for Faryab are also compared both to the women's and to Pashtun's perception on the same matters (Section 5.5 and 5.6).

The results are calculated as a percentage of those who have an opinion, if the proportion of respondents replying *Refused* or *Do not know* is negligible (i.e. respondents that answer *Refused* or *Do not know* are removed).

### 5.1 General situation

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population's perception of their own and of Faryab's situation in general. The first question in the survey asks if the respondent, in general, think things

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<sup>11</sup> There have been no significant changes to the number of villages that have been replaced due to the security situation. Regarding villages replaced due to poor accessibility there have been an increase in number replaced from wave 1–3 to wave 4.



in Faryab is going in the right or wrong direction. Wave 1 stands out as very positive in this question. Wave 2–4 are less positive and with a somewhat negative trend.

Figure 5.1 compares the results on this question from all four surveys. In the comparison, wave 1, in April 2010, stands out as the extremely positive with as many as 80% saying things are going in the right direction. Wave 2–4 are less positive, where respectively 59%, 55% and 53% say the same. Although there is not a major difference between the three last waves, the proportion between respondents saying things are going in the right direction and the slightly increasing number of respondents saying things are going in the wrong direction implies a somewhat negative trend.




Figure 5.1 Result on the question: In which direction do you think things in Faryab today are going?

## 5.2 Security

The perception of the security situation is stated directly through a question on how satisfied the respondent is with this. In wave 4, 53% reply that they are somewhat or very satisfied (rightmost column in Figure 5.2). 17% say the security situation has improved, while 30% express the opposite (the remaining saying it is the same).

Figure 5.2 shows the results from all four waves on this question. The results seem to have a seasonal variation: The respondents are more positive to the security situation in April (wave 1 and 3), while they are more negative in October (wave 2 and 4). It also may indicate a somewhat negative underlying trend, parallel to the development of the general situation (Section 5.1). The seasonal variation might be due to a more active fighting season in the summer, i.e. prior to the October survey, compared to the winter. The same seasonal variation is also seen in the results of other security related questions, such as how satisfied the respondents are when it comes to security at schools and the ability to move safely.




Figure 5.2 Result from the four waves on the question: How satisfied are you with the security situation?

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (Figure 5.1), were asked to give the main reason for why they think so. Almost half of these respondents, 45%, justify this optimism by saying the security has improved or that the Taliban no longer exists in their area (Figure 5.3). 26% justify it by saying that it is due to reconstruction.





Figure 5.3 Main reasons to why things are going in the right direction. (Note: this was a single-answer question.)

In the survey, respondents are also asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. 11% respond that lack of security is the biggest problem in their local area in wave 4 (Figure 5.11). Even though this is a fairly low percentage all in all, there has been a slightly negative trend where more and more respondents say that security is the biggest problem: in wave 1 only 3% said security was the biggest problem, while it rose to 7%, 8% and then 11% in respectively wave 2, 3 and 4.

### 5.2.1 Key security actors

60% of the respondents consider the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be an important security provider in their districts (Figure 5.4), whereas 10% express the same about the Afghan National Army (ANA). The higher response to ANP is probably not due to a better impression of the police compared to the army (as stated later in this section), but can possibly be explained by their area of responsibility: ANP is recruited locally and continuously operates in the province as a whole, while ANA is focusing on the problem areas. Thus, ANA has less visibility compared to ANP, and the security is worse in the areas ANA has focused on.

Comparing the waves, the results show that the proportion saying ANA provides the security is decreasing, while the proportion saying ANP provides security is fairly steady and fluctuates around 60%.



*Figure 5.4 Result on the question: Who provides security in your district? (Note: this was a multi-answer question, i.e. the respondent could answer more than one actor as the provider of security.)*

Only 2% believe that international forces provide security. As the security responsibility in Faryab is soon to be transitioned to the Afghan security forces, the national forces are primarily in lead of the operations in Faryab with the international forces only in a supporting role. As such, it is positive that the people recognise ANSF as the security provider rather than the international

forces. However, as many as 32% respond that the people themselves provide security in their area, and 18% respond that the elders or the shuras provides security in their area (Figure 5.4). This may indicate that the national security actors are not present in these areas or they are not doing a good enough job. The latter may be supported by the about 60% respondents agreeing that the ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained (third graph, Figure 5.6).

