Tribal engagement strategies in the Islamic Emirate of Azawad

Abstract

The Tuareg uprising in northern Mali in 2012 culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Azawad, a proto-state run jointly by Tuareg Islamists in Ansar Dine and foreign jihadists with connections to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ruling over a vast territory where jihadist ideology had little traction, the jihadists had to navigate a complex field of tribal politics to stay in power. This article explores jihadist tribal engagement strategies in Azawad during the occupation of northern Mali (2012–2013) and discusses how the relationships with tribal chiefs and traditional authorities impinged on the state-building efforts. Based on novel primary sources and local media reports, this article shows that the jihadists sought above all to avoid a tribal uprising and, therefore, pursued a relatively lenient policy towards the tribal chiefs. The comparatively weak position of the jihadists gave the chiefs some bargaining power in the new political settlement. However, collaboration with the jihadist rebels increased over time as their territorial control became more consolidated.