dc.contributor.author | Åtland, Kristian | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-04-11T12:16:30Z | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-04-15T11:58:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-04-11T12:16:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-04-15T11:58:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Defense and Security Analysis 2016, 32(2) | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ffi-publikasjoner.archive.knowledgearc.net/handle/20.500.12242/326 | |
dc.description | Åtland, Kristian.
North European security after the Ukraine conflict. Defense and Security Analysis 2016 ;Volum 32.(2) s. 163-176 | en_GB |
dc.description.abstract | Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in
February–March 2014, and the country’s well-documented involvement in the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine, have led to a significant worsening of Russia’s relations with the West. Vladimir Putin’s move to redraw Russia’s southern borders through the use of military force and subversive measures has given rise to an uncertainty that goes well beyond the post-Soviet space. Since 2014, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has had to reassess many aspects of its relationship with Russia. The alliance has also initiated various measures to strengthen the military security of its eastern member states, particularly the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. Further to the North, NATO’s northernmost member – Norway – is following developments in Russia with a heightened sense of awareness. The same goes for non-aligned Sweden and Finland, which are trying to adapt to the emerging, and increasingly complex, security environment in Northern Europe. | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.title | North European security after the Ukraine conflict | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.updated | 2016-04-11T12:16:30Z | |
dc.identifier.cristinID | 1343912 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/14751798.2016.1160484 | |
dc.source.issn | 1475-1801 | |
dc.type.document | Journal article | |