**ANP**

All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan police. 75% believe that the police are leaving a good impression on the people. And 94% agree that ANP is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens. This confidence in ANP is confirmed through another question: 89% say they will report crimes to the police while 11% respond they will not. However, it is important to know that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising their local authorities. And so, the support to the Afghan security forces may therefore be overestimated in the results. Hence, the development of the response on this question over time is at least as interesting as the levels of impression in itself.

There is a negative trend on the impression of ANP comparing the different waves: The proportion saying ANP is leaving a good impression on the people have decreased from 91% and 92% in the first two waves to 86% in wave 3 and then 75% in wave 4 (Figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5 The impression the Afghan National Police is leaving on people with its performance.

About half of the respondents, 51%, agree that ANP has sufficient forces in their area while 49% express the opposite. And 56% believe that ANP can not operate on their own and need support from international forces. Still, 88% agree that ANP helps to improve the security (Figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6 Responses on four statements related to ANP.

Even though the respondents seem to believe the police are improving security and are honest and fair, they also believe ANP are corrupt: 69% respond that corruption is a problem amongst police officers in their area. This discrepancy might be due to several reasons, especially cultural factors: the expectations of the ANP might be low, the population is uncomfortable in criticising the authorities, the corruption is part of how the society functions and so on.

## ANA

All in all, the respondents have a good impression of the Afghan army (Figure 5.7). 75% believe that the army is leaving a good impression on the people. And 78% agrees that ANA is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens. Again, it is important to stress that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising their local authorities. As for the ANP, the support to the ANA may be overestimated. (Corruption amongst ANA was not included in the questionnaire.)

As for the impression of ANP, there is a negative trend. The proportion saying ANA is leaving a good impression on the people have gradually decreased from 90% in wave 1 to 75% in wave 4.




Figure 5.7 The impression the Afghan National Army is leaving on people with its performance.

The perceptions of ANA are about the same as of ANP, but slightly less positive. 47% agree that ANA has sufficient forces in their area while 53% feel the opposite. Still, 71% believe they help improve the security (Figure 5.8). At the same time, 44% believe that ANA can not operate on their own and need support from international forces.




Figure 5.8 Responses on four statements related to ANA.

### International forces

Even though only 2% believe that international forces provide security (see Section 5.2.1), the respondents in Faryab recognise a need for international support to the national security forces (Figure 5.6 and 5.8). 53% reply that they have a good impression of the international forces and their efforts in the province (Figure 5.9).




Figure 5.9 The impression the international military force are leaving on people with its performance.

There is a negative trend on the impression of the international military forces (Figure 5.9). The proportion saying the international forces are leaving a good impression has gradually decreased from 79% in wave 1 to only 53% in wave 4. This trend might be explained by the visibility of ISAF: The visibility has gradually decreased since wave 1 (Figure 5.10). In wave 1, 16% said they saw ISAF in their area less than once a month, while in wave 4, 45% said the same<sup>12</sup>. At the same time, the respondents that never see ISAF also have the worst impression of these: In wave 4, 75% of the respondents that never see ISAF say that the international military forces are leaving a bad impression on the people with their performance.

<sup>12</sup> Out of the 45%, 20% saw ISAF *Less often* (than once a month) and 25% have *Never* seen ISAF. The numbers for the other categories are: *Almost every day*: 8%, *Once a week*: 15%, *Few times a month*: 15%, and *Once a month*: 17%.




Figure 5.10 How often people see ISAF in their area.

### 5.3 Development

In the survey, the respondents are asked what the biggest problem in their local area is. This is an open-ended single-answer question, i.e. there are no alternatives, and so the respondent is free to reply what he or she feels like. As illustrated in Figure 5.11, the biggest problem in the province is by far unemployment (27%). This is so, despite the fact that Faryab province has suffered a severe drought. Lack of water (either for drinking or irrigation) is although the second mentioned biggest problem in the province, but with a response rate of “only” 14%. Lack of security ends up at third with 11% saying this is the biggest problem.




Figure 5.11 Biggest problem in the local area.

