Pakistans kjernevåpenprogram

Abstract

Pakistan is believed to have acquired its nuclear force by extensive import, smuggling, espionage and alleged assistance from China. The most important incident is presumed to be the espionage on enrichment centrifuge designs in Western Europe. Pakistan is in possession of functional fission weapons based on uranium, and may have fission weapons based on plutonium and/or boosted fission weapons. Irradiation of litium-6 to tritium has long been possible in the safeguarded research reactor PARR-1. The interest in tritium (which is necessary for boosting) was apparent a long time ago. The enrichment facility in Kahuta is generally thought to produce 80 – 140 kg of weapon-grade uranium per year. In 1998 Pakistan started its first and only non-safeguarded heavy water reactor, Khushab. This makes it possible to produce spent fuel rods with weapon-grade plutonium. Apparently, the reprocessing capacity New Labs is large enough to handle it all. As of the end of 2004, Pakistan is estimated to be in possession of 990 – 1700 kg of weapon-grade uranium and 40 – 80 kg of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 55 – 90 nuclear weapons. Pakistan has a “first use” policy permitting a nuclear response to a conventional attack. This may be explained by the state’s military inferiority to India in conventional war. Pakistan has several means for nuclear delivery that should cover the entire India (the missiles Ghauri II and Shaheen II). In February 2004, it was confirmed that Dr Khan (the “father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb”) admitted to the selling of nuclear weapons related technology to three countries (Iran, North Korea and Libya).