Table 5.1 shows the top 5 problems in the area for wave 1–4. Unemployment has been by far the biggest problem through all waves. Also, lack of water and poverty have recurred at top 5 in all waves.



Lack of security is in top 5 in wave 4. Despite of only 11% responding this is the biggest problem, there has been a somewhat negative trend. Also poor roads have had a slightly negative trend, and are occurring in wave 4 as the fourth most replied biggest problem.

|          | Wave 1              | Wave 2        | Wave 3              | Wave 4           |
|----------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Number 1 | Unemployment        | Unemployment  | Unemployment        | Unemployment     |
| Number 2 | Lack of electricity | Lack of water | Illiteracy          | Lack of water    |
| Number 3 | Lack of water       | Poverty       | Lack of water       | Lack of security |
| Number 4 | Poverty             | Illiteracy    | Poverty             | Poor roads       |
| Number 5 | Corruption          | Corruption    | Lack of electricity | Poverty          |

*Table 5.1 The five biggest problem in the local area.*

### 5.3.1 Basic infrastructure and public services

The survey attempts to explore how the population assess the basic infrastructure and essential public services. This is done, amongst others, by the interviewer, assessing the road conditions and access of water and electricity (Section 3.5), and a question on how satisfied the respondents are when it comes to different subjects within basic infrastructure and public services. Figure 5.12 shows the result from wave 4 on this question.

The availability of jobs, in general and especially for women, is the subject which the respondents are most dissatisfied with. This is in conjunction with previous stated results (Section 5.3). 66% are dissatisfied with job opportunities in general and 77% with education and job opportunities for women in wave 4. And only 7% and 8% respectively feel that these conditions have improved the last year. The result is about the same as for the previous waves. Road conditions are also one of the subjects the respondents are most dissatisfied with. 64% express their dissatisfaction on this matter.

The subject the respondents are most satisfied with is availability of water. Although most satisfied, 29% are dissatisfied with the availability of clean water for drinking and cooking. But despite the fact that Faryab province has suffered a severe drought in 2011, the satisfaction with the availability of both clean water and water for irrigation have had a positive trend since wave 2.

The satisfaction with the security situation, education for children, water for irrigation, health clinics and electricity is divided. As previous stated, the satisfaction with the security situation seems to have a seasonal variation. And so, in the October-waves the respondents are more

dissatisfied with this matter. A similar variation is seen for the satisfaction with the availability of clinics and hospitals, with a lower satisfaction in the waves carried out in the fall. The satisfaction with the availability of education for children has had a slightly negative trend. In wave 1, 70% were satisfied with this, compared to 65% and 66% respectively in wave 2 and 3, and 52% in wave 4.




Figure 5.12 How satisfied are you with the...?

Overall, the proportion of dissatisfaction is substantial. This is a concern as insurgents easily can exploit this situation for recruiting, especially when it comes to the great dissatisfaction of job opportunities.

5.3.2 Reconstruction

The respondents saying things are going in the right direction in Faryab (green line in Figure 5.1), were asked to give the reason why. 26% of these respondents justify this optimism by saying that this is due to reconstruction, i.e. development of the province (Figure 5.3).

On another question, 32% of the respondents say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is a significant lower proportion compared to wave 1–3. In the two first waves in 2010, about half of the respondents

said aid projects had been implemented the last year, and as many as 64% said the same in April 2011.

The respondents who know of aid projects were asked to mention which kind of projects these were. 41% say (as first or second mentioned) these projects are bridges, while corresponding number for construction of wells, road construction and schools are 40%, 36% and 27% respectively. These are the same type of aid projects that are mentioned in the previous waves as well (although not always in the same order).

## 5.4 Governance

The overall perception of the government has been good throughout all four waves. The apparently good impression of the government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem. Again it is important to stress that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities.

When asked who has most influence in their local area, the government, opposing government elements or neither, 79% respond the government and 14% elements in opposition to the government (OGE – opposing government elements). Figure 5.13 compares the results from all four waves on this question. Wave 3 and 4 are less positive than wave 1 and 2. When this is combine with the increasing proportion that states that opposing government elements has most influence in their area this can be seen as a slightly negative trend for the government.




Figure 5.13 Who has most influence in your mantaqa (local area)?

On another question, 46% of the respondents say that the government has satisfactorily addressed the needs of their community. This is a significantly lower proportion compared to wave 1–3. In the three first waves, the corresponding results were about 60%. This result can be seen in connection with Section 5.3.2 where the same negative trend is seen with respect to aid projects.

The apparently good impression of the provincial government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that 81% state that corruption is a moderate to big problem amongst the provincial government officials. This is the same situation as seen when looking at the Afghan police (Section 5.2.1). There has been no significant change with respect to this from earlier waves. However, there has been a significant change when it comes to whether or not the provincial and district governor misuses their power. In wave 1 in April 2010, more than 50% stated that the government officials never misused their power. Corresponding numbers for wave 4 in October 2011 is around 25%.

When it comes to justice and the rule of law, 47% would go to an Afghan state court if they had a dispute. 26% would go to the local Shura/Jirga and 24% of the respondents would take the dispute to both. 4% would not use any in case of a dispute. Compared to wave 1–3 the portion going to an Afghan state court is stable, but more respondents would take the dispute to both rather than only to the Afghan state court.

## 5.5 Women

Afghanistan is the most dangerous country for a woman to live, due to violence, bad healthcare and poverty [11]. Also, women that speak their opinion may challenge the culture of what is acceptable, and may be intimidated or, in worst case, get killed if they do so.

The Faryab Survey has about 50% split of male and female respondents, and, in that respect, has an opportunity to study the female opinion of the province.

Surprisingly, the opinion of the women and men in the survey is fairly similar.<sup>13</sup> The results show just a few areas where women are more positive. A couple of examples are:

- Women are, in general, more positive to ANSF, both towards the Afghan police and the army.
- Women are, in general, more positive to the situation today compared to a year ago.

## 5.6 Pashtunes

When comparing the answers for Pashtunes with the answers for Faryab as a whole, we find some differences. First of all, it is worth mentioning that the living standard for the Pashtunes in wave 4 is assessed to be worse than that of Faryab in total, see Figure 5.14 where the living standard for Pashtunes in the sample is compared with the main sample. While almost all of the Pashtunes fell into the two worst categories, about 70% of the respondents in the main sample fell into the same two categories. The same results are found when comparing illiteracy and formal schooling. Fewer Pashtunes are able to read and write (6%).

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<sup>13</sup> One explanation for this may be that other people, than the respondent and interviewer, were present for the interview.




Figure 5.14 Living standard comparison between Pashtunes and Faryab (main sample).

However, regarding what direction the general situation in Faryab is developing in and why, there are no significant differences between Pashtunes and the overall opinion in Faryab.

The Pashtunes have the same opinion as the rest of the population in Faryab on who are the most important security actors in the area, and it is an even more telling difference, with almost 80% considering the Afghan National Police to be an important security provider and about 55% that consider the people themselves to be an important security provider, corresponding numbers for Faryab are about 60% and about 32%.

When it comes to the impression of the ANP, 58% have a good impression of the Afghan police compared to 74% overall in Faryab. Still 96% of the Pashtunes agree that the ANP is honest and fair to the Afghan citizens, corresponding number for Faryab is 95%. All in all, several questions indicate that the Pashtunes have a significantly worse impression of the Afghan police than the overall population in Faryab.

The Pashtunes impression of the performance of the Army is about the same as for the Police. About 58% of the Pashtunes agree that the ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people compared to 78% overall in Faryab. When it comes to professionalism amongst ANA there is no significant difference between the opinions of the Pashtunes compared to Faryab. But only about 50% of the Pashtunes believes that the Afghan army helps improve security while more than 70% have the same impression overall in Faryab.

The Pashtunes are much more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. The Pashtunes satisfaction with the situation is shown in Figure 5.15. The corresponding numbers for Faryab are shown in Figure 5.12. For all parts the Pashtunes are significantly more dissatisfied than the overall population of Faryab. The biggest

differences are in the areas of electricity, drinking water, security, education and the conditions of the roads.




Figure 5.15 How satisfied are the Pashtunes with the...?

Regarding who has most influence in their area, significantly fewer Pashtunes respond the government. About 63% of the Pashtunes responded the government compared to 79% overall in Faryab. 23% responded that opposing government elements have more influence, and 13% responded that neither of them has more influence, corresponding numbers for Faryab is 14% and 7%. Regarding corruption among provincial government officials and the trust in the state court, there is not any significant difference between the opinion of the Pashtunes and the overall opinion in Faryab.

## 6 A comparison of the Faryab Survey with a nationwide survey of Afghanistan

An annual nationwide survey has been conducted in Afghanistan since 2006 by the Asia Foundation [12], a non-profit and non-governmental organization. The last one was carried out between 2<sup>nd</sup> of July and 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2011 and had 6348 respondents. The sample is proportional to the population within the provinces. Asia Foundation uses the same data collector as the Faryab survey, i.e. ACSOR.

The Asia Foundation questionnaire includes questions with similar/comparable content to the Faryab Survey questionnaire. As such it is possible to compare results in the Faryab survey to results from the Asia Foundation survey – both results in Afghanistan as a whole and results for Faryab. The Faryab sample in the Asia Foundation survey consists of 241 respondents from a few districts in Faryab. As such it is less representative for analysis disaggregated to the provincial level and as a consequence we have emphasized the comparison between wave 4 and national level results. An important consideration in the comparisons is the fact that the two surveys have been carried out with three months apart, which could lead to shifts in the results. In addition it is found that nationwide surveys in Afghanistan can over-sample urban areas and under-sample the rural areas. These issues are discussed in [10].

A standard question in the two surveys examines the level of education. Comparing the results on this question shows a lower level of education in Faryab compared to Afghanistan as a whole.<sup>14</sup> This is seen both on the proportion of the population with no formal schooling, which is much higher in Faryab, and on every grade in the school system, from 1<sup>st</sup> grade till university level, which is lower in Faryab (see Figure 6.1).




Figure 6.1 A comparison of the level of education in Faryab (blue) and Afghanistan (red).

The Faryab Survey and the Asia Foundation survey ask the population whether they believe things, in Faryab and Afghanistan respectively, today are going in the right or wrong direction. On this question the population in Faryab assess the situation in Faryab somewhat more positively compared to what the population do on Afghanistan: 53% say Faryab province is moving in the right direction (Figure 5.1), while 46% of the respondents in Afghanistan say the

<sup>14</sup> The difference might not be as big if the Asia Foundation has over-sampled the urban areas in their survey.

same about Afghanistan. Figure 6.2 shows the results on this question from the Asia Foundation survey.




Figure 6.2 Result from the Asia Foundation on the question: Generally speaking, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

Figure 6.3 shows more results from the Asia Foundation survey. The categories are the same as in Figure 5.12, which shows the results from the Faryab Survey.<sup>15</sup>

Even though the respondents in Faryab are somewhat more positive with regards to the general situation, they are less satisfied on other more specific subjects. When asked how satisfied they are when it comes to different subjects, the respondents in wave 4 are less satisfied than on average in Afghanistan when it comes to the:

- security situation
- availability of education for children
- availability of clinics and hospitals
- ability to move safely
- availability of medicines

On the other hand, the respondents in Faryab are more satisfied when it comes to the supply of electricity.

Again it should be stressed that caution should be exercised when these results are interpreted. This relate to the different timings and variations in the sampling plans (e.g. that the sampling

<sup>15</sup> It is important to notice that the question do not have the exact same wording in the two surveys, although the meaning of the question and the response categories are comparable. Empty columns in the figure show response categories that are not covered in the Asia Foundation survey.



points in wave 4 are in less developed areas) and the fact that these questions do not have the exact same wording in the two surveys. These challenges are also illustrated through preliminary analysis of Faryab parts of the Asia Foundation survey where we observe inconsistencies compared to the results above.




Figure 6.3 Results from the Asia Foundation survey: Present condition of the...?

## 7 Conclusions

The Faryab Survey attempts to measure the population’s perception on their own and Faryab’s situation in general.

The literacy rate in wave 4 is lower than the Afghanistan average. It is also significant lower than the illiteracy rate that we have observed during our three first waves of the survey. This could indicate that, on average, the sampling has been done in less developed areas this time. Also, other questions support this observation.

Overall the perception of what direction things are going in Faryab is divided, even though 53% say that things go in the right direction. However, the trend is heading somewhat downwards.

## **7.1 Security**

The perception of the security situation seems to have a seasonal variation: The respondents are more positive to the security situation in the spring compared to in the fall. But it is also an underlying trend pointing somewhat downwards.

The Afghan National Police is considered as an important security provider and the impression of ANP is good. The impression is also good for the Afghan National Army. However, it is important to know that the Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising their local authorities. And so, the support to the Afghan security forces may therefore be overestimated in the results. Still, there is a negative trend on the impression of both ANP and ANA. In addition, even though the respondents seem to believe the police are improving security and are honest and fair, they also say corruption is a problem amongst police officers.

There is a negative trend on the impression of the international military forces. This trend might be explained by the visibility of ISAF: The respondents that never see ISAF has a worse impression of these. And the visibility has gradually decreased since wave 1.

## **7.2 Development**

Unemployment is clearly stated as the biggest problem in Faryab, and it has been through all waves. In addition, the availability of jobs, in general and especially for women, is the subject which the respondents are most dissatisfied with.

Lack of water is the second biggest problem in Faryab, although significant less compared to unemployment. At the same time, this is the subject the respondents are most satisfied with, despite the fact that the province has suffered a severe drought in 2011. The satisfaction with availability of water has had a positive trend since wave 2.

Only 32% of the respondents say that aid projects (to the benefit of the community) have been implemented in their area in the last year. This is a significant lower proportion compared to wave 1–3.

## **7.3 Government**

The overall perception of the government is good. However, wave 3 and 4 are less positive than wave 1 and 2. When this is combined with the increasing proportion that states that opposing government elements has most influence in their area, this can be seen as a slightly negative trend for the government. The good impression of the government is somewhat contradicted by the fact that corruption amongst the government officials is stated as a problem. The Afghan people may be uncomfortable in criticising the authorities. When it comes to justice and the rule of law, the proportion going to an Afghan state court is stable throughout wave 1–4, but in wave 4 more respondents, than in wave 1–3, would take the dispute both to the Afghan state court and to the local Shura/Jirga.

## **7.4 Women**

Surprisingly, the opinion of the women and men in the survey is fairly similar. The results show a few areas where women are more positive. For instance women are, in general, more positive to ANSF, both towards the Afghan police and the army, and women are, in general, more positive to the situation today compared to a year ago. However, details concerning the interview situation have to be examined further in order to make firm conclusions about the opinion of the women.

## **7.5 Pashtunes**

When comparing the answers for Pashtunes with the answers for Faryab we find that there are some differences. First of all, it is worth mentioning that the living standard for the Pashtunes is worse than that of Faryab in total. The Pashtunes are also much more dissatisfied with their own situation and the development in their area than the overall population in Faryab. The biggest differences are in the areas of electricity, drinking water, security, education and the conditions of the roads.

When it comes to the impression of the government and the ANSF the Pashtunes have a significantly worse impression than the overall population in Faryab have. There are significantly fewer Pashtunes that regards the government to have more influence in their area.

## **7.6 Faryab survey compared to nationwide survey of Afghanistan**

Results in Faryab can be compared to results in Afghanistan as a whole. It is found that nationwide surveys often can over-sample urban areas, and i.e. under-sample the rural areas. This must therefore be a consideration in the comparisons.

The Faryab Survey and the Asia Foundation survey ask the population whether they believe things in respectively Faryab and Afghanistan today are going in the right or wrong direction. On this question the population in Faryab assess' the situation in Faryab somewhat more positively compared to what the population do on Afghanistan.

Even though the respondents in Faryab are somewhat more positive with regards to the general situation, they are more dissatisfied on other more specific subject.

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## Abbreviations

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| ACSOR    | Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research |
| ANA      | Afghan National Army                                  |
| ANP      | Afghan National Police                                |
| ANSF     | Afghan National Security Force                        |
| ANTILOPE | Analysis support to military operations               |
| FFI      | Norwegian Defence Research Establishment              |
| ISAF     | International Security Assistance Force               |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                    |
| NSD      | National Security Directorate                         |
| OGE      | Opposing Government Elements                          |
| PRT      | Provincial Reconstruction Team                